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Tigers, like banks, are kings in their jungle. Both survive because of their strength and both 
cause public fear when they ‘run amok’. Mankind has always wished that it could tame 
tigers - and banks. Whilst banks are essential to an economy, this dissertation considers the 
desire to control the difficulties banks cause. 
Using examples, it looks at the problems to which banks and bankers are prone. The 
traditional problem is of ‘borrowing short and lending long’, but the examples show other 
problems that have arisen, including those that led to the Financial Crisis 2007-2008. It is 
suggested that one cause of the problems of banks is of ‘Financialisation’ and, in 
particular, the demands of shareholders for ‘Return on Equity’.  
The dissertation considers two ways used to control banks. Firstly, it looks at regulation, 
with reference to the example of capital regulation. It outlines how equity capital appears 
on a bank’s balance sheet, reviews the problems of capital regulation and concludes that 
bankers seek to circumvent or change regulations that hinder the aim to maximise profit. 
Secondly, having discussed the limits of regulation, it considers the alternative of changing 
organisational culture to improve the conduct of bankers. The dissertation looks at 
different approaches to such cultural change, but concludes that the pressures to produce 
Return on Equity prevail over exhortations to act ethically. 
The dissertation then considers whether shareholder control could ameliorate the 
problematic conduct of bankers and concludes that shareholders exacerbate the problem. 
Finally, the dissertation introduces the possible use of alternative legal structures, which 
are not subject to demands to provide Return on Equity. The dissertation suggests that such 
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A very large American insurance company, 
which was a played a central role in in the 
Financial Crisis of 2007 -2008 and had to be 
rescued by the US Government  
B.I.S Bank for International 
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CRESC Centre for Research in 
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1. Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 
On 12 December 1912, an old and ailing JP Morgan testified before the Sub-committee of 
the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, (the “Pujo 
Committee”): 
 
“Mr. UNTERMYER: Commercial credits are based upon the possession of money 
or property?  
Mr. MORGAN: What?  
Mr. UNTERMYER: Commercial credits  
Mr. MORGAN: Money or property or character.  
Mr. UNTERMYER: Is not commercial credit based primarily upon money or 
property?  
Mr. MORGAN: No, sir; the first thing is character. 
 Mr. UNTERMYER: Before money or property? 
Mr. MORGAN: Before money or anything else. Money cannot buy it….Because a 
man I do not trust could not get money from me on all the bonds in Christendom."   
(House of Representatives, 1912); (Bruner and Carr, 2009) 
 
 
John Pierpoint Morgan had hitherto been seen as the hero of the 1907 Bankers’ Panic (or 
Knickerbocker crisis).1 However, by 1912 the public had become highly critical of him 
which in turn led to calls for the regulation of banks which were seen to be a trust 
(monopoly) in New York (Bruner, and Carr, 2009). The result of the committee’s 
deliberations was the establishment, for the first time, of a central bank for the United 
States - the Federal Reserve- as well as further anti-trust legislation. 
 
The exchange between Untermyer, counsel for the committee, and the renowned banker 
exemplifies the ongoing debate between those who consider that the problems of banks 
                                              
1 "Knickerbocker crisis" One of the largest casualties of the 1907 New York financial crisis was the 
Knickerbocker Trust Company. JP Morgan died 4 months later (31 March 1913), 9 Months before the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve (Bruner, and Carr, 2009) . (The quotation is the actual one rather than 
the one often paraphrased). 
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should be dealt with by regulation and those who believe that banking is based on 
confidence, ethics and trust. Indeed, as Gillian Tett points out in her book “Fools Gold”, 
the word “credit” is derived from the Latin “credere”, meaning 'to believe' (Tett, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, banking crises continue to be relatively common and this dissertation will 
consider why neither regulation nor morality and ethics have been successful in preventing 
their recurrence. 
1.1 The Importance of Banks 
This dissertation will begin with a consideration of the importance of banks within society 
and the economic system as a whole. It will then consider the ‘problems’ associated with 
banks ever since they came into existence. In fact, they always appear to have been 
problematic2. This dissertation will focus, by way of examples, on the problems arising 
from the Financial Crisis 2007-20083  and subsequent banking ‘scandals’. It will reflect on 
the factors, both those arising from the nature of the business of banking and also from the 
conduct and ethical behaviour of bankers, which have contributed to these problems and 
become more prominent since the growth of financialisation.4 It will analyse the two 
responses which are widely believed to be needed to overcome those problems, namely, 
regulation and the embedding of an ethical business culture within banks. This dissertation 
                                              
2 From Aristotle (Aristotle, c.384BC) (Aristotle, C400 BC) to Karl Marks there has been a continuing debate 
concerning the morality of making money out of money and lending at interest (usury) through Plato 
(Cornford,F, 1945) to St Thomas Aquinas (Akerman, J, 1981); Martin Luther (Lindberg, C, 2003); Adam Smith  
(Laidler, 2 1981) and Karl Marx  (Lapavitsas, 1994,); ( Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
3 The Financial Crisis 2007-2008, also called the Banking Crisis or the Global Financial Crisis (2007-2008), 
started on 9 August 2007 when BNP Paribas froze three of their funds, stating that they were unable to 
value the underlying assets of the funds known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) (see definition note 
25 below). BNP Paribas actions raised concerns about the value of lower quality American mortgage-backed 
securities (subprime mortgages - see note 21 below) and led to a fall in their price. Later that month there 
was a bank run on Northern Rock. The crisis escalated in September 2008, with the collapse of American 
merchant bank, Lehman Brothers, which the US government had refused to bail out. This raised concerns 
about the possible collapse of other banks, with the effect of stagnating financial markets and causing 
financial institutions to liquidate investments. International trade collapsed and borrowing became very 
difficult. Central banks and governments acted to cut interest rates, nationalise failing banks and take on 
bad loan portfolios to return stability to their economies and prevent a bank run (systemic banking crisis - 
see below). Throughout this dissertation this crisis and related events and consequences are referred to as 
the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008" 
4 Financialisation is a term that covers a number of concepts regarding the use of capital. Firstly, it describes 
the situation where financial markets over the recent decades have become more important than the old 
agricultural and industrial economies. Secondly, "Financialisation" is an economic system that tries to 
convert the value of all things, whether tangible, intangible, present or future promises, into a financial 
product or a derivative of a financial instrument. The intent of financialisation was to convert any service or 
product into a tradable instrument, such as money, and therefore to facilitate exchange in such financial 
instruments. Accordingly, governments can engage in deficit spending by financialisation of future promises 
to repay loans e.g. UK Gilts. Individuals can, by means of mortgages or hire purchase, exchange their 
promises for future work and pay for a home, cars or other goods.  See also section 1.3 Financialisation . 
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will, however, suggest that attempts at further regulation or the improvement of ethical 
behaviour  will always come up against a fundamental problem, namely, the desire of the 
shareholders of joint-stock banks5 to achieve maximum profits for their investment, 
otherwise known as ‘Return on Equity’(“RoE”).6 It will consider the suggestion that 
bankers regard ‘regulation’ as an incumberance that  only needs  to be followed by the 
‘letter’. Secondly, it will consider the belief that bankers  use ethics for the purpose  of  
‘window-dressing’. 
 
Few bank shareholders have any concern for their shareholding other than the earnings it 
produces by way of dividends or capital growth (Ireland, 2005). It will be argued that the 
need to provide dividends for shareholders places an overarching pressure on bankers to 
put the generation of profits first. In doing so, regulations and ethical standards become 
obstacles to bankers in maximising return, when the intent of such regulations and ethical 
standards is for the protection of customers, the wider society and the economy overall. 
 
The second chapter of this dissertation will look at the background and reasons for 
regulation, its timing and its limitations. The third chapter will  then consider why 
academic writers who argue that regulation has limitations, suggest that principles of 
ethics, or principles of social science such as Social Anthropology, Education Theory or 
Organisation Theory should be used to address the problems of banks.The limitations of 
both regulation and self-imposed control through ethics or cultural change will be 
examined and it will be suggested that neither approach, whether alone or in combination, 
is likely to be successful. It will be asserted that the reason why neither regulation nor 
cultural change can solve the problems of banks is because of the fundamental need for 
RoE. 
 
This dissertation will conclude by proposing that, in addition to both regulation and self-
imposed ethics, alternative legal structures to those of the joint-stock bank should be 
considered. Such alternative entities would not, by their legal structure, be expected to 
maximise profits for shareholders in joint-stock banks and would not be subject to the 
pressures to make the maximum profit by taking advantage of banking opportunities that 
are technically legal if not ethical. They would provide customers with alternative 
                                              
5 Joint-Stock Bank is a bank which is a public limited company issuing shares that are held by investors. 
6 Definition of "Return on Equity" The ratio of net profit to shareholders' equity (also called book value, 
net assets or net worth), expressed as a percentage, as a measure of how well a company uses 
shareholders' funds to generate a profit. 
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approaches to banking  and would not regard customers as simply ‘profit making 
opportunities’. The hypothesis is that, in doing so, such alternative structures would 
encourage better behaviour  because their aims would not be solely  to maximise profit.  In 
addition, because they would provide effective competition to the joint-stock banks, they 
would raise the level of behaviour of all banks, as ethical behaviour would become the 
norm.  
 
This subject is of significance owing to the fundamental importance of the banking system 
to the economic structure of any modern society. It is the oil that allows economic activity 
to function. It provides essential services including assisting with sales and purchases, 
transfers of money, credit to governments, credit to help smooth cash flows, financing for 
business, loans for house purchase as well as the preparation for retirement and the holding 
of savings (ResPublica, 2014). Indeed, banks have had such an important place in the 
economic system that they predate coinage itself. It was in the temples and royal palaces of 
ancient Mesopotamia that people could find secure places for keeping grain and other 
agricultural produce. Receipts for these products came to be used for transfers not only by 
the depositors but also to others (Davies G, 2002, Chapter 2).  
 
Banks play a critical role in the maintenance and growth of the economy; they borrow 
short and lend long and, in doing so, they allow the real economy to expand and grow (De 
Grauwe, 2008, p. 1). Confirming this role, an article in The Economist on the history of 
financial crises, pointed out the importance of banking and finance when asking the 
rhetorical question, 
 
“What is mankind’s greatest invention? Ask people this question and they are likely 
to pick familiar technologies such as printing or electricity. They are unlikely to 
suggest an innovation that is just as significant: the financial contract. Widely 
disliked and often considered grubby, it has nonetheless played an indispensable 
role in human development for at least 7,000 years” (The Economist, 2014). 
 
Continuing to explain the importance of banking and finance, The Economist explains that 
finance acts as an economic "Time Machine" by assisting savers to move today's surplus 
into the future when it might be required, and the immediate access to funds by borrowers. 
It also assists in insuring against the accidents that befall individuals in society and helps 
investors find the businesses that are most likely to grow so that funds can be injected (The 
Economist, 2014). However, as will be set out in the following section (1.2), one of 
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mankind’s ‘greatest inventions’ has become one of its biggest modern day problems to 
such an extent that there were fears at the advent of the Financial Crisis 2007-2008, that 
such problems would result in the collapse of the world economy. 
1.2 Inherent Problems of Banking 
1.2.1 Borrowing short and lending long – a fundamental problem 
In order to function, banks take deposits, which are returnable to customers at short notice, 
whereas when they lend, it is either by way of a fixed loan or as an overdraft that has to be 
recovered from a customer. Banks are able to lend out money accrued from the deposits 
and, in the knowledge that not all customers would ask for their money back at the same 
time, they can lend the money out numerous times over (Fractional-Reserve Banking).7  
Banks only keep a small amount of cash in reserve. In normal times, there is a continual 
inward and outward flow which the bank anticipates and manages. However, if customers 
lose confidence in the ability of the bank to repay "on demand" or indeed, pay at all, they 
seek to withdraw their cash as soon as possible. This creates a panic (a “bank run”)8 
through a “herd mentality” (Anderson, 2013). The bank may have enough good loans to 
cover the savings of the depositors, but it does not have the cash to pay depositors  who are 
all demanding their money at the same time. In such a case, the bank exhausts its initial 
reserves and has insufficient funds to meet customer demands, and, as the fear of a bank 
default increases, so does the customers’ desire to withdraw their cash. The bank reaches 
the point where it faces a sudden default known as a ‘Liquidity Problem’. As one bank 
faces collapse, customers in other banks may also lose confidence. This is known as  
“Contagion”9  and there becomes a fear of a systemic10 banking crisis (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008) where all of a country's banks are under threat, because all customers start 
to withdraw their money from all banks. This results in an economic recession as 
businesses are unable to obtain capital from banks that are trying to recover loans in order 
to repay customers. Indeed, such runs on banks were given as the primary cause of the 
Great Depression11 in the United States (1930-1939) (Bernanke, 1983, p. 257). 
 
                                              
7 Fractional Reserve Banking is a system of banking where only a small amount of the sums lent are 
backed by cash in the bank available for withdrawal. 
8  A bank run is usually triggered by customer worries that a bank may be in financial difficulties and results 
in an exceptionally high number of withdrawals by bank depositors. It is also known as a "run on a bank". 
9 "Contagion" : When economic or financial problems spread from one country to another. (The Economist, 
2014) (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2011 at page 14) 
10 Definition of Systemic: "affecting the whole system or relating to a whole system."  
11 Great Depression - see note 18 below 
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In addition to a bank run, where concerns about a bank’s ability to repay become a self-
fulfilling prophecy, problems can arise from its use of gearing/leverage,12  the use of its 
money and the quality of the loans it makes. This is a known as a Solvency Problem and 
occurs either where a bank makes unwise loans and the borrower defaults or where the 
bank, in effect, borrows money from its own customers in order to trade (deal) on its own 
behalf. The leveraged/gearing increases the return from its transactions but is also a risk, an 
example being Baring Bros and Nick Leeson.13 
 
In an attempt to prevent the use of depositors’ monies for speculative trading, the USA 
passed the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated the investment/speculative arm of a bank 
from its retail/borrowing arm after the 1929 crash. However, that Act was abolished in the 
late 1990s allowing retail and investment banks to combine again (Wray, 2015); (Wray, 
2009); (FSA, 2009). 
 
1.2.2 The Financial Crisis 2007-2008: the banking problem that affected the world. 
It is now a decade since the Financial Crisis of 2007-200814 started to unfold with the BNP 
Paribas preventing withdrawals from three hedge funds, citing liquidity problems, in 
August 2007. This was followed by a bank run15 on Northern Rock16 at the end of August 
2007, and was in fact the first UK bank run since the collapse of Overend, Gurney & 
Company 17 in 1866  (Sowerbutts & Schneebalg, 2016, p. 95). 
 
                                              
12 Leverage: see footnote 90. 
13 Barings Bank:  A merchant bank founded in 1762, and considered as one of the most  reputable and 
stable banks in the world., Barings collapsed in 1995 when "rogue trader, Nick Leeson, became involved in 
unauthorised speculation of derivatives at its office in Singapore and they were unable to meet their cash 
requirements. (Cassis, 2013) (Tickell, 1999) 
14 Enron Scandal (2001): Enron was a Texas commodities energy and service company. It grew over 15 
years, to be America's seventh largest Corporation. It had issues about its profits and stands accused of 
many unethical dealings, including concealing debts from the company's balance sheet. 
15 WorldCom Scandal (2002): WorldCom was a telecommunications company. Costs were underreported by 
capitalising them and false accounting entries were used. It Inflated its assets by about $11 billion leading to 
$180 billion losses for investors. 
 
16 The demise of Northern Rock was the harbinger of the Financial Crisis 2007-2008. The unfolding collapse 
was described in The Crunch (Brummer, 2008). 
17 Overend, Gurney and Company was established in 1800 and became a well-respected wholesale bank 
specialising in discounting bills of exchange. They became known as the bankers banker. It was run from 
1807 until his retirement in 1856 by Samuel Gurney whose family had a well-established bank in Norfolk. 
After Samuel Gurney's death its business model changed and it took on long-term debt and invested in 
railways. A loss of confidence ultimately caused a bank run. The Bank of England, a private bank at the time 




Just as the Great Depression18 had followed the banking runs and collapses of 1930 
(Bernanke, 1983), so the bank runs on Northern Rock and collapses of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers in 2007-2008, led to the "Great Recession"19  in the United States, 
recession and austerity in the United Kingdom (De Grauwe, 2008 ) and the problems of the 
Euro "European Sovereign Debt Crisis"20 from 2009 onwards (The Economist, 2014); 
(Tett, 2010). 
  
The sequence of events that led to the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 can be found in the 
expansion of the United States housing market through sub-prime lending21  to poorer 
Americans to help them buy (or remortgage) their homes. These loans were indirectly 
guaranteed by the US government and were bundled and sold as new financial products 
called “mortgage-backed securities",22 which were then packaged as investments and sold 
as low risk securities. It became common for house owners to remortgage their homes 
which had increased in value, in order to refinance existing consumer credit debt. 
However, often the lending criteria to those whose incomes had not increased were 
unsatisfactory (Tetlow and Smith, 2016). This situation led to high failure rates by 
borrowers which affected the value of the financial products. Eventually when, with 
increasing borrower default, the value and quality of the mortgage-backed securities fell 
into question, the liquidity of the banks was affected not only in the United States but in 
other countries that had similarly invested heavily in such securities (The Economist, 
2014); (Tett, 2010). Thus, unlike in the 1930s, the modern global economy and 
interrelationships between banks made the liquidity problem a global one, rather than a 
                                              
18 The Great Depression lasted from 1929 to 1934. It was a period during which economic activity was very 
depressed and unemployment in Europe and the United States was very high.  
19 The Great Recession followed the Global Banking Crisis in 2007.  There was a severe decline in economic 
activity, widely accepted as the greatest fall in economic activity since the Great Depression. The term 
Great Recession applies to both the American recession, officially lasting from December 2007 to June 
2009, and the global recession in 2009, which followed it. 
20 European Sovereign Debt Crisis: The introduction of the Euro in certain member countries of the 
European Union was accompanied by an agreement that each of the member countries would keep their 
sovereign debt levels below 60% of their GDP.  There were concerns about whether a number of those 
countries that were part of the Euro zone would be able to service their national debt obligations in 2010. 
This led to substantially increased yields on the national debt issued by these Eurozone countries. The EU 
with the European Central Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) created a rescue package of 
some 750 billion to assist. 
21  Subprime Loan/mortgage:  A loan that is made at a higher interest rate than most other loans. 
Subprime loans are made to borrowers who do not qualify for ordinary loans because of bad credit history 
or some other reason. There is a higher risk of default on subprime loans. (Farlex Financial Dictionary, n.d.) 




crisis affecting a single region or state, as the mortgage-backed securities11 were traded 
internationally between banks.23 
 
 
The effects of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and insurers AIG in the 
United States and Northern Rock, Royal Bank of Scotland and other banks in the UK had a 
pivotal role in subsequent economic problems. Whilst there was already a slowing down in 
incomes in the United States and United Kingdom in the period before 2007 (Carney, 
2016); (Woolf, 2010), the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 and consequent recession exposed 
income inequality. It could be argued that this is one factor that contributed to the election 
of the ‘populist’ President of the United States and the Brexit referendum in the United 
Kingdom. For example, an article "Squeezed Midwest vs squeezed Midlands: How US and 
UK incomes Compare" in the Financial Times, commented that there had been a popular 
revolt which could be seen in the rise of "populist" parties on the right and left. More and 
more electors believed that the existing system did not support them, and that globalisation 
gave privileges only to the few (Tetlow and Smith, 2016). A very similar observation was 
made in an article in the Guardian  (Elliott, 2016). This is further examined in the section 
on Financialisation below.24 
 
The Financial Crisis 2007 exemplified both the  liquidity  problem of banks (Northern 
Rock ) and  the solvency  problems of many banks  starting with  Lehman Brothers and the 
problems affecting banks arising from unwise lending and  in particular, from CDOs,25.  
However,  there have been a series of scandals affecting banks arising not just from the 
traditionally regarded liquidity or solvency problems of banks, but, as will be seen in the 
                                              
23 Details of the unfolding Financial Crisis 2007-2008, can be found in the number of official reports. The 
Bischoff Report (Bischoff, 2009)(O'Grady, 2009)was a City sponsored report which was criticised by several 
academic writers. (Froud & Moran, 2010) (Froud, 2010) (Glynos , Klimecki & Willmott, 2012) (CRESC, 
2009)The UK Governments response was in the Vickers Report (Independent Commission on Banking, 
2011) and the UK Government Response ( (HM Government, 2011)The Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards produced 5 reports, the final one being Changing Banking for Good. (Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking, 2013)and UK Government Response (HM Government, 2013).                                 
Return on Equity could bring in it is used in calculating remuneration (at page 9) and because of the 
reluctance of banks to accept capital adequacy restrictions, because they diluted return on equity (Para 40 
at page 22) 
 ( Parliamentary Commission on Banking, 2013) (Parker, 2013)The Turner Review (FSA, 2009) (Pratley, 
2009)In addition there were official American reports: the US government Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission (Angelides Commission) (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission (United States), 2011) and a US 
Senate report (Levin-Coburn US Senate, 2011). 
24 Section 1.3 Financialisation  
25 CDO: (Collateralised Debt Obligation) a derivative which can be bought and sold and is tradeable. 
Capital payments arise from a collection of different financial contracts paying interest and whose capital 
will ultimately be repaid. CDO's are "collateralised" as it is the promise of the repayment of capital that 
gives the CDO is their value. 
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next section, those related to the personal conduct of bankers and financial intermediaries 
of which examples are provided in the next section. However, it should be borne in mind 
that these are examples rather than a complete catalogue. 
 
1.2.3 Some Examples of Scandals that have affected Banks 
In addition to the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 being of global proportions, it also 
revealed other problems affecting individuals and groups, in particular  bad behaviour or 
unethical conduct on the part of banks and bankers. This ranged  from the excesses of 
investment bankers  (Tett, 2010), to the selling of sub-prime mortgages to borrowers who 
could not afford such mortgages by financial intermediaries who then falsified the 
paperwork on behalf of the borrowers, and of lenders who did not give due consideration 
to those mortgage applications  (The Economist, 2013). Some of the examples arose during 
the Financial Crisis 2007 - 2008, while others, despite the focus on banker behaviour 
which the Crisis  generated, only came to light  after the crisis. 
 
The first example is that of the Abacus Bond.26 The creator, Goldman Sachs, did not 
disclose in its marketing materials that the underlying assets were selected by a third party 
who in turn used another party, a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co. Inc. ("Paulson”) to 
select those underlying assets. Paulson had interests contrary to those of the investors in 
Abacus, because it shorted (that is, bet against) the Abacus portfolio by entering into credit 
default swaps ("CDS").27 This meant it had an interest in the portfolio it was selecting for 
Abacus underperforming. Accordingly, Goldman Sachs was benefiting through the credit 
default swaps at the same time as it was profiting from the arrangement of Paulson when 
acting against the interests of the Abacus bondholders (Hill, 2012, p. 678). 
 
A second example relates to Citigroup. Citigroup marketed and sold a mortgage-related 
CDO as being of high rated quality/standard. In fact, the CDO was not at all of high quality 
and Citibank then took a short position (i.e. bet against it). The bank made a profit of $160 
million, while investors lost (Hill, 2012, p. 679).  
 
                                              
26 The Abacus Bond is an example of a CDO (collateralised debt obligation), which is a derivative that can be 
bought and sold, is tradeable and whose capital will ultimately be repaid. CDO's are "collateralised" as it is 
the promise of the payment of capital that gives the CDO its value. 
27  Credit Default Swap (CDS):  In a Credit Default Swap, party 1 agrees to provide protection to party 2 in 
case a corporate bond or national debt is unpaid. Usually party 2 pays an annual sum to party 1 in return for 
the guarantee of compensation if the bond defaults. 
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A third example involved Lehman Brothers, which developed and used a transaction 
structure called “Repo 105”.28 Lehman Brothers had recorded repurchase transactions as 
asset sales, thereby giving it a far more favourable debt ratio than was actually the case. An 
examination found that no reason, other than a cosmetic one to improve its debt ratio, 
could be given for this procedure. The advantage for Lehman Brothers for so doing was to 
improve its balance sheet, which avoided its credit status being downgraded by the credit 
rating agencies and enabled it to make further loans and increase profits. 
  
A fourth example is that of the involvement of JP Morgan Securities in arranging a 
transaction for Jefferson County. When the county was forced into bankruptcy, it was 
discovered that one of the important contributions to that bankruptcy was a ‘swap’ 
transaction27 arranged by JP Morgan Securities. The bank had bribed local officials and 
had received ‘enormous"’ fees for arranging the credit default swap transaction for 
Jefferson County compared to comparable transactions. Not only was the bribery of local 
officials illegal, but the bank benefitted whilst knowing that the residents of the county 
would be prejudiced; the fees that were charged were far too great and were an 
unreasonable burden on the local taxpayers. (Hill, 2009-2010; Hill & Painter, 2015 
Chapter 1). 
 
However, the problems of banks did not start with the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. A 
fifth example is from an earlier period, the Savings and Loan Scandal of the 1980s.29 In 
this case the loans were made to connected individuals and their friends and business 
network. It involved making excessive or fraudulent valuations of property to allow larger 
loans. This created larger asset values on the balance sheet and the ability to make more 
loans as well as declare larger dividends. In addition, the directors and managers engaged 
in extravagant expenditure and entertainment (Chavez, 2002, p. 21).  
 
A sixth example is that of Goldman Sachs assisting the Greek government to obfuscate its 
debt and borrowing to enable it to meet the criteria to become one of the founding 
members of the Euro. It did so by buying Greek debt in other currencies using an 
imaginary exchange rate. The result was that Greece met the convergence requirements of 
                                              
28 "Repo: A "repo" is a repurchase agreement. It is a type of short-term loan. The seller of a money market 
security agrees to buy it back at a specific time and price. The interest rate paid by the seller is known as the 
"repo rate". 
29 The Savings and Loan provided were amongst the safest sources of mortgages for homes in the United 
States. In 1989 more than 1000 S&Ls collapsed, perhaps, the most significant banking industry crisis since 
the Great Depression.  
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debt, so allowing it to join the Euro. It also allowed Greece to continue borrowing and 
ultimately contributed to the Greek Debt Crisis. Although the Euro has other problems, the 
effect of the Greek Debt Crisis has been significant on the European Union as well as the 
Euro itself. Indeed, the problems of the Greek economy as part of the Eurozone featured in 
the UK referendum campaign. Therefore, the effect of the Goldman Sachs manipulation on 
behalf of the Greek government has had very significant effects on the European Union 
and, indirectly, on the United Kingdom30 (Hill & Painter, 2015 Chapter 1). 
 
A seventh example is the ‘PPI Scandal’. For 15 years before 2011, loans and credit card 
repayments were often sold with an insurance product, PPI (Payment Protection 
Insurance), to cover the consumer of the financial burden if the borrower died, was ill or 
disabled. In principle, there was nothing wrong with PPI policies, as borrowers may have 
wanted insurance when taking out a large loan or mortgage, but for years before 2011, 
millions of people were mis-sold PPI, often at high rates of interest, without a proper 
understanding that it was being added to their repayments.  Between 2005 and 2017 The 
FSA fined banks £157 million and £27billion has been repaid by Banks in compensation to 
consumers (FCA, 2017). 
 
A final, but more recent, example of the problems of banks is that of the LIBOR31 
‘scandal’. LIBOR was first developed in May 1970 to facilitate loan transactions. The 
problem that affected LIBOR arose from its manipulation.32  This was caused by  a 
“culture of impunity in many parts of the market, coloured by a perception that misconduct 
will either go unpunished or undetected.” FEMR Report,33 (HM Treasury, Bank of 
England, FCA, 2015).34 
                                              
30 With global financial markets still reeling, Greece announced in October 2009 that it had been 
understating its deficit figures for years, raising alarms about the soundness of Greek finances (New York 
Times, 2016). 
31 LIBOR: London Inter-Bank Offered Rate. It is the average cost of borrowing by banks, and is calculated 
on a daily basis. Official LIBOR is the average of those rates and is used as a base to price many loans and 
financial products worldwide. It is calculated on the basis of submissions by 16 banks submitting the costs 
of their borrowings. The bottom four and top four rates are ignored, and an average is taken of the rest. 
Accordingly, LIBOR is the average of 8 submissions (The Daily Telegraph, 2015). 
LIBOR impacts on the markets in three ways; firstly, it is regarded as a measure of the creditworthiness of 
banks and therefore effects pricing of the shares.  Secondly, it acts as the basis for calculating the interest 
rate for LIBOR linked investments and lending and thirdly, it is used in the calculation of costs relating to 
futures and swap (interest rate) markets. (Luna II, 2014). 
32 Manipulation was not difficult because the LIBOR submissions were predictable. In cooperation with 
other contacts in other banks traders could enter figures that affected the submissions, and so over short 
periods the LIBOR rate could be moved and as a result profits made for those traders. 
33 Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR) 
34 The LIBOR scandal resulted in three Official reports: The UK Treasurys Wheatley Report, which 




1.2.4 How the press and public react to the problems of banks and how it makes 
matters worse. 
The difficulties that have caused banking crises and the strategies used to overcome them 
are classic problems of Liquidity and Solvency which have been discussed, debated and 
reported on throughout the existence of banks (Davies G, 2002). The scandals and 
problems that have affected banks have brought calls from both public and politicians to 
ensure “it doesn’t happen again”. For example, The Overend, Gurney collapse in 1866 35 
was not only followed by emergency measures; it resulted in Walter Bagehot (the then 
editor of The Economist) writing a treatise supporting the Bank of England’s actions in 
becoming the ‘lender of last resort’ and suggesting that it should continue to do so  
(Sowerbutts & Schneebalg, 2016). The panic that affected the New York banks in 1907 
was followed by a call by US congressman, Charles Lindbergh, for a full investigation into 
Bankers’ Trusts (monopolies) and the Pujo36 Committee which led to a US constitutional 
amendment and the establishment of the Federal Reserve37 ("the Fed"), (Bruner, and Carr, 
2009). 
Similarly, the 1930 banking crisis in United States was followed by the Banking and 
Currency Committee of the United States Senate and the Pecora report between 1933 and 
1934, and was in turn followed by the Glass-Steagall Act38 which separated deposit 
taking/high-street banks from commercial or merchant banks (Pecora, 1939).39  
 
A similar reaction occurred in relation to the 2007-2008 banking crisis. In 2009 Janet 
Yellen, then President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and, 
currently President of the Federal Reserve Board, referring to the 2007-2008 Banking 
Crisis, said, 
                                              
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Report (PCBS)  ( Parliamentary Commission on Banking, 
2013)34 and The Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR) (HM Treasury, Bank of England, FCA, 2015) which 
aimed at restoring confidence in the LIBOR and other financial markets. 
35 see above (Sowerbutts and Schneebalg , 2016). 
36 the Pujo Committee - named after its Chair, congressman Arsène Pujo of Louisiana. 
37 Unlike European countries at that time the United States did not have a Central Bank. 
38 the Glass-Steagall Act is otherwise known as the Banking Act of 1933 (USA) (Pub.L. 7366, 48 Stat. 162), 
enacted June 16, 1933. 
39  However the change between the Knickerbocker Crisis, the Wall Street Crash and the Financial Crisis  




"A clear lesson of history is that a 'sine qua non' 40 for sustained economic recovery 
following a financial crisis is a thorough going repair of the financial system" 
(Yelland, 2009). 
 
The Economist, in a special article reviewing banking crises over the past 200 years, 
reflected: 
 
“The response to a crisis follows a familiar pattern. It starts with blame. New parts 
of the financial system are vilified: a new type of bank, investor or asset is 
identified as the culprit and is then banned or regulated out of existence. It ends by 
entrenching public backing for private markets: other parts of finance deemed 
essential are given more state support. It is an approach that seems sensible and 
reassuring.” (The Economist, 2014).41 
 
The Economist continued by suggesting that a former editor, Walter Bagehot, 1860 to 
1877, had argued that financial crises occurred following the flood of "blind capital" from 
the public into unwise and speculative investments. The reaction to this (regulation) has, in 
the view of The Economist, made the problem worse (op.cit, 2014). It will be suggested in 
this dissertation that the implication of these comments is that there is a “knee-jerk” 
reaction whenever there is a banking crisis. However, the result is regulation that 
retrospectively looks back to the crisis that has just happened rather than towards future 
crises.42 Regulation can only be based on what is known at the current time rather than 
what may happen in future, as “what may happen” is never known before it happens. 
 
Whilst the Economist might write from a liberal (or, even, neoliberal) capitalist point of 
view, other authors have recognised the pattern, but have attributed the blame to the 
bankers and financiers who they suggest have an intention to avoid unwelcome reform 
(Glynos, Klimecki & Willmott, 2012); (Froud, 2011). The suggestion is that legislators, 
bending towards public opinion and wanting to be seen to be taking action, have increased 
investor protection following every banking crisis. However, this has served as the seed of 
the next crisis, because it has given the banks a degree of protection that is not afforded to 
                                              
40 sine qua non a necessary condition without which something is not possible (Cambridge University 
Press, n.d.). 
41 This comment in the Economist can be compared with the article on "Cooling out the Marks" (Glynos , 
Klimecki & Willmott, 2012). 
42 This view is supported by John Lanchester in Whoops! Why everybody owes everyone, and no one can 
pay  (Lanchester, 2010). 
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other private-sector companies. The-too-big-to-fail-problem43, for instance, means that 
government are under political pressure to intervene to ensure that banks can fulfil their 
obligations to their depositors, whilst at the same time protecting bankers who have no 
personal liability (Williams and Conley, 2014). 
 
After each banking crisis, those who sought to prevent future banking crises suggested 
regulatory reform. For example, the suggestions of the lender of last resort of Overend, 
Gurney in 1866, the establishment of the Federal Reserve after 1907, the Glass-Steagall 
Act after 1929, the Enron44 Scandal (BBC News, 22 August, 2002); (Hill, 2012, p. 691) 
and WorldCom45 scandals, led to increased reporting regulations in the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act 2002. The banking crisis of 2007-2008 resulted in the Dodd-Frank (Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010) in the United States; in the UK Banking 
(Special Provisions) Act 2008, for the nationalisation of Northern Rock and the Banking 
Act 2009, which provided for a special insolvency regime for banks, envisaging that banks 
could be taken over by the government in the event of failure. 
 
However, whilst the problems of banking crises and the regulation of banks have long 
drawn public and government attention, academic thought has also looked at the problems 
from perspectives other than a purely regulatory one. In fact, the issue of culture and ethics 
in banking has received considerable critical attention, particularly in the last twenty years. 
The interest appears to have coincided with the importance and growth of 
financialisation.46  In effect, generation of profit by use of capital has become more 
important than by generation through industry or agriculture. Whilst this way of generating 
                                              
43 A company that is "Too big to fail" is one that is so large that a government feels obliged to act to prevent 
its failure, for fear that if it does not do so there will be systemic effects throughout the economy. In the 
case of a major national company, if it fails, then smaller companies that may be its suppliers will also fail 
and jobs will be lost. The political and economic cost of a bailout is calculated to be less than the cost of the 
failure to the economy; a government may consider that solution. In the case of a bank not only will there 
be losses to individual depositors, who have invested believing the bank to be safe, there is the fear of 
contagion (runs on other banks). This is a frequently discussed problem: for example  Kay, (2015 at location 
1372 Kindle edition); (OBRIEN, 2012, p. 244); (Carney, 2014, p. 3); ( (Minner, 2016, p. 23); (Bischoff, 2009, 
p. 46). 
44 Enron: see footnote 14. Enron were not a bank, but many of the activities were similar and Enron's 
bankers were instrumental in the misrepresentation that assisted them to fool the rating agencies, the 
investing public and markets into thinking that they had less debt and more income and cash flow than it 
actually did (Hill, 2012); (BBC News, 22 August, 2002); (Johnson, 2003). 
45 WorldCom: WorldCom were a telecommunications company. The Chief Executive failed to report costs 
but capitalised them rather than placing them as expenses of the business as well as increasing income with 
false accounting entries. The result was that assets were inflated by $11 billion and losses of $180 billion to 
its investors (Blackburn, 2008). 
46 Financialisation -see footnote 4 above and section  1.3 Financialisation .  
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profit has always existed, financialisation has become significantly more important since 
the 1970s (Ireland, 2010, p. 18);  (Krippner, 2005, p. 82). 
 
Subsequently, an increase in alternatives or enhancements to regulation has been the 
subject of much recent research with the recognition of the limitations of current attempts 
to regulate the industry. Those who wanted more regulation were looking to the problems 
of the most recent banking crisis. However, banks sought to overturn regulations which 
they considered inconvenient for their purposes (Kay, 2015); (New Economics Foundation, 
2011, p.10).47 As De Grauwe observed, bankers, over the period of the growth of 
financialisation48 (1975 onwards) were becoming increasingly less regulated and 
eventually the Glass-Steagall Act was repealed in 1999.  The effect was that retail banks, 
which took in customer savings and lent them out to borrowers, henceforth were able to 
pass them to "commercial divisions". Merchant Bank subsidiaries could now use such 
monies for far riskier activities such as underwriting the offer of shares and trading on their 
own account. This coincided with the development of new financial products such as 
derivatives49 and structured products. De Grauwe argued that all of the activities that had 
led to the 1929 Wall Street crash had been reinstated and the lessons of history had not 
been learnt (De Grauwe, 2008, p. 2).  There was also evidence of excessive risk-taking 
which contributed to the banking crisis of 2007-2008 (Cohn, 2012); (Cohn, Fehr and 
Marchal, 2015). It was suggested that "time inconsistent preferences" resulted in a trade-
off by bankers between short-term reward and long-term achievement. These are 
psychological issues which may have contributed to corporate crime, but certainly led to 
unnecessary risk-taking, even though those risks may not have been sufficient to be 
deemed criminal in nature (Painter, 2012-2013). A view was taken that the aim was 
maximising profit and that the law did not provide  
sufficiently rigorous processes for decision making (Fichter, 2016). Moreover, 
occasionally behaviour was simply unethical or dishonest  (Hill, 2012). 
                                              
47  One of the speakers at the Good Banking conference, Will Hutton, was mentioned in the report as saying 
"Banks ran down the capital at the core of their balance sheets, not replenishing and adding to it  but 
paying it out in dividends and bonuses. If they had paid out just 20 per cent less, calculates the Bank of 
England, between 2000 and 2007 they would have reserved more than the state paid out (New Economics 
Foundation, 2011, p. 7). 
48 See section 1.3 Financialisation . 
49  Derivatives: derivatives are a financial investment with a value based on the performance of underlying 
assets (e.g. property, shares, bonds or currency). The main types of derivatives are swaps, financial futures 
and financial options.  
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Furthermore, following the banking crisis of 2007-200950 other banking scandals 
continued to emerge despite the profound effect of the 2008 banking crash. The fixing of 
the LIBOR (London Interbank Lending Rate),51 Foreign Currency Forward Price-Fixing52 
without the customers’ knowledge and to the customers’ disadvantage; and money 
laundering to assist criminals, drug dealers and corrupt individuals were such cases (Hill, 
2012, pp. 678-686).  
1.3 Financialisation and Return on Equity (“RoE”) 
The trend towards financialisation has also increased the traditional banking problems of 
liquidity and solvency.53 This has not only exacerbated the problems of banks by creating 
the conditions for banking crises, but has also increased the importance of RoE which in 
turn has undermined the attempts at regulation and change of culture to deal with banking 
problems. Given the importance that RoE has in this dissertation, as being the main issue 
overshadowing any attempts to regulate changes in regulation or banking culture, the 
concepts of financialisation and RoE are now considered in a more detail. 
 
The traditional view of finance and banking is that they are the lubricant that makes all 
economies work. Historically, economic development depended on the expansion of 
production in agriculture and industry and there have always been recessions as part of a 
business cycle.54 However, it has been suggested that extremes in booms and recessions 
will become more severe as they are ‘Financialisation Recessions’ that is, recessions 
resulting from crises in the financial system and banking in particular (Bogle, 2005). These 
increase the high and low points in the business cycle, because, unlike the product of 
manufacturing - which is transferred into stock or agricultural produce - financial products 
                                              
50 banking crisis see footnote 3 above. 
51 The LIBOR scandal resulted in three formal reports. The Wheatley Report considered the problems arising 
from LIBOR and other financial benchmarks required a wider policy response (Wheatley, 2012). The 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Report (PCBS), ( Parliamentary Commission on Banking, 
2013)51. The third (tripartite) report was the Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR), (HM Treasury, Bank 
of England, FCA, 2015) aimed at restoring confidence in the LIBOR and other financial markets. All these 
reports made proposals for further regulation, but attracted concerns that sanctions will condemn the 
bad, but not necessarily develop the good (Hardowar, 2017) and would concentrate the participants on 
compliance rather than best practice. In addition, concerns were expressed as to how long it would take for 
traders and bankers to find new ways to manipulate rates. (Hardowar, 2017). 
52 Foreign currency forward price-fixing was a way in which traders could affect the market price by 
submitting a rush of orders at the last moment before the market closed.  Traders can affect market prices 
by submitting a rush of orders during the window when the fix is set. They could give an obscured view of 
supply and demand and so change the market price (BBC News, 20 May 2015). 
53 Financialisation: see footnote 4 above and section 1.3 Financialisation . 
54 Business Cycle, also known as the economic cycle: the period of time during which an economy 
moves from a state of expansion to a state of contraction, before expanding again (F.T. Lexicon, n.d.). 
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are intangible55 and are only valued on the basis of other illusory products. For example, a 
diamond is a carbon crystal, which can now be created through a manufacturing process 
for use in industry. Its value as a jewel is only based on how much someone wishes to own 
‘a diamond’. Similarly, the value of some identically constructed houses can differ greatly 
depending on the locality in which they are situated. If the attractiveness of a 
neighbourhood increases, the value of properties in that neighbourhood rises. The 
neighbourhood may have changed little, but public opinion has given it increased value. 
For example, Notting Hill was considered as a downmarket bedsit area in the 1950s and is 
now one of the most expensive areas in London. In a similar way, in a systemic56 financial 
crisis, trust is lost in the worth of deposits at banks or other financial assets, as their value 
is based on the trust that is instilled in them by depositors or investors who previously 
believed that they could redeem those assets on demand. 
 
The concept of "Financialisation" (‘financialization' USA) has been used by academics 57 
in recent years to interpret the way that industrial and agricultural society is being replaced 
by one that is based on finance, which in turn appears to be autonomous of other industries 
and has even resulted in an imbalance of democracy in individual countries (Froud, 2011). 
Finance, instead of being a way of providing capital to support industry and agriculture has 
become an end in itself and shareholder value (RoE) has become the key driver of growth 
through financialisation within major economies (Ewald, 2011, p. 108). 
 
Although academic literature on financialisation is extensive and diverse, three main 
strands can be identified.  
 
1.3.1 Return on Equity (“RoE”) 
The most important feature of financialisation under consideration for this dissertation is 
RoE which arises from the legal construction of the modern company characterised by 
favouring shareholders over other stakeholders in a company, such as employees or 
customers. The effect of RoE is not just to benefit shareholders, but also explains the 
eagerness for corporate takeovers and restructuring as well as executive remuneration 
                                              
55 Money could, itself, be described as illusory and not just intangible. It is a creation of the human mind, 
imagination which is shared with humans, which has made humans unique from other animals. (Mithin, 
2001). A banknote is only a worthless piece of paper until a common imagination gives it value. 
 
57 The concept of financialisation was introduced discussed in the Financialization of the American 
Economy (Krippner, 2005) and in Financialisation and the World Economy (Epstein, 2005) and Banking 
in the public interest: Progressive reform of the financial sector (Sikka , 2014). An American academic writer 
David Kotz also saw the Banking Crisis 2007-2008 as a crisis of neoliberalism (Kotz, 2008) (Kotz, 2009). 
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schemes that are based on profits and options on shares. As such financial constructs 
increase the RoE available to shareholders. The importance of RoE is seen as a 
consequence of the divide between the owner-manager and the investor ("rentier"), who 
has no attachment to the company other than the profit that can be extracted from it 
(Ireland, 2010).  Whereas prior to financialisation, industrial corporations would prioritise 
reinvestment of profits into production, post-financialisation, such companies are inclined 
to distribute profits to shareholders either by dividends or by repurchase of shares. It is also 
suggested that RoE has not only been to the detriment of wages, but also that restructuring 
has resulted in unemployment (Lazonick, 2000); (Blackburn, 2008). 
 
If RoE is calculated as profit divided by equity capital, then an increase in the equity 
capital will adversely affect the RoE. If equity capital were, say, 100 million and profits 10 
million, then the RoE is 10÷100 = 0.1 but if the capital is increased to 200 million the RoE 
is 10÷200= 0.05 amounting to half the return (Elliott, 2010). Accordingly, in order to 
increase profits banks would have to increase charges and interest rates. Alternatively, 
there appears to be evidence that when faced with a requirement to increase capital there is 
a preference by banks to reduce lending, which allows them to meet the capital regulations, 
but without raising further capital (Aiyar et al. 2013); (Ratnovski,2013).58 This would 
affect the supply of credit/loans available and may have an adverse effect on the economy. 
Accordingly, it was in the bank’s interest to show success in achieving capital adequacy by 
reducing its equity capital (Kay, 2009). 
 
1.3.2 The Growth of Credit 
The second strand of financialisation focuses on the disconnection between rising wages 
and rising industrial productivity which began in the 1960s. The connection between 
wages and productivity has been replaced by a growing flexibility in employment markets 
and the growth of credit, which has enabled consumption when there was no growth in real 
earnings and which may be diverted to paying returns to shareholders instead of 
employees. In addition, not only have manufacturing companies expanded into the 
financial sector (for example, GE Finance (General Electric) or GMAC Finance (General 
Motors), but such manufacturing companies have also had to pay more to financial 
companies through interest and dividends, thus reducing their capital available for 
investment in manufacturing (Krippner, 2005).  Further, those who follow the 
"accumulation" view of financialisation suggest that the reliance on consumption fuelled 
                                              
58 See Chapter 3 below. 
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by consumer credit and rising house values enabled by mortgage credit, were by their 
nature unstable because they were based on continuing confidence in intangibles, which, in 
turn, leads to individual debt and housing asset bubbles. This inevitably caused the boom 
that led to the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 (Blackburn, 2008). 
 
1.3.3 Growth in Financial Products 
The third strand of the financialisation literature focuses on the financial products that have 
been introduced into the lives of people in all Western societies. Studies have suggested 
that this has occurred through an expansion of consumer credit, mortgage lending and a 
range of other financial products (van der Zwan, 2014). In addition, there has been a 
considerable change in attitudes to credit. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s people who 
used credit or hire purchase to acquire goods and services were frowned upon by others as 
buying on the “never-never.”59 In addition, pensions that were formerly funded by 
company employers or the state are now increasingly based on accumulated financial 
capital; for example, the replacement of Final Salary schemes which relied upon the 
company providing pensions rather than with Money Purchase schemes, where the 
employee invests in his/her own pension. The state has been a participant in such a 
transition by making reductions in state welfare provision in favour of schemes which are 
financially based, for example, student loans.  This shift to individual responsibility has led 
to a number of consequences. Whilst some individuals have become stock market 
investors, most have restricted themselves to increasing personal wealth by maximising the 
increase in value of their own homes by obtaining the largest mortgage their salaries would 
allow or by becoming 'Right to Buy' investors. Unfortunately, most individuals do not have 
sufficient financial expertise to make informed financial judgements and if they have 
limited income or capital they are exposed to over borrowing and risk.60 An example of 
this is when many who acquired shares in the demutualised building societies, but did not 
sell them, lost out when those building societies, as banks, collapsed in the Financial Crisis 
                                              
59  The never-never was a colloquial name for hire purchase. This was a system of making an initial part 
payment for an item and then making regular small payments until the debt is paid and the item becomes 
that of the borrower. 
60 Joe Kennedy, a prominent American entrepreneur, is reported to have said - explaining why he withdrew 
his money from the market in 1929 - "Taxi drivers told you what to buy. The shoeshine boy could give you a 
summary of the day's financial news as he worked with rag and polish. An old beggar who regularly 
patrolled the street in front of my office now gave me tips and, I suppose, spent the money I and others 
gave him in the market. My cook had a brokerage account and followed the ticker closely. Her paper profits 
were quickly blown away in the gale of 1929." (Rothchild, 1996). 
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2007-2008. Another example is PPI61, which large numbers of individuals agreed to when 
taking out credit.62 
 
1.3.4 The effect of Financialisation on Banks  
Financialisation can thus be seen to have had three main consequences which relate to the 
problems of banks. Firstly, it has encouraged, through the new culture of accumulation 
which has encouraged borrowing, a reliance on future earnings or the increasing value of 
property. This was made possible because of the availability of credit but resulted in the 
over indebtedness of individuals and asset bubbles in housing. Secondly, it has led to the 
‘popularisation’63 of finance, in which far larger numbers in society are involved in using 
credit and risk taking. This in turn necessitates increasing involvement with the providers 
of finance, namely, banks. Thirdly, RoE, places pressures on those employed in joint-stock 
banks to maximise returns and to place RoE above all other considerations including 
compliance with regulation and ethical practice. 
 
In 2011, the New Economics Foundation held a Good Banking Summit which reported that 
the lending of the top 10 UK banks came to 450% of national output whilst in the USA the 
lending by such banks was only 60%. They also noted an observation made by US 
Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner that UK "light touch" regulation attracted business from 
other banking centres and resulted in £1.3 trillion of extra public UK debt.  The Good 
Banking Summit also reported that banks in Britain had a RoE of 15-25%, with insurance 
companies and finance accounting for 30% of FTSE 100 profits. It also recognised that 
under pressure to maximise profits, banks had become involved in proprietary trading64  in 
wholesale markets and mass selling (for example, PPI) in retail banking. It suggested that 
traditional companies had failed in preventing risky behaviour as there was, in effect, joint 
enterprise between finance traders and shareholders, with the traders receiving up to 45% 
of net turnover65. The different working groups at the Summit examined a range of issues 
                                              
 
 
62 In The end of the experiment? From competition to the Foundational Economy (Bowman, 2014)  of 
CRESC (Centre for Research on Socio Cultural Change), Mis-selling for Return on Equity seeks to explain 
how the problems of commercial (retail) banking arose from moves in the 1980s to chase higher Return on 
Equity which pressurised banks to push products for profit (e.g. PPI and free-if-in-credit-banking, which 
obfuscated customer choice (Bowman, 2014, Ch. 4).  
63 Others have described the democratisation of finance whereby financial products are made available to 
a wider society (van der Zwan, 2014) and consumer literacy (Zokaityte, 2015). 
64 Proprietary Trading: the activity of a bank or other financial institution trading on its own account 
rather than for a customer using bank capital often in speculative trades.   
65 The symbiosis between shareholders and managers/traders is a continuing theme in this dissertation. 
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and, in particular, the recently published Independent Commission on Banking 
(Independent Commission on Banking, 2011) which suggested that the Commission had 
not gone far enough in suggesting reforms to banking. One of the working groups did in 
fact look at alternatives to the current banking structure. However, such consideration was 
relatively brief and its focus was limited to the example of a Post Bank (New Economics 
Foundation, 2011, p. 21).  
 
Official reports have tended to ignore the concept of Financialisation; it is not a term that 
appears to be found in any of the major UK reports66 and the absence of the consideration 
of financialisation was criticised by a number of writers (CRESC, 2009); (Ewald, 2011); 
(Froud, 2011). Nevertheless, financialisation is set down as a key background cause of the 
Financial Crisis 2007-2008 by a number of writers (New Economics Foundation, 2011); 
(Ireland, 2010); (Sikka , 2014); (Krippner, 2005); (van der Zwan, 2014); (Klimecki & 
Willmott, 2009); (Glynos, Klimecki & Willmott, 2012); (Froud & Moran, 2010). However, 
the neoliberal view is that the Financial Crisis 2007- 2008 was a result of regulation, in that 
it failed because the regulation set the limits of behaviour rather than encouraging sound 
commercial judgement. In this case, regulation protects the bankers against failure and 
removes the need for banks to act wisely.  Neoliberalists argued that the free market and 
competition would control banks (Jacomb, 2011).67 
 
However, it is argued that taking the effects of neoliberalism in financialisation further, by 
emphasising the effects of maximising profits for shareholders and RoE, shareholders 
commonly take a short-term outlook whilst free markets and competition are concepts of 
the medium to long term (Talbot, 2013). Attempts to enhance the powers of shareholders 
are misconceived because whether capital is held by individual shareholders or financial 
institutions the goal is to maximise liquidity and attain maximum return on profits. 
Managers and traders whose bonuses are linked to profits are therefore compliant. Even the 
suggestion that shareholders should assert their voting power is mistaken because it 
provides the false impression that it will provide a regressive method of corporate control 
(Talbot, 2013). Indeed, it is argued that the promotion of the idea that shareholders have a 
role as stewards rather than that of purely seeking to maximise capital will result in further 
banking problems (Dignam, 2013); (Graafland, JJ van de Ven, BW, 2011). 
                                              
66 See footnote 23 above for details of the Official Reports. 
67 Other examples can be found in newspaper reports. For example, the Financial Times reported that, 
when the Vickers commission was considering ring-fencing, Sir Bob Diamond suggested that such regulation 
would encourage Barclays Bank to leave the UK. (Goff, 2011). Newspaper reports in the Financial Times also 




1.4 Research Potential, Methodology and Outline of Chapters 
The issue to be addressed here is why banks have the problems they have, and why the 
proposed ways of dealing with those problems have been unsuccessful. Neoliberalists have 
suggested there should be less regulation. Another school of thought suggests that the 
problems can be overcome by regulation. There is a debate within the latter as to whether 
regulation is sufficient and whether there should be even greater regulation. The other 
school of thought suggests that regulation, certainly on its own, will not be sufficient and 
an ethical and cultural change will have to be effected. According to such a school of 
thought, the importance of the human need to achieve, strive and “win” is considered (Bell, 
2013, p. 15). This dissertation argues that alternative legal structures other than joint-stock 
banks (for example, publicly owned cooperatives or mutuals) may be required to allow the 
proposals of either the regulators, ethicists or social scientists to take effect.  
 
The methodology of this dissertation is library-based focusing on government and non-
governmental reports, and academic literature on and existing scholarship in the areas 
under consideration, namely, banking and its problems and, in particular, literature on 
regulation of banks and literature that considers ethical, moral and culture change in 
relation to financial institutions. 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on how banks are regulated and how regulation is undermined by the 
effect of the demands of RoE. Whilst the literature, and, in particular, the official reports68, 
show that the continuing aim of governments and central bankers is to try to address the 
problems of banks by means of more regulation, for example greater capital reserves; the 
conduct of banks and individual bankers remains a problem, as the scandals subsequent to 
the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 have shown.69 The official reports, whilst sometimes 
recognising that there is an ethical problem, fail to suggest solutions other than sanctions 
and penalties. On the other hand, those who look at the subject from an ethical or social 
science aspect, are unable to answer how - whatever the ethical decision-making process, 
ethics training, emphasis on leadership qualities or cultural change within an organisation - 
to reconcile the demands of shareholders and the pressure to meet such demands to 
maximise profits, particularly when the profits are linked to senior bankers’ 
                                              
68See footnote 23 (above) for details of official reports.  





As it will be argued in Chapter 3, discussions of ethical theories may have an effect at the 
level of the individual. However, individuals’ behaviour must be seen within the context of 
the organisations in which they are employed. Inevitably, the pressure for RoE places 
burdens on bank employees to perform and maximise profit. In the conflict between 
attaining targets and being paid for doing so on the one hand, and ethical behaviour on the 
other, ethical behaviour loses to the pressure to maximise profits. It will be suggested that 
this will continue even if ethical training has taken place or if a bank has adopted ethical 
principles. As numerous writers have reported and, as was indicated by JP Morgan in the 
opening statement (above), trust is the most important commodity a bank can have. It is 
when customers lose trust in their bank that bank runs take place with all the concomitant 
economic problems that follow.  
 
However, one aspect that has received very little consideration is how the corporate 
structures of banks are related to their problems and the ethics of those who work in them. 
In “Better Bankers, Better Banks: Promoting Good Business through Contractual 
Commitment “ (Hill and Painter, 2015, Chapter 2) the question of limited liability is shown 
to encourage risky behaviour by bankers. The authors suggested such a structure  could be 
replaced by covenant banking, where a senior banker pledges to make a specific payment 
in the event of a loss (at location 2374 Kindle edition) or assessable stock (at location 
2918)71.  
 
It would therefore appear that there is an opportunity to research into how alternative 
banking structures could play a part in improving the ethics and behaviour of bankers. 
Such structures are likely to be mutuals, similar to building societies, but established by 
government or local authorities. They could also be cooperative structures. In the 
concluding chapter of this dissertation, it will be suggested that such alternative structures 
could have the effect of having ethics as their basis or primary call, rather than the priority 
                                              
70 A number of works refer to the problems of ethics and give examples, but do not suggest how the 
problem of unethical behaviour can be resolved (Boatright, 2013). Business culture and dishonesty in the 
banking industry: (Fehr & Marechal, 2014); (Di Lorenzo, 2005); ( Graafland, JJ van de Ven, BW, 2011). A 
number of studies by Claire Hill and Richard Painter have recognised that there are problems in regulation 
and enforcing the law in financial services: (Hill, 2009-2010); (Hill and Painter, 2015). Some writers have 
used a Social Science based approach (Williams and Conley, 2014). Other writers have considered an ethical 
approach (Chavez, 2002); (Rhodes, 2010) and used Ethical Decision Making Theory (Kohlberg, 1975); (Rest, 
1975) combining them with other social science approaches: (Fichter, 2016); (Fichter, 2017); (Hardowar, 
2017). 
71 Assessable stock: If the bank is in financial difficulties then an assessment has to be made and a 
payment made by the original stockholder. 
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of paying shareholder dividends. In addition, it will be argued that if they were to achieve 
sufficient market strength, then the competition may work to make other banks provide a 





2. Chapter 2 - The Limitations of Banking Regulation  
Banking crises not only have political consequences, but also personal ones. Consider the 
2015 banking crisis in Italy which involved four small regional banks. Not only were 
depositors at risk, but inexperienced Italian banking customers who held risky 
subordinated debt72 lost monies they had entrusted to the banks. They had been mis-sold 
the subordinated debt when they thought they were making high interest deposits. Ordinary 
depositors were eventually repaid but the subordinated debt holders, whose holdings form 
part of the bank’s equity capital, were not so fortunate.  A pensioner living near Rome was 
reported to have committed suicide after having lost €110,000 in Banca Etruria. Another 
customer, Letizia Giorgianni, who lost €100,000 in Banca Etruria and was the leader of a 
customer protest group, warned that failure by the government to take action would cause 
further damage: “Think about the psychological impact. What kind of confidence will 
citizens have in their banks after this? What savings are safe?”  An Italian politician, 
Guglielmo Picchi, declared “When you take money out of people’s pockets, they get 
angry” (Politi & Sanderson, 2015). Nine months later the crisis affecting the regional 
banks led to concerns about the solvency of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the third 
largest Italian bank, and considered to be the world’s oldest bank. The Guardian reported: 
 
“The big question now is whether worries about the banking sector, coupled with 
anger over the economy’s slow growth and concerns about the ongoing migration 
crisis, will pose a further risk to [Prime Minister] Renzi’s chances of winning the 
referendum in the autumn” (Kirchgaessner, 2016). 
 
One month later the referendum was lost and the Italian Prime Minister, Renzi, had 
resigned. 
 
2.1 Introduction - The Objectives of Regulation 
The failure of banks differs from that of most other businesses. When other businesses fail, 
it is the creditors and the shareholders who have to share the losses. However, when a bank 
fails, it is also the customer deposits that are at risk. It is therefore in the interest of the 
depositor to be the first in the queue to withdraw their savings. When a queue forms at the 
                                              
72 Subordinated debt:  debt that ranks lower than other debts when there are claims on the assets of a 
company. If there is default, someone who has subordinated debt, which is also known as "junior debt, 
cannot receive their money until the claims of all superior holders of "senior debt" are met.  
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doors of the bank, it becomes conspicuous to other customers who in turn wish to 
withdraw their own money for fear of losing their savings. Even if the bank is 
fundamentally sound, the rapid withdrawal by savers of their cash results in the bank 
becoming illiquid and failure becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Banking failure is 
followed by government intervention or support. Such intervention is costly, both 
financially and politically73. 
 
It is important to illustrate how the structure of banks has changed since the nineteenth 
century,74 from partnerships to larger joint-stock companies, both of whose members had 
unlimited liability, to limited liability companies, where the members maximum liability is 
to the value of their shareholding (Davies G, 2002). However, these developments did not 
prevent banking crises. Crises brought public pressure and political demands for action and 
intervention, in the form of regulation. However, this section will show that attempts at 
regulation have failed to solve the problems of banks, and the requirement for “capital 
adequacy”75 will be looked at as an example of the failings of regulation to control banks. 
 
Various authors have set out the objectives of regulation.76 The first objective is the 
reduction of risk to those who lend to banks: “prudential regulation”. The second objective 
is to reduce problems arising from economic or banking conditions that may result in 
"contagion": runs on more than one bank” and “systemic risk”. The third objective is to 
avoid banks being used for criminal purposes such as money laundering. The fourth 
objective is to direct credit to favoured sectors such as homeownership. The final objective 
is to ensure that customers are treated fairly (Klomp, 2012); (Barth & Caprio, 2004); 
(Rochet, 2009); (Adenas, 2013); (Benjamin, 2010). 
 
                                              
 Bank rescues are expensive. According to the National Audit Office, the cost of providing support to British 
banks at the peak of the 2007-2009 financial crisis was £1,162 billion (£1,162,000,000,000). (National Audit 
Office (UK), n.d.) or 60% of the UKs GDP (Schildbach, 2010). By contrast, the amount of total taxes borne 
and taxes collected, from banking activity amounted to approximately £63.0bn or 11.6% of total UK 
government tax receipts (Price, Waterhouse, Coopers, 2012). It has been calculated that the fiscal costs 
after recoveries could average 13.3% of GDP and could be as much as 55.1% of GDP (Laeven, 2008, p. 23). 
74 For a more detailed synopsis of the development of financial regulation, see  (Davies G, 2002; Davies G, 
2002). 
75 Capital Adequacy: a test that shows if a bank has sufficient capital to meet potential losses on lending.  
76 In addition to the writers who have looked at the objectives of regulation, there are many authors who 
have looked at the technical aspects, for example,  (Laux, 2009); (Rochet, 2009); (Cranston, 2003); 
(Benjamin, 2010) . Such works are largely descriptive. Whilst they recognise the interrelationship between 
bank capital and the return on equity, they do not focus on the effect that shareholder requirement to 
maximise profit has in seeking to minimise capital requirements.  
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These objectives are achieved by various regulatory means. The first major measure is that 
of a capital requirement77 in relation to banks’ assets. While it is called "capital”, it is, in 
fact, what other companies would call (equity) shareholding (Admati, 2013, pp. 6,7).78  A 
second obligation is a reserve requirement.79 This is the amount that a bank must hold to 
meet the request for return of funds lent by customers. From the fact that banks are often 
large organisations, if proper systems are not in place and supervision is lacking, there are 
likely to be problems. For this reason, corporate governance is regulated to ensure a bank 
is properly managed and does not become a liability (Admati, 2013, p. 127).80 Other 
regulatory measures include credit rating requirements, exposure to large risks and 
restrictions on certain activities/partnerships (ring fencing). These measures are outlined in 
(Klomp, 2012); (Barth & Caprio, 2004) and (Rochet, 2009). 
 
Whilst each of these measures could be critically scrutinised, this chapter will look at one 
area of regulation in particular, capital adequacy.81 Capital adequacy will be considered as 
it is arguably deemed to be one of the most effective forms of regulation (Bank for 
International Settlements, 1988 (and updated)). A focus on this form of regulation serves 
the purpose of illustrating the reasons why regulation has been unsuccessful in dealing 
with the problems of banks. To see why regulators seek to control bank capital it is 
important to understand how banks lend and how equity capital forms part of a bank’s 
balance sheet.  This will be dealt with in the next section (2.2). The method of controlling 
the amounts banks can lend, ‘Capital Adequacy’, in relation the amounts of equity capital 
they hold is then considered (2.3). The chapter then concludes by considering the problems 
associated with using capital adequacy as a way of regulating banks. 
 
2.2 Equity capital in the bank’s balance sheet. 
 
                                              
77 Capital requirement: the amount of shareholders equity that a bank or other financial institution must 
have as required by its regulator/government to operate safely in relation to the amount that it may lend. 
Capital requirements also known as regulatory capital or capital adequacy. 
78 The bank definition of capital includes other assets owned by the bank rather than being lent to it  (Farag, 
2013, p. 204). 
79 Reserve Requirement: the minimum amount of cash and bank notes to be held by a Bank. 
80 Following the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 the Prudential Regulation Authority was established in the UK 
with a general objective to promote the safety and soundness of the financial services organisations; in 






Before the concept of capital adequacy is scrutinised, it would be useful to consider how 
equity capital features in the balance sheet of a bank. Using double-entry bookkeeping, a 
simplified bank balance sheet has two sides - assets and liabilities. Assets consist of central 
bank reserves, loans and mortgages to customers and bond holdings, other securities and 
other assets (e.g. buildings). Liabilities consist of the current and savings accounts of 
depositors (as well as borrowing from institutional investors such as pension funds and on 
the wholesale market from other banks) and equity capital. In diagrammatic form, this 




Central Bank reserves   Customers’ deposits  
Loans to customers  
Government bonds and other 
securities  
Equity capital  





On its day of opening, before it starts trading, a bank may have the following balance 
sheet, one side balancing the other: 
 
Assets Liabilities 
assets (office building) (A) £1 
million 
Equity capital (C) £1 million 
 
On its first day, the bank lends to Mr Smith who wishes to borrow £500 to purchase a new 
car. After checking the credit worthiness, the bank makes the loan and the balance sheet 




 Deposits £500 
Loans to customers £500 
 Equity capital £1 million 






The bank has at the same time created a loan as an asset and a deposit as a liability on the 
balance sheet. The bank does not need to have any money from savers. It has created credit 
“out of thin air”, by means of an accounting entry.82  
 
If Mr Smith pays for the car using a cheque, which is paid into another bank, there is a 
liability from the first bank to the second bank. Again, this is a bookkeeping entry and the 
bank’s balance sheet has increased, as if by magic. However, this becomes a problem if Mr 
Smith defaults on his loan; or he seeks to withdraw the deposit to pay for the car by cash; 
or the second bank wishes the first bank to settle its account. In the case of Mr Smith 
defaulting on his loan, this eats into the equity capital. If it is a complete default the £500 
failed loan is shown as a reduction of £500 on the equity capital. If he had borrowed £5 
million instead of £500, then the bank would be insolvent. In the other cases, the first bank 
must access reserves at a price at which it can afford to pay them, otherwise it has a 
liquidity problem. 
 
The above description shows that it is not the deposit that creates the loan; it is the loan 
that creates the deposit. L Randall Wray stated, “In the real world, banks extend credit, 
creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later” (Wray, 2015, p. 2034).  In 
fact, the view that a bank does not need to have the reserves before it lends was supported 
by the chief economist at Standard and Poor’s (Sheard, 2013). 
 
Banks lend on short-term overdrafts or as longer-term loans. They use their customers’ 
deposits to provide themselves with liquidity and the success of a banking business 
depends on ensuring that loans are made to creditworthy customers, that such loans are 
adequately secured and that there are sufficient reserves to repay depositors when they ask 
for their savings to be returned or when cheques/ transfers are made.  
 
It is when bankers seek to maximise RoE by taking imprudent lending risks that are too 
great, that problems are likely to occur. Accordingly, understanding ‘how banks lend’ is 
important not just for a comprehension of how banks operate, but also for appreciating 
how they should be regulated. As will be seen below, the approach to capital regulation is 
                                              
82 This is known as the credit creation theory of banking and was demonstrated in an empirical exercise by 
Richard Werner in cooperation with Raiffeisenbank Wildenberg a regional bank in Germany. The 
macroeconomic effects are that banks are not just agents.  As an alternative theory financial 
intermediation theory of banking would suggest that banks have an effect in increasing the money supply 
(Werner, 2014) .   
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based on an assumption, by those responsible for formulating the capital regulation 
requirements, that the financial intermediation theory is correct.83 
 
2.3 Capital requirements 
Banks lend in a variety of ways, for example to those who want mortgages, personal, 
business and other loans (e.g. to government). In normal times, banks know that not all 
depositors will require their money back in a short space of time and therefore they can 
lend the deposits many times over (“leverage”).84 This practice by bankers is known as 
“Fractional Reserve Banking”.85 In addition, as well as leveraging depositors’ money, as 
seen in the previous section the bank can, through accounting practice, create further 
money which it is then able to lend. The challenge for bankers lies in balancing prudent 
lending with maximising the return on the potential lending they can make. They must 
maintain sufficient liquidity or be able to obtain sufficient reserves from other banks or the 
central bank to honour customers’ cheques and repay deposits. If they are unable to do so, 
then the bank fails and customers face the prospect of losing their deposits.  
 
Equity Capital is shown on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. It is a source of funding, 
but the balancing item on the asset side includes cash assets, reserves at the central bank 
and realisable bonds. These are held as realisable assets for any potential liquidity crisis 
(Farag, 2013). As seen above, the difficulties banks face come from problems of illiquidity 
and insolvency. A solvency crisis occurs when borrowers fail to repay their loans to an 
extent that the bank’s book of assets, that is, its loans, is worth less than its liabilities 
(deposits and capital). This happened in the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, when sub-prime 
mortgagors failed to repay their loans. As will be seen below, banks hold a buffer in equity 
capital to absorb those initial losses. Accordingly, if a bank has equity capital of £20 
billion, it can absorb £20 billion of losses on loans before it becomes insolvent. In those 
circumstances, the creation of new deposits by making new loans would have no effect, 
because the amount of loans and the liabilities, that is, new deposits, would be exactly the 
                                              
83 "Financial Intermediation Theory": banks are just financial intermediaries; they only take in monies and 
reallocate them. (Werner, 2014). 
84 Leverage: the number of times a customers deposit can be lent by a bank. The leverage ratio is the 
ratio of capital to total assets. It demonstrates the ability of a bank to absorb losses into its capital. The 
higher the leverage (i.e. a low ratio of capital to total assets), the riskier the bank. 
85  Fractional Reserve Banking: a method of banking where only part of the loans made by banks is 
represented by cash available for immediate withdrawal. See also an example and diagram in section 2.5 
Would abolition of reliance on bank deposits overcome the question of capital adequacy? below. 
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same, but would have no effect on the assets and liabilities. In such circumstances, a bank 
must reduce its liabilities or increase its assets (or do both) in order to regain solvency.  
 
A liquidity crisis (a cash flow insolvency) occurs when a bank is unable to repay deposits 
(or honour cheque payments and transfers) when repayment of those deposits becomes 
due. This is because there is a maturity mismatch between loans being repaid and deposits 
being withdrawn and happens because, apart from overdrafts, most loans are long-term (for 
example, a mortgage or car purchase loan). Although some monies are borrowed short-
term on the money market86 and some savers want longer term deposits in return for a 
higher interest rate, most customers wish to have the ease of withdrawing their money 
when they wish to do so and therefore hold their monies in a current account or instant 
access savings account. If confidence is lost in the bank, then many customers may 
withdraw all of their savings at the same time causing a “bank run”. The position can be 
made worse because banks only hold a small proportion of reserves, as they know that in 
normal circumstances, customers are unlikely to demand all of their cash at the same 
time.87 The bank holds a certain amount cash reserves, but once these are used, it needs to 
sell its loans (assets) in order to obtain central bank reserves to pay savers and other banks. 
If it has to drop the price of those assets, it may find that the value of those assets becomes 
less than its liabilities and it faces an insolvency crisis. As noted above, this problem is 
exacerbated if one bank gets into difficulties, then depositors in other banks may become 
concerned and seek to withdraw their monies ("contagion"). The collapse of banks then 
becomes a systemic bank run affecting many, if not all banks, in the country. As a result of 
the severe effects on a nation's economy and damaged individual savers, governments then 
become involved in enabling banks to survive as they are considered the Lender of Last 
Resort (Ryan-Collins, et al., 2012). 
 
Capital requirements have been the main instruments of banking regulation since the 1990s 
(Admati, 2013). Whilst capital requirements will be the example of bank regulation to be 
                                              
86 For example, Northern Rock was highly dependent on short-term money. Out of total liabilities of £101 
billion Northern Rock had capital and reserves of £ 7.7 billion only, £22.6 billion of retail deposits whilst 
borrowing £ 24.2 billion on the wholesale market with £40.2 billion as securitised mortgages and £6.2 
billion as covered bonds. Its share of retail deposits dropped from 62.7% at end 1997 to 22.4% at end 2006 
(Milne, 2008). 
87 There may be differences in balances on a day-to-day basis, but a system equates the monies and is likely 
to leave them with approximately the same amounts to and from other banks and the central bank reserve. 
This system is known as Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS). The clearing banks each have a reserve account 
with the Bank of England and rather than each of the 46 banks having to settle separately with each other 
they send payment instructions to the Bank of England's RDG system increasing or reducing each banks 
reserves as appropriate (Ryan-Collins, et al., 2012, p. 76). 
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focused upon, there is an interrelation between banks’ capital and their reserves (liquidity). 
If depositors believe that a bank is becoming insolvent, then they are likely to withdraw 
their funds. If a bank has to sell off its assets in an emergency, it is less likely to achieve a 
good price for them and this in turn may affect its solvency.  
 
However, in practice, with many millions of pounds being transacted on a daily basis, at 
the end of each day some banks will be short and some will have an excess of liquidity. 
They will therefore either have to borrow from the central bank or trade overnight with 
another bank on the London Interbank Market using liquid assets such as gilts (government 
stock). The London Interbank Market is preferred by banks because the interest rate is 
usually better than that which can be obtained from the Bank of England. This is always 
subject to the banks having confidence that their loans will be repaid. This confidence 
disappeared in the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. If the Bank of England, as a central bank, 
makes loans to banks to assist with their reserve account deposits, it does so through its 
Open Market Operations, through secured loans called ‘repos.’88 
 
Equity Capital is raised from shareholders as was described in the previous section. It is for 
holders of this Equity Capital that bankers seek to maximise RoE. However, unlike 
deposits, the shareholding (Equity Capital) cannot be withdrawn by the shareholders. It 
can, however, be traded on a stock market, although shareholders may be reluctant to do 
so, if there is a fall in the price of the shares or if potential purchasers of shares are 
unwilling to buy. It is permanent funding in exchange for a share in the bank. Capital also 
consists of retained profits and subordinated loans (loans which the lenders agree to rank as 
liabilities after depositors’ savings). Its aim is to protect the business against losses arising 
from bad loans, which would render it insolvent in cases where losses on loans exceed 
capital. If it did not have this equity capital, then should there be any losses at all on loans, 
the bank would be insolvent as its assets would be smaller than its liabilities. If, however, 
there is Equity Capital, the losses are simply reflected by a reduction in the capital. In 
addition, unlike interest that a bank is obliged to pay to depositors, shareholders anticipate 
receiving a dividend out of profits, that is, RoE. If there has been a period of 
unprofitability, then distributions to shareholders can be reduced or cease altogether. In 
contrast, reserves are in place to protect the bank against too many depositors withdrawing 
their cash at the same time. If a bank were unable to do this then the bank would be “cash-
flow insolvent” (Farag, 2013, p. 203). In such circumstances, the bank will draw on 
                                              
88 "repo": see footnote 28  above. 
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reserves from the most cost-effective source. Firstly, it will be from cash or liquid reserves 
already held by the bank and it may sell assets. It could also obtain reserves from other 
banks or from the Central Bank. If the bank is forced to ask to use Central Bank reserves 
then the Central Bank usually asks for collateral, often a Treasury security for which it 
receives a discounted sum (Wray, 2015, p. 2058) . 
 
It must be said that all bank lending involves the risk of loss. However, the level of losses 
depends on a number of factors such as the creditworthiness of the borrower, the nature of 
the loan and whether or not collateral has been supplied. However, as banks have an 
historic experience of lending they should be able to predict the level of expected losses. 
However, there are unexpected losses that can occur when unforeseeable circumstances 
arise as happened with the Financial Crisis 2007-2008. 
 
It follows that the first aim of capital requirements regulation is to increase the amount of a 
bank’s own equity, that is, money invested in it by shareholders and others as a capital 
contribution, in order to reduce the proportion of depositors’ funds relied upon. In fact, the 
state protects banks because of their importance in the economic system. In the UK, the 
state gives savers a Deposit Guarantee of £85,00089, provides reserve facilities, acts as 
Lender of Last Resort and may ultimately nationalise or bail out a bank. As a result, the 
state wishes to ensure that banks have adequate capital buffers to guard against insolvency. 
The problem arises from their knowing that they are “Too-Big-to-Fail” (“TBTF”) and can 
expect to rely on support from the state if they experience either insolvency or illiquidity. 
In such cases, their borrowings are relatively less expensive because the risk of default is 
carried not by the bank, but by the government. Knowing this, they are then prone to take 
on too much risk or lend excessively, with as low a level of capital as possible knowing 
that ultimately Government support will be available  (Admati, 2013); (Rochet, 2009). 
Indeed, this also affects depositors who know that they will be protected in the event of 
collapse and may, as a result, take less care in placing their money in a risky bank.  
 
                                              
89 Deposit Guarantee: The Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) operates a deposit 
compensation scheme for deposits placed in UK banks and 'subsidiaries' of foreign banks in the UK. The 
current compensation limit is £85,000 per person per authorised firm (raised from £50,000 in December 
2010)  (FSA, 2010). 
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A further aim of the regulation of capital requirements is to prevent banks from using 
excessive leverage with banks which become insolvent due to unwise lending.90 
Microprudential regulation seeks to ensure that individual banks account for risks by 
requiring them to manage their operations with sufficient liquidity and capital to reflect the 
risks and ensure they are properly accounted for (Farag, 2013). One of the primary 
objectives of such prudential regulation is to ensure satisfactory capital requirements are 
maintained (Farag, 2013). 
 
The rules for capital adequacy are now set down by the Bank for International Settlements 
in the Basel Accords (Bank for International Settlements, 1988 (and updated)). It was felt 
by the ‘Group of 10’ countries, those with the largest economies, that through their central 
banks an international agreement on capital requirements and risk-weighted assets was the 
best way forward as it allowed comparisons between banks operating in different 
jurisdictions. These capital adequacy rules set out the internationally agreed requirements 
for capital adequacy in Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. As the more the banks can lend the 
greater is their RoE so the attention of the Accords was to ensure that there is sufficient 
Equity Capital to protect against the risks of default. 
  
The calculations required by the Basel Accords (currently Basel III, which is being 
implemented in stages until 2019), set out the capital requirements (and in the future, 
liquidity requirements) for banks, and these are - subject to local interpretation - 
implemented in each country. The Basel standards require that each time a bank makes a 
loan it must set aside a certain amount of equity capital. The Basel standards in Basel III 
have three sections or “pillars”. The first Pillar deals with capital and risk using a system 
known as “risk weighting” which sets out the requirements for specific risks such as house 
loans, corporate loans or government loans91. 
 
The second Pillar deals with supervisory reviews of the bank’s capital adequacy in relation 
to its risk profile. The supervisory authority can impose additional capital requirements if it 
is thought there are further risks. Such risks could be potential failures in internal 
procedures or risks from market fluctuations such as changes in interest rates that could 
                                              
90 The leverage ratio is a measure of the riskiness of a bank calculated by dividing its capital by total assets. 
However, some assets carry a greater risk, which needs to be accounted for (See section 2.3.1 Risk-
Weighted Assets below). 
91 For more details of "risk-based assets" see section 2.3.1 Risk-Weighted Assets2.4.1 Problems with Risk-
Weighted Assets, below. 
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affect the bank’s profitability. Basel III also required two further capital buffers. Firstly, a 
"capital conservation buffer", equivalent to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, must be secured 
to assist where banks face stress periods and a "discretionary counter-cyclical buffer", 
allowing regulators to require up to an additional 2.5% of capital during periods of high 
credit growth. A further buffer must be in place for systemically important institutions to 
allow for further capital requirements where there are risks that are not catered for 
elsewhere. 
 
The final pillar, Pillar 3, sets out standards for information to be disclosed92 including key 
risk information, which allows the monitoring of the capital adequacy of a bank by the 
market. There are additional requirements as to the type of capital. For example, 4.5% of 
the 8% first Pillar requirement must be “common equity Tier 1”.93 As 2.5% of the capital 
conservation buffer must also be from the highest class of capital, “common equity Tier 1”, 
the total is 7% although this may increase, when the other buffers referred to are put into 
effect. 
 
2.3.1 Risk-Weighted Assets 
Where there is discretion on the part of a bank, there is always a greater possibility of that 
discretion being used to maximise profit. A bank must hold some equity capital for each 
loan that it makes. However, not all loans are regarded the same as some loans have a 
greater degree of risk than others.  Loans that carry a higher degree of risk are ‘weighted’ 
and require a greater amount of equity capital to be set aside to cover them. Each class of 
assets can be given a weighting according to the risk it is assessed to carry.94 This therefore 
                                              
92 Pillar 3 disclosure is effected in the United Kingdom through the Financial Conduct Authority BIPRU 11.5: 
Technical criteria on disclosure" of market information. This includes disclosure of risk management 
objectives, response to the requirements of the Banking Consolidation Directive, capital resources, capital 
adequacy, exposure to risk, securitisation and remuneration,  (FCA, 2007). 
93 Under the Basel Accords (Basel III), Tier 1 is considered to be Core Capital consisting of equity capital 
(primarily ordinary shares) and balance sheet reserves. Tier 2 allows, in addition, in certain circumstances, 
depending on national accounting variations, supplementary capital. This could include undisclosed 
reserves (for example, profits that have not yet been allocated as retained or as part of general reserves), 
revalued (rather than historic cost) reserves, general provisions against losses not yet identified, hybrid debt 
instruments having characteristics of both debt and equity and subordinated term debt, which would be 
paid out after ordinary customer deposits. (International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards (July 1988, updated to April 1998);  (B.I.S, 1998). 
 
94 Risk-Weighted Asset: the value of the asset is altered depending on its risk. An asset with a low risk is 
multiplied by a small number whilst one with a high risk is multiplied by a higher number. For example, 
government stock would be regarded as zero risk. A loan to a government carries considerably less risk than 
a loan to a start-up business. (If the United States government were to have difficulty repaying any loans to 
it, it could just print more dollars). Government bonds therefore receive a zero-risk weight. Mortgages, as 
they are secured on property, are also considered to carry far less risk (King, 2010).  
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alters the value of the assets and so capital requirements are expressed as a capital 
adequacy ratio which is the ratio of core capital95 that must be held as a percentage of risk-
weighted assets. Capital requirements govern the ratio of equity to debt, shown on the 
liabilities and equity side of a bank’s balance sheet. For example, if a mortgage on a 
£200,000 property has a 50% risk-weighting, the risk-weighted asset would be £100,000. 
In the case of credit card and other personal loans which are assessed as 75% risk-
weighting, that would be £75 for loan of £100. In relation to overdue debts the risk 
weighting may increase to 100% or over. There are various methods of assessing risk-
weighting but the two most prominent are the ‘Standardised Approach’ in which 
institutions rely on rating agencies and the ‘Internal Ratings-Based approach’ in which 
banks are allowed to use their own methods (Elliott, 2010). 
 
However, while certain categories of loans can easily be classified, such as government 
bonds, others are less easy to quantify. Banks were therefore allowed from the 1990s to 
create their own risk models (Ryan-Collins, et al., 2012, p. 2155). The rationale for this 
was that they had more up-to-date information and ways of assessing the risks, but the 
regulators appear to have failed to consider the conflict between the requirements to have a 
sound banking system and the opportunities to assess risk in order to take on more 
profitable business by downgrading the assessment of risk (Admati, 2013). 
2.4 Critical Assessment of Capital Requirements and Basel III 
 
The second of the Basel accords, Basel II, was effective from 2004. However American 
and European banks found ways to create high leverage and avoid the requirements by 
moving risks to Off Balance Sheet entities96 or concealing them behind inaccurate risk 
models or mistaken credit ratings (Admati, 2013). When the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 
started the equity capital required was of 2% or 3% of their total assets (Admati, 2013). 
 
                                              
95 Core Capital: i.e. Tier 1 money provided by shareholders equity and continually subordinated debt, Tier 
2, supplementary capital which is formed of undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, 
hybrid instruments and subordinated term debt. Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital must be convertible into 
ordinary shares or written down when the regulatory authority deems the bank is no longer viable.  
96 "Off balance sheet financing": If an item in a corporate balance sheet is not definable as debt, it can be 
excluded from a company's balance sheet. The advantage of this for the company is that it can improve 
accounting ratios such as return on equity and leverage. It does so by failing to reveal the true activities of 
the company, giving a better reflection of its liabilities than, may, in fact, be the case. Examples of off-
balance sheet items include, factoring of debts, special purpose vehicles, leasing or leaseback arrangements 
and "repo's. See also 2.4.4 Off Balance Sheet Entities. 
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Although Basel III has increased the percentage of equity capital that banks must hold 
from 4% to about 7%, such percentages are small in relation to deposits received from 
customers and total sums lent. A comparison could be made with an individual with a 
deposit of only 7% having a 93% mortgage. It is suggested that banks can still get around 
the regulation and have as little as just 3% equity of their total assets. If a bank with such a 
small amount of shareholder equity knows that it will be rescued by government should it 
become involved in reckless transactions, it is suggested that there is little to protect it from 
insolvency (Admati, 2013). 
 
At the time, the banks lobbied intensively to restrict increases in capital requirements in 
Basel III. The Guardian reported that the British Bankers Association were to tell the 
Chancellor, 
 
“that up to £1tn is poised to be drained from the financial system, hampering 
economic recovery and depriving households and businesses of loans and other 
forms of credit” (Treanor, 2010). 
 
The article was entitled “Tighter banking rules will drain £1tn from financial system, study 
shows”. The suggestion, promoted by the banks, was that economic growth would be 
hampered by the increased capital requirements. In fact, as has been seen above, capital 
can be used either for reserves or for lending. That “capital” is not “set aside” so it cannot 
be used. Even the word “capital” causes confusion because in other contexts, for example, 
manufacturing, it refers to assets. In the case of banks, it refers to shareholdings/equity 
which appears on the liability side of the balance sheet. The bank has loans and other 
assets including reserves which are funded by equity and debt. 
 
Similar lobbying was reported by the Financial Times which claimed, “HSBC and 
Standard & Chartered call for Basel III rewrite” and warned that if “tough capital rules” 
were not “toned down, world trade could be severely hampered”. By 2015 the Financial 
Times was reporting that “Bank trading reform would lift capital needs by up to nine-fold”. 
The article reported on the review of the way banks assessed the risk factor of their trading 
(known as the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book). However, on reading the article, 
it appeared that whilst the increase was a startling 74%, the actual increase of the average 
bank capital requirement was only 4.7% (to approximately 8%). Bankers were reported as 
suggesting they would have to "quadruple the amount of capital they hold" and that a Basel 
IV was being imposed on them although this was denied by regulators (Binham & Noonan, 
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2015). The aim of such lobbying was to reduce the amount of equity capital the banks had 
to retain for Capital Adequacy. 
 
However, the lobbying was effective, as the Financial Times reported in January 2016: 
 
“Global banking supervisors have softened new rules forcing investment banks to 
hold much more capital against their trading books, after heavy lobbying from the 
banking industry” (Noonan, et al., 2016). 
 
The effect of this softening was to reduce the increase from 74% down to 40% with a mean 
average of 22%. The article reiterates the bankers’ complaint that increases in equity 
capital “will drain liquidity in key markets” (Noonan, et al., 2016) as well as increasing the 
banks costs in implementation of the new rules. 
 
As has been seen above, the rules on capital regulation only deal with the question of the 
proportion of a bank’s funds that must be raised by issuing shares and cannot be lent to 
borrowers. It does not tell banks what to do with those funds (Noonan, et al., 2016). The 
concept   of capital adequacy can be criticised because, it is a clear example of the bank 
suggesting that the capital will be placed in abeyance, rather than being used. 
 
The claim that equity capital is expensive for banks can also be critically examined. Firstly, 
it can be pointed out that it is unusual for companies to rely on such a small amount of 
equity capital and such a large amount of borrowing. Most non-financial companies have 
borrowings of no more than 50% of their total capital. Some companies such as Apple have 
no borrowings. If equity capital is so much more expensive than borrowing, then it is 
logical to ask why non-financial companies have far more of it. There are other reasons 
suggested as to why banks prefer to borrow rather than issue equity capital. Why use 
equity capital when borrowing is cheap and the real cost is met by the taxpayer? Secondly, 
as they have the protection of the state, they have higher risk ratings afforded by the Credit 
Ratings Agencies, which reduce the rate of interest at which banks are able borrow. 
 
Historically, it also appears that whilst banks in the United States and the UK used larger 
portions of equity in the past, that is, in the early part of the 20th century, their performance 
did not appear to be worse and the spread of interest rates and loans did not appear to be 
higher. Conversely, it was suggested that there was a paucity of evidence that growth rates 
46 
 
increase with increases in bank leverage (Ratnovski, 2013). Authors also point out that the 
costs complained of by bankers are small in comparison with the cost of rescuing the banks 
(Miles, 2011). It was noted previously that the cost of the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 to the 
UK government was £1,162 billion. Although the implementation cost of Basel III - as 
estimated by the lobbyist in the Financial Times article as being $100m-$150m for each 
bank to implement over three years - this is small in comparison to the costs of bailing out 
the banks. 
 
However, whilst the Modigliani-Miller Theorem97 may suggest, all other things being 
equal, that the value of a company is not affected by how it is financed, the special position 
of banks is a departure from this principle. One reason for this is the belief that should the 
banks fail, they would be supported by funding from the central bank. This results in a 
lower premium for the risk in lending to a bank by a customer. There is no extra reward for 
the risk that a customer may face in losing his deposit as it is guaranteed by the state and 
this makes borrowing cheaper than raising capital through equity. The cost of this premium 
is, in effect, borne by the taxpayer (Admati, 2013, p.8). 
 
It is suggested that even prior to considering the effectiveness of the Basel Accords, which 
culminate with Basel III, the background to their preparation exemplifies the problems of 
banks; lobbying by banks was effective in diluting the equity to borrowing ratio. It has 
been noted that banks have used their lobbying power to minimise the amounts of equity 
capital they are required to hold in relation to the amount that they can borrow. The 
concept of capital adequacy is, however, affected by a number of factors that prevent it 
from being adequately dealt with. These arise from the nature of the criteria that are used 
in assessing capital adequacy which are, by their nature, subjective. The following section 
looked at examples of problems with capital adequacy arising from the Basel Accords. 
 
2.4.1 Problems with Risk-Weighted Assets 
Even without any conscious or subconscious manipulation, factors such as the assessment 
of mortgages as being of lower risk led to problems that contributed to the Financial Crisis 
2007-2008. Throughout the period leading to the financial crisis, banks were expanding 
their loan books of mortgages, as they were regarded to be of lower risk. However, 
                                              
97 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem starts from the basis that there are three forms of funding; borrowing, 
retained profits and equity capital. It suggests that all other things being equal, there is no difference 




consideration of the lending during this period shows that, as mortgage lending expanded, 
less care was given to the reliability of the loans or the borrowers (Tett, 2010). For 
example, in June 2007, only months before its collapse in autumn 2007, Northern Rock 
received a Basel II waiver, on the grounds that it satisfied the UK Financial Services 
Authority that it had “Advanced Approaches”98 to risk management which even allowed it 
to increase its dividend. Its chief executive, Adam Applegarth, explained: 
 
“when you get your Basel II approval, the relative risk weighting of certain assets 
in your balance sheet changes. So, what we had, because of the quality of the loan 
book was you saw our risk weighting for residential mortgages come down from 
50% to 15%. That clearly required less capital behind it, so that links to why we 
were able to increase the dividend” (Milne,2008, p.6).  
 
Whilst Northern Rock may have used risk-weighting to enable itself to increase its 
dividend, the overall promotion of mortgage-based lending increased property prices and 
consumer borrowing. As property prices increased, so did the ability to borrow against 
them. However, this created a “systemic risk” and as the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 
developed, the situation reversed with property prices falling and consumers facing 
difficulties in repayments (Tucker & Hall, 2013). 
 
Further problems as to the assessment of risk in assets arose from the “securitisation” of 
packages of loans known as CDO’s or collateralised debt obligations. The rationale for 
securitisation was to reduce the risk of any individual loan by placing it with others. Whilst 
some loans may default, the majority would be sound. In the case of mortgages, they 
would be backed by collateral of a mortgage on the property. These CDOs, with the help of 
the Ratings Agencies (see below), were promoted as having lower risk and good credit 
ratings (AAA) placing them on the same level as government debt. This allowed banks to 
hold these CDOs with the minimum of equity capital being used, because they were rated 
so highly. However, the holders of such packages of loans had little way of assessing their 
risk. When the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 developed, both the individual risks of such 
packages and the systemic risk of the property market declining became apparent and was 
a major contributor to the Crisis (Admati, 2013, p. 185) . 
 
                                              
98 See Financial Services Authority Handbook, BIPRU 1.3, Applications for Advanced Approaches 
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It is suggested that it is difficult, if not impossible, to have satisfactory adjustments to 
capital adequacy using risk-weighting. Apart from the inherent incentive of the banks to 
have the most favourable risk assessments in order to maximise the most profitable loans, 
which are those with the highest risk, the level of risk in assets can change as happened 
with the mortgage-backed securities29 in 2007-2008, and what can be considered as 
security, for example, property, can also change in value. The ability to dispose of such 
assets to assist in increasing bank liquidity is impaired as such assets have incurred losses 
and are difficult to sell (Admati, 2013, p.186).  
 
2.4.2 Manipulation of Impairment Provision 
Normally, there is a period between the time the bank suspects that a loan has “gone bad” 
and the time it writes off the loan. Whilst there are accounting rules that state when such an 
‘impairment provision’ should be made (Farag, 2013), it is very much a subjective view as 
to when and how long it should be until the debt is finally considered irrecoverable or even 
suspected as being so. When a loan is written off, it appears as a reduction in capital on the 
balance sheet and affects the requirements for capital adequacy and the amount that the 
bank can subsequently lend. It is therefore in the interests of the bank to prevent an 
impairment provision for as long as possible. Capital adequacy can therefore be 
manipulated by maintaining that debts are more likely to be recoverable than, perhaps, is 
the real case. 
 
2.4.3 The problem of capital adequacy promoting procyclicality   
 
The effect of procyclicality99 in recessions is that risk-based capital requirements, such as 
those required by the Basel Accords, become greater, whilst at the same time losses on 
loans increase and reduce the capital holdings of the bank. If a recession is looming, it also 
becomes more difficult for the banks to raise new capital and their ability to lend, given 
capital requirements, falls. At the same time, if banks were to lend more, a recession may 
result in higher defaults on those loans. There is a continuing debate between those who 
believe that the effects of procyclicality have to be absorbed and those who believe that 
there should be specific correction of procyclicality (Repullo, 2013). 
Basel II was criticised for encouraging lending growth in an economic cycle. The more the 
world economy boomed, the more the banks lent as they were driven by maximising RoE. 
                                              
99
 Procyclicality describes how an economic trend is related to economic fluctuations. Its opposite is 
countercyclicality. It shows the tendency to accelerate in the same way as economic growth and in the 
opposite direction when the economy declines. 
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However, when the cycle entered a downturn, the worsening effects were accelerated. If 
banks make more profits during an economic boom and reinvest those profits in lending 
(Ryan-Collins, et al., 2012, p.2143) or capital requirements fall during such periods, then 
banks, especially those that are well capitalised, feel able to lend or consider themselves to 
be "Too Big to Fail", often taking less care in their lending decisions.  The suggestion was 
that the banks’ motives for taking advantage of procyclicality was because during boom 
periods they can take advantage of market conditions, increase lending to willing 
borrowers and as a result maximise profit and RoE. 
Accordingly, procyclicality encourages lending growth in the upside of an economic cycle, 
where banks have the opportunity to increase shareholder value and achieve greater RoE, 
because of the upturn.  However, if there is a recession not only do lending losses affect 
the capital of a bank, but capital adequacy requirements become higher as a result, and in 
order to protect RoE, banks would reduce their lending rather than increase their capital 
adequacy requirement  (Libertucci, 2013). 
 
The Turner Review (FSA, 2009) recommended introducing overt counter-cyclicality, 
which would result in the increase in the equity capital required during boom periods and 
would create “capital buffers” which would be available during recessions and which could 
be drawn on as losses increased during those periods. Basel III reached a compromise 
between the two conflicting views. Whilst attempting to enhance the quantity and quality 
of the capital requirements required, it also sought to create buffers. One was capital 
preservation and the second, a countercyclical buffer. The intention is to build up reserves 
in the times of boom which can be released in the times of recession. However, whilst 
Basel III recommended such provisions to deal with procyclicality, no timetable was 
introduced and the requirements for extra capital adequacy during these periods have yet to 
be introduced. This is despite warnings of booming mortgage and consumer credit (Berry, 
2015) and the urging by the Bank of England following the referendum on 23 June 2016 
(Gov. of the Bank of England, 2016) when £250 billion of liquidity was announced.100 
 
Whilst Basel III is regarded as an attempt to address the problems of procyclicality (Rubio 
& Carrasco-Gallego, 2014), the compromise taken, illustrates the pressures brought to bear 
to ensure that the banks can still maximise profits and RoE. 
                                              
100 However, Basel III has come in for criticism in relation to procyclicality. For example, it adopts a single 
approach which may result in a contrary effect, unless there are means of counteracting the fluctuations of 
the minimum requirements of the regulations. It is suggested that as a result, they may perversely 




2.4.4 Off Balance Sheet Entities 
Whereas it might be hoped that banks would comply with the spirit as well as the letter of 
the capital adequacy rules, “off balance sheet entities” disclose opposite practice. 
 
In order to comply with capital adequacy rules, banks comply with the regulations and 
ensure that the debt to equity (D/E) and leverage ratios stay within the requirements. 
However, if an item is removed from the bank's balance sheet, it does not fall under 
consideration for capital adequacy. The shareholder equity therefore is enhanced and the 
RoE for shareholders (and any profit related remuneration schemes) is greater. By using 
off balance sheet entities, RoE for shareholders is enhanced, whilst keeping to the ‘letter’ 
of the capital adequacy rules. 
 
The use of off-balance sheet finance may have beneficial outcomes for a bank when 
financial savings are produced or liquidity is enhanced. However, they can be used to 
obfuscate the financial position of the bank, for example, the use of repo 105 by Lehman 
Brothers101. These have included operating leases where the asset is taken off the balance 
sheet and only the rental expense for the use of the asset is reported in the accounts. Other 
examples include research and development partnerships and joint ventures (Yeoh, 2007). 
 
Another frequently used method is for banks to move their assets to special companies that 
they set up in order to remove loans from the bank’s balance sheet. Often these are 
“Structured Investment Vehicles” which are set up by the banks. These consist of a group 
of assets aiming to create a profit from the use of short and long-term structured debt and 
are funded by continually issuing and rolling over short-term debt instruments (borrowed 
short-term money on the capital markets). The funds received are then invested in longer 
term investments (bundles of loans from the banks) which are less easily realisable but pay 
higher rates. Often higher leverage is used to create larger returns.  
 
Such SIV's have passed the tests of independence for capital adequacy purposes. However, 
such off-balance sheet companies are dependent on the banks that created them and caused 
considerable difficulties for their associated banks during the Financial Crisis 22007-2008. 
As the primary purpose of such special purpose entities is to overcome the capital 
                                              
101 See section 1.2.3 Some Examples of Scandals that have affected Banks above. 
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adequacy rules of the Basel accords, it throws doubt on the utility of the Basel Accords in 
maintaining capital adequacy (Elliott, 2010). 
 
2.4.5 Reliance on Credit Rating Agencies 
The best known of these agencies are Standard and Poor’s and Fitch and Moody’s. In its 
consideration of the Financial Crisis 2007-2008, the Parliamentary Commission on 
Banking Standards reported that credit agencies were based on an inherent conflict-of-
interest, because they are funded by those whom they purport to independently assess. In 
addition, the Commission noted there were economic barriers to entry which reduced 
competition and that rather than just being an ‘extra opinion’, the ratings agencies had 
become a convenient bookmark for risk for the regulators as well as participants in the 
market ( Parliamentary Commission on Banking, 2013). 
 
It is suggested that Credit Ratings Agencies have affected the ability of capital adequacy to 
control the problem of banks in several ways. Firstly, it is suggested that in assessing the 
credit rating of banks, Credit Ratings Agencies may give higher ratings to the debt of 
banks than would be the case, if there was not the implicit guarantee that banks would be 
bailed-out if they were to fail (Admati, 2013, p. 9). Secondly, Credit Rating Agencies have 
a role under Basel III in assessing risk weightings. The more favourable a risk weighting a 
Credit Reference Agency gives, the better the capital adequacy and the more a bank is able 
to lend and, in turn, the more profit the bank makes. Finally, Credit Rating Agencies 
assessed the securitised packages of debt, often giving them AAA credit ratings, when on 
careful consideration they were far from that. 
 
2.4.6 Problems Caused by the Credit Creation Theory of Banking 
As has been stated above, the Basel capital adequacy rules are based on the ‘Financial 
Intermediation Theory of Banking’. If the ‘Credit Creation Theory of Banking’ 102 is 
correct and banks can create money out of “thin air”, doubt must be thrown on whether 
Basel III is a satisfactory way of regulating banks. If banks can create money out of "air", 
higher capital requirements will not necessarily help in preventing banking crises or 
economic cycles, as even with increased capital requirements, banks could still enable 
money supply expansion, pushing up the price of assets with the effect that some of this 
new money could enable a bank to increase its capital (Werner, 2014, pp. 2, 17).  
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2.5 Would abolition of reliance on bank deposits overcome the question 
of capital adequacy? 
As opposed to Credit Creation Theory, the theory of Fractional-Reserve Banking proposes 
that banks are just financial intermediaries; they do not create money, but by interacting 
together they achieve its creation. This is done by using the money multiplier, whereby an 
initial deposit is expanded each time it passes to another bank. In the example below an 
initial deposit of £100, requires for example, a reserve of 5%. This allows the first bank to 
lend out £95 which if deposited in a second bank, after 5% reserve is deducted, allows 
£90.25 to be lent by the second bank. This passes to a third bank, which again deducts 5% 
for reserves, allowing it to lend £85.74. By this method the initial deposit is multiplied 
many times over (Werner, 2014) .                           
      
          
 
 
As an alternative to allowing banks to lend the deposits it receives, some economists have 
proposed 100% or Full-Reserve Banking. Under such a system banks must keep the full 
amount of the depositors’ savings in “demand deposit accounts” or cheque accounts 
(Tomlinson, 2010). Such sums would not be lent by the bank, but would be made available 
to satisfy demands for withdrawal. Monies for lending would be acquired through term 
deposits or through use of equity capital.      
                                                                                                                                                                  
John Cochrane points out shares/stock are immune from bank runs. If you sell shares, the 
company will not go bankrupt and you cannot demand that the company repays the shares: 
 
“If a bank has 2 percent equity capital, loses 1 percent of the value of its assets, and 
(as the story goes) cannot quickly issue more equity to rebuild capital, then it has to 
sell half of its assets to restore its capital ratio. If the bank has instead 50 percent 
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equity capital and loses 1 percent of the value of its assets, it only needs to sell 2 
percent of its assets to get back to a 50 percent capital ratio. And if the bank is 100 
percent equity-financed, it doesn't have to sell anything” (Cochrane, 2014). 
 
It is suggested that equity-based capital is expensive compared to short-term borrowing 
from depositors (Jenkins, 2010). Cochrane challenges this assumption when he draws 
attention to the fact that the expense of guarantees, subsidies, financial regulation and 
crises are omitted by those suggesting that equity capital is expensive, as such costs should 
be included in calculating the comparative cost of equity capital and borrowing from 
depositors (Cochrane, 2014, p. 28). He also addresses concerns that 100% Reserve 
Banking would limit the amount available for lending and suggests that securitisation 
would overcome this. Debt which has been securitised can be passed to secondary markets 
and does not have to be financed by bank depositors’ securitised debt (op. cit. p. 28).  
 
Admati and Hellwig agree that full reserve banking (narrow banking) would provide 
effective protection for the depositors without any need for government intervention 
(Admati, 2013) . However, they suggest that Full-Reserve Banking would not eradicate the 
problem of instability in the rest of the financial system unless it was regulated (Admati, 
2013, p. 271); (Turner, 2010). For example, it is suggested that Narrow Banking would not 
have prevented the run on Northern Rock, nor the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which was 
not a retail bank (Turner, 2010). Nevertheless, they are highly critical of current capital 
requirements and the Basel Accords, suggesting that Basel II assisted rather than prevented 
the Financial Crisis 2007-2009. Leverage was high because, prior to the crisis, banks could 
calculate their capital adequacy requirements based on risk models that sought to reduce 
equity and even treated risks as non-existent if they thought it appropriate to do so 
(Admati, 2013, p.184).  Admati and Hellwig therefore argue that rather than having a Basel 
III level of 7% – 8% equity requirement (Admati, 2013), it should be at a far higher level 
of 20-30% of bank assets. This view is supported by Lev Ratnovski, who suggests a 
similar figure of 18% (Ratnovski, 2013). 
 
As has been noted, increases in capital requirement may result in banks preferring to 
reduce lending to keep within those capital requirements, rather than raising additional 
capital through the equity markets. If equity capital is not increased, it becomes no harder 
to increase RoE. Research has shown that in such circumstances unregulated banks/shadow 
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banks103 increase their share of the lending (Aiyar, et al., 2013). This is disadvantageous 
because such banks are not subject to regulation and their potentiality for failure is greater. 
 
2.6 Conclusions – Regulation has limits 
Economist John Kay also sees the capital adequacy system as fundamentally flawed and 
claims that the “rules proved worse than useless” (Kay, 2009, p.7). He points out that in 
general banks entered the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 with more capital than was 
prescribed by the Basel requirements. Indeed, some continued to have capital adequacy 
that was compliant even though they were being supported by governments during the 
period. He suggests that this was due to inadequate assessment of the risks involved. In 
addition, he argues that the use of “off-balance sheet” financial vehicles was intended to 
evade the Basel requirements and concealed failures in capital adequacy from the 
regulators and often from management itself (Kay, 2009, p.8). Furthermore, Kay 
concludes, “No rules on capital adequacy, however complex, can account even 
approximately for the varying circumstances of all the banking institutions in the world. 
This problem is fundamental and is not soluble, even if committees sit in Basel until the 
River Rhine, or at least the local hostelries, run dry” (Kay, 2009, p. 8).  
 
Whilst it is accepted that Basel III improves on Basel II in relation to the amount of equity 
capital required, critics suggest that the concept of capital requirements is inadequate, if 
not flawed. The proportions of equity capital required at 7-8% are small and give little 
protection. Some of the banks such as Northern Rock that appeared to meet the Basel II 
requirements at the start of the financial crisis were soon found to have serious difficulties 
and became dependent on government support. The Basel Accords cannot cope with the 
varying nature of banks. Low equity capital requirements, whilst assisting banks achieve 
higher RoE, increase the requirement for supervision and the risks for the Lender of Last 
Resort or government rescue. In other words, the critics suggest capital requirements 
increase rather than prevent the problems of banks.  
 
Capital requirements are Pillar One of the Basel III Accords. This suggests that they are 
considered to be the most important of the regulatory controls on banks. However, as has 
been seen above, not only was there extensive lobbying to reduce the proportion of equity 
capital borrowing in the Basel III Accords, but banks have substantial latitude in 
                                              
103 Shadow Banks: financial institutions that together conduct traditional banking activities, but do so 
outside of banking regulation 
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interpreting the risk weighting assets, deciding when loans become “impaired” in dealing 
with procyclicality and in their use of Credit Reference Agencies. The closer to Full-
Reserve or 100% banking, the less likelihood there is of depositors’ funds being at risk. 
However, at approximately 7-8% equity capital to deposits, the protection is much 
reduced. 
 
Even if regulation were to prevent the liquidity and insolvency problems experienced by 
banks, these are only some of the problems. Section 1.2.3104 gives numerous examples of 
unethical or dishonest behaviour by bankers that have no relationship to capital adequacy 
or could easily be dealt with by regulation or with controls (Hill, 2012). These will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
 
If there are limits to the effectiveness of law and regulation, can the culture of banks be 
changed, and can those changes be embedded so that the standards of behaviour and 
conduct that would be hoped of banks might be achieved?   Beyond the strict limits of the 
law there are levels of good behaviour, conduct and ethical values that are questions of 
judgement rather than questions of legal interpretation (Group of Thirty, 2015, p. 12). If 
the ability of regulation to control bankers is limited, could culture supplement regulation? 
The next chapter will look at conduct and behaviour that could be altered by cultural 
change. It will consider examples of the different social systems that can create a corporate 
culture. It will also look at the attempts to improve corporate culture within banks and 
explain why, despite those attempts to improve corporate culture, the overarching 













                                              




                                                                                                                           
3. Chapter 3 “Why cultural change is not enough” 
 
The core values of the four largest banks: 
 
Barclays: Respect, Integrity, Service, Excellence, Sustainability 
HSBC: Dependable, Open, Connected. 
Lloyds: Putting Customers First; Keeping it Simple; Making a Difference Together 
RBS: Serving customers, Working together, Doing the right thing, Thinking long 
term 
( Llewellyn, Steare, Trevelli, 2014). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The core values105 of each of the four largest banks are intended to be a statement of their 
inherent culture.  These may come as a surprise given the problems that UK banks have 
experienced over recent years. From the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 and the 
mistreatment of small businesses, as well as the manipulation of foreign exchange markets, 
it appears that banks have moved from one crisis of public confidence to another. Each has 
challenged the ethical credibility of banks.  In 1987, the "Complete Book of Wall Street 
Ethics" (Walker, 1987) was written as a joke, all its pages being totally blank. However, 
what was regarded as a joke in the 1980s  became a widely held public attitude towards 
Wall Street, the City and bankers twenty years later, when the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2008 unfolded as is evidenced by books such as  “The Seven Sins of Wall Street” (Ivry, 
2014), “Fool's Gold” (Tett, 2010), “Citiphilia” (Lanchester, 2008) and “Whoops” 
(Lanchester, 2010). 
 
The previous chapter suggested that regulation, on its own, was insufficient to control the 
damage that banks can cause to a national economy or, as was shown in the Financial 
Crisis of 2007-2008, to the world economy. It was also shown that banks sought to avoid 
or change regulation, if it impeded their ability to maximise profits for shareholders.  
 
                                              
105 The core values of a business organisation are the fundamental beliefs and values which are the basis 
upon which they conduct themselves and work. They act as principles which guide behaviour and assist 
staff and others in determining the correct path in fulfilling the organisations goals.  
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This chapter will explore the suggestion that if cultural change is embedded into a banking 
organisation it will assist in resolving the problems of banks. It will consider the changes in 
the world system of monetary and exchange rate management and how computerisation 
and information technology as well as financialisation have affected the culture within 
banks. It will also consider the idea that there are “limitations to the law” and that, given 
those limitations, culture and ethics can assist in controlling banks once law and regulation 
reach the limits of effectiveness. This chapter will suggest that the problems arising from 
culture are often different from those of regulation. It will look at a number of 
contributions from different academic disciplines and perspectives. It will consider 
examples of the problems of the culture that may exist in banks, but will conclude that all 
cultural change, ultimately, will be unsuccessful in solving the problems of banks, because 
of the overriding need to achieve the best financial returns to meet the demands of 
shareholders. Proposals to change banking culture can take different forms and different 
proposals will be critically examined. It will be suggested, however, that, whilst such 
change is desirable and should be possible, ultimately the desire to get the best RoE, will 
override any such initiatives.  
 
This chapter will examine the concept of culture in banks and the accepted definitions of 
“culture”. It will also assess the claim that the law has its limitations in dealing with the 
problems of banks and, as a result, the law has to be supplemented by cultural concepts. It 
will then critically consider suggestions to strengthen corporate culture as well as the 
limitations of such proposals. It will conclude by stating that the need of bankers to provide 
returns to shareholders affects both regulation and attempts to make banks and bankers 
more ethical. 
 
3.2 Culture: How Changes in the Business Model of Banking have Sought 
to Change the Ethics of Banking. 
Before considering the effect of culture on banks or other organisations, the accepted 
definitions of culture and corporate culture should be considered. It can be stated that 
culture is the prevailing ethos that leads a group or organisation to consider the problems 
that face it and to behave in a particular way without the need to consider formal rules, 
thereby providing self-regulation. Culture can be defined as “an integrated social system 
which promotes the effectiveness of the organization and the well-being of all its 
stakeholders” (Racelis, 2010 cited in Hardowar, 2017). A further definition of culture is the 
“assumptions, beliefs, goals, knowledge and values that are shared by organizational 
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members” (Schwartz H and Davis S, 1981).  The stakeholders in banks are the 
“employees, customers, suppliers, and competitors” and culture affects “how a firm will 
interact with these key actors” (Barney J B, 1986).   
 
In 1989, just three years after the “Big Bang”,106 and two years after the publication of the 
“Complete Book of Wall Street Ethics" (Walker, 1987), a former Deputy Chief Executive 
of NatWest Bank, Charles Green, in praising “Business Ethics in Banking” was able to 
say, “A banker’s role is one of stewardship based on trust. We are trusted by those who ask 
us to look after their money and we have a duty to lend that money responsibly” (Green, 
1989, p. 632).107 In considering the future of banking, he added: 
 
“We should not allow commercial expedients to overrule our fundamental moral 
attitudes and responsibilities. In today's fast and changing market that resolve is 
being tested every day. The pressures on us personally and, as corporations, will 
increase as we move forward. Competition for market share and the battle for 
survival may tempt us to compromise our ethical stance. Increasingly, we shall be 
asked to manage complex and conflicting ethical issues. As we look to the future, 
we have to remember that a company, like an individual, is an accountable moral 
agent. And I believe our commitment to ethical behaviour has to be continuous if 
we are to manage in the longer term.” 
           (Green, 1989, p. 634) 
 
Charles Green was a member of the ‘Old School’ of bankers whose conduct had been 
followed in England for most of the 20th century (Green, 1989). However, such ethical 
conduct had resulted in a cartel of the leading banks, with little to distinguish between 
them and little competition. Competition was, at that time, considered to be unethical in 
that a banker would not poach a customer from another bank, would not compete on price 
and would not involve themselves in hostile takeovers (Chavez, 2002, p. 17).  
 
The change in attitudes from those expressed by Charles Green resulted in the type of the 
misconduct exemplified by and commented on by central bankers in Chapter 1, 108 
                                              
106 The Big Bang occurred on 27 October 1986. There were several parts to Big Bang: it abolished minimum 
fixed commissions on trades; it removed "single capacity", which since 1911 had separated the role of 
brokers, who acted as agents for clients, and jobbers, who made the market and provided liquidity by 
holding stock on their books; and it allowed foreign ownership of UK brokers, to fix capital shortfalls at 
many firms (Slater, 2016). 
107 This reflects the words of JP Morgan at the start of the introduction to this dissertation. 
108 See section 1.2.3 Some Examples of Scandals that have affected Banks, above. 
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following the end of the post-war phase in banking. At the end of the Second World War, 
the strength of trade unions, together with controls on capital and the fear that communism 
could encompass the whole of society, led to a weakening of financial interests. This 
coincided with companies becoming more socially aware and resulted in the improvement 
in employee earnings and benefits. However, with the ending of the Bretton Woods 
agreement in the 1970s,109 shareholder interests began to reassert themselves (that is, a 
wish to maximise their return on their shareholdings). The fall of communism - which had 
led to governments ensuring that their peoples were “content”- as well as the loss of power 
of the trade unions, resulted in the decreased influence of labour on the requirements of 
business (Harvey, 2005). In addition, share option schemes for managers together with 
other performance measures and bonuses meant that the share price and profit of the 
companies became increasingly important. Thus there was a direct correlation between 
bankers’ bonuses and shareholder reward (Ireland, 2011). In other words, RoE became the 
predominant aim of banks and bankers. 
 
The "Big Bang" not only brought new technology into trading in the City of London, but it 
also allowed "Wall Street" to have access to it either directly or through acquisitions of 
London financial firms. In addition, the 1980’s saw the promotion of an 'equity culture' in 
Britain by the Conservative Government.   The Conservatives wished to encourage a 
'property and shareholding democracy'.110 Homeownership was encouraged, for example, 
through the 'right to buy' scheme, which allowed Council house tenants to purchase their 
rented homes at a substantial discount and, with assistance from the local council, lending 
tenants the monies to purchase those properties. The Conservative Government also saw 
the denationalisation of state industries and utilities as a way of improving efficiency, 
increasing the capital raising powers of such industries and utilities, as well as a way of 
obtaining government revenue by selling shares in those industries and utilities. A further 
advantage was that the shares in those industries and utilities were marketed to the public 
through mass advertising and this was aimed at increasing a “shareholding democracy”. 
                                              
109 The Bretton Woods agreement was established under the auspices of the United Nations in 1944 for 
post-war monetary and exchange rate management. It was developed at a conference held in Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire in 1944 and set up the IMF and World Bank as well as a system of exchange rates 
with the US dollar pegged to gold as the world's reserve currency. The system introduced strict exchange 
and capital controls to maintain a fixed exchange system with the dollar. Nevertheless, even though these 
movements appeared to constrain the financial sector, in fact the result was to strengthen it with the result 
that financialisation has been named the unplanned child of Bretton Woods (Nesvetailova, 2013).  
110 We've trebled the number of shareholders in Britain and privatised twenty major industries. That's 
good, but not enough. We want more shareholders and more workers to own shares. So we'll privatise the 
major ports; then we'll tackle British Rail [applause]with more to come. [applause] We have enabled 
three million more peoplehalf of them council tenantsto become new home-owners. Goodbut not 
enough. (Thatcher, 1990). 
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Private pension provision increased as a result of lobbying by insurance companies and 
also the reduction of the value of the basic state pension. This resulted from the change in 
its being linked to prices instead of wages, and led to a reduction of its value against 
average earnings (Ireland, 2011). The government also introduced incentive schemes such 
as PEPs (Personal Equity Plans) to increase indirect and direct share ownership. A number 
of mutual companies,111 particularly those involved in finance, such as insurance 
companies (for example, Norwich Union and Friends Provident) and building societies, 
(for example, Abbey National, Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & Bingley) also 
demutualised by issuing shares to their members.112 
 
Nevertheless, whilst many who had not held shares before, acquired them through 
denationalisation sales or on demutualisation, it appears that most of the British public 
confined their property owning to more easily understood house and property ownership 
(Ireland, 2005). However, as Financialisation grew, so did the opportunities for financial 
institutions to sell financial products to the public who often had insufficient financial 
understanding of such products. This resulted in an increase of RoE, but as seen in section 
1.2.3 above, such products were on occasions mis-sold. 
 
3.3 Unethical Behaviour 
Literature relating to ethics in banking refers to “Morality” as the concept of right or 
incorrect behaviour or conduct, whereas “Ethics” are the standards which govern the 
conduct within a profession, organisation and its membership (Hardowar, 2017). 
Alternatively, ethics can be defined as, “a discipline dealing with what is bad or good, right 
or wrong, and which determines moral duty or obligation. Ethics is also the principle of 
conduct governing an individual or a profession" (Chavez, 2002, p. 21). However, the 
concepts of “Morality” and “Ethics” are often used interchangeably (Jones, 1991, p. 367).  
 
                                              
111 Definition of Mutual Company: an organisation that distributes its surpluses to its customers depending 
on their financial participation in the organisations business. Most members normally have an equal vote 
notwithstanding their commitment.  
112 Six building societies, Abbey National, Halifax, Alliance & Leicester, Northern Rock, Woolwich, and 
Bradford & Bingley demutualised in the late 1980s and 1990s. At the time it was argued that it would bring 
competition to the banking sector. Members were given shares which they kept or sold. The conversions 
resulted in £1 billion in fees and commissions to the city and those who kept their shares lost when all went 
bankrupt or were taken over by Santander or existing banks.  
A parliamentary enquiry calculated that the cost of the demutualised banks had increased by 35% and 
those who achieve most were the top employees. For example, a CEO of demutualised building society 




Ethics are, “standards of behaviour and are designed to respond to the particular dilemmas 
presented by the context” (Sinclair, 1993). In relation to the conduct of business, ethics are 
considered to be “Moral rules or principles of behaviour that should guide members of a 
profession or organization and make them deal honestly and fairly with each other and 
with their customers” (Longman, n.d.). Ethical decisions are those that are accepted as 
being both legal and morally excepted by a wider society  (Jones, 1991, p. 367). Behaviour 
is considered unethical when it offends what is commonly regarded as acceptable conduct, 
adversely affects others, (Tett, 2015) (at Kindle location 1521); (Ho, 2009.); (Robson, 
2014). In relation to banking, unethical behaviour can arise from “sins” such as “greed, 
pride, overindulgence and envy” (Ivry, 2014). 
 
In the wake of the LIBOR manipulation, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England 
recognised that there has been an “ethical drift and abdication of responsibility within the 
industry for guaranteeing financial stability” and advocated “higher standards” and 
“cultural change” (Carney, 2014). The Financial Crisis 2007-2008 has therefore been 
called an ‘ethical crisis’ but there is ample evidence to show that unethical behaviour 
existed before and since the Crisis, and in countries not affected by it (Argandoña, 2011). 
However, this chapter will show that whilst ethics were certainly a problem, they were not 
the determining factor; and that concentration on ethics (and other social science 
approaches) alone, will not suffice to address the problems banks face. Whilst bankers pay 
due respect to the concept of ethics, pressure to ensure maximum RoE is a more important 
determinant of their behaviour. 
 
The Introductory Chapter 1 (section. 1.2.3), provided examples of the problems that have 
arisen from banks, prior to and following the Financial Crisis 2007-2008. However, few 
criminal prosecutions have taken place and very few criminal convictions. The reluctance 
to bring prosecutions resulted from a fear that financial markets would be undermined 
through a failure in confidence. In addition, prosecutions can only be brought for a breach 
of the criminal law, in effect, because the accused has acted in a way that is knowingly 
dishonest. Given the complexity of financial transactions, it is difficult for prosecutors to 
prepare a case and even more difficult for a jury to follow its complexities This could well 
result in prosecutions being unsuccessful when brought for bad or unethical behaviour, or 
for reckless investment or business decisions (Treanor, 2016); (di Vincenzo, 2005). 
Nevertheless, although conduct may not be unlawful it may still be counted as unethical or 




Banking scandals such as those mentioned in Chapter 1 follow certain themes of unethical 
or unacceptable behaviour, including the mis-selling of mortgages by brokers to 
individuals113 or the reckless preparation of CDO’s (Tett, 2010). In the USA, the public 
crisis of confidence in bankers was exacerbated as senior banking executives, who 
‘probably caused the crisis,’ went on to advise the government on how to extract itself 
from that crisis (Boddy, (2011). Top executives of the insolvent companies - Bear Sterns, 
Lehman Brothers and AIG -   retained their fortunes intact.  Officials, such as Timothy 
Geithner,114 who had advised that Lehman should be allowed to collapse, were promoted 
within government and bankers continued to be given billions in bonuses after the 
government bailout (Inside Job, 2010). Academic economists who had wanted relaxation 
of banking regulations became consultants (Casselman, 2012). Accordingly, no one was 
punished and the incentives to change were absent. 
 
The regulatory failures that caused the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 are detailed in 
numerous official reports.115  In addition, it was shown that bankers did not understand 
what they were selling, or they did understand, but still sold, toxic securities to customers, 
who understood them even less. Furthermore, bankers proceeded recklessly ignoring the 
wider effects on the economy including house price inflation and an unsustainable credit 
boom (Hill, 2012, p. 676). The prevailing ethos not only encouraged the behaviour, but 
externalising risk and searching for loopholes in regulation became an object of pride (Hill, 
2012, p.676).  
 
 One example given in section 1.2.3 was the LIBOR scandal, which revealed a number of 
causes of the manipulation of the interest rate. In fact, there were a number of theories as to 
the causes. Pride was proposed as being a factor, as demonstrated by the “Reputational 
Account Theory”, where banks tried to conceal they were not strong by submitting lower 
rates, thereby not giving the impression that they needed to use the London Interbank 
Market to raise money (Rauterberg, G and Verstein A, 2013). According to the "Positional 
Account Theory,” another factor was greed, in that banks were manipulating rates in order 
                                              
113 The individuals were lent monies against the security of their home, but could not afford them and did 
not understand the, often complex, details of the mortgage conditions. For example, some of the 
mortgages sold in America had a high initial discount, which meant initial repayments were initially low, but 
then led to repayments at the full rate which the borrowers could not hope to afford (Tett, 2010). 
114 Timothy Geithner was the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2003 to 2009) and then 
US Secretary of the Treasury under Barack Obama (2009 to 2013). 
115 For example: Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission (United States, 2011); the Levin-Cockburn Report 
(Levin-Coburn US Senate, 2011.); Vickers Report, (Independent Commission on Banking, 2011). 
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to increase their profits (Hardowar, 2017). Finally, there was the “Rogue Trader Theory" 
which demonstrated the greed of traders wishing to increase their earnings by pressurising 
participants to submit LIBOR rates which would enable them to maximise personal gain 
from their dealings (Hardowar, 2017). The description of the scandal above shows how the 
system was available to be exploited by bankers who acted unethically and resulted in the 
three reports116 and consequential reforms. 
 
That regulation on its own has not been successful and that there is a problem of morality 
and ethics in banking has been recognised by the regulators themselves. The Financial 
Crisis 2007-2008 and subsequent scandals have led to calls for a greater emphasis on ethics 
in banking from a number of leading central bankers. Thomas Baxter, the executive Vice 
President and General Counsel of the New York Federal Reserve observed in a speech in 
2015: "The bad behaviour that contributed to the Financial Crisis was evidence of a culture 
that was not strongly ethical" (Baxter, 2015). He suggested that, if financial services 
organisations had a strong moral base, they would avoid poor banker behaviour. Such poor 
banker behaviour, Baxter suggested, would often lead to regulatory investigations which 
resulted in large fines. These will adversely affect the financial services firm’s reputation 
(Baxter, 2015). However, Baxter’s suggestion that enforcement actions “often” happen 
must be questioned. Investigation and enforcement only takes place if the regulatory 
breach is discovered. It is the suggestion of this thesis that, as the desire to maximise return 
for shareholders is predominant, bankers are encouraged to take risks, in the hope that they 
would avoid enforcement action. Even if there were to be a regulatory investigation, by the 
time the regulator investigates, the bank employees concerned may well have left, having 
received their bonuses for their contribution to shareholder profits. 
 
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, observed that the failure in ethics came 
from bankers becoming “detached from end-users”. He noted that when transactions 
became more important than customer relations, banking instruments meant to assist 
business became ways of increasing financial returns for banks. He suggested that when 
bankers became detached from their customers the only reward was money (Carney, 
2014). In other words, the Governor was endorsing the view that RoE predominated.  
Nevertheless in his speech the following year, Carney recognised that the Fixed Income, 
                                              
116 The Wheatley Report, (Wheatley, 2012); the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards Report 
(PCBS) ( Parliamentary Commission on Banking, 2013); the Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR) (HM 
Treasury, Bank of England, FCA, 2015). 
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Currencies and Commodities (FICC) markets117 had relied on an informal set of 
understandings and codes, which may have been applicable in past times, but with 
changing markets and financial products was no longer the case. He particularly noted the 
misconduct in those markets which resulted in a loss of public confidence and threatened 
financial stability (Carney, 2015). William Dudley president and CEO of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York was another to recognise that despite the Financial Crisis of 
2007-2008, examples of unethical conduct of bankers continued despite intervention and 
regulation (Dudley, 2014).  
 
However, when asking the question: “Do employees understand their job to be maximizing 
revenues in any way possible so long as they do not do anything illegal, or do they 
understand their job to be maximizing revenues in a manner consistent with a broader set 
of considerations?" (Tarullo, 2014), Federal Bank Governor Tarullo raised a central 
concern of this thesis; namely, do bankers see their role as creating the greatest possible 
financial returns, so long as they keep within the law, or should they be bound by wider 
ethical considerations? 
3.4 The Limits of the Regulatory Standards 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, the LIBOR scandal and the other examples set out in 
the Introduction have generated an increasing debate over the extent to which the law alone 
can effectively control banks by regulation.  Whether the law is limited in its ability to 
control banking behaviour, and whether a cultural change can assist in controlling banks, 
when the law does not, or cannot do so, should be examined.  The focus will be the 
suggestion that the imperative for RoE is key in affecting the conduct of bankers. 
 
The law is limited in controlling banks for a number of reasons. Many financial 
instruments are very technical and change frequently making it impossible for regulation to 
keep track of these and modify rules to meet fast-moving changes (Hill, 2012). Regulation 
sets the standard below which those who are regulated must not fall. In doing so, it creates 
the problem that regulation sets the base standard rather than the best standard. Regulation 
does not set a horizon of good standards to be achieved. Sanctions are imposed against 
those who break the rules, but regulation does not promote or reward those who develop 
good practice (Law and Ethics in Finance Project, 2015).  Whilst conduct on the wrong 
                                              
117 (FICC) Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities markets: are not one market , but many markets, 
which range from trading in low risk government bonds to foreign exchange currencies specialising in 
interest rates and high risk commodity trading. 
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side of the line is penalised, regulation can encourage poor behaviour that is just on the 
other (right) side of the line; it is lawful but not necessarily ethical (Hill, 2012). However, 
in a system where there is pressure to maximise shareholder return, rather than to provide 
the best service and work for the benefit of society, it is difficult to see how a banker can 
be penalised for obeying the law and achieving the best financial return for the bank. In 
addition, the base standard is lowered because, as was seen in Chapter 2, banks use their 
resources to employ lawyers to find ways around regulations so they can maximise returns, 
or lobbyists118 to change them so that they are the base standard, thereby assisting banks to 
maximise profits rather than maximising banking standards. 
 
One of the results of the limitations on regulation is that further regulation may be 
considered to overcome the defects in existing regulations. Another disadvantage of 
regulation is that the greater the number of rules that exist, the greater the compliance 
problems. Compliance itself, or meeting compliance standards, becomes the objective, 
rather than the means to achieve the objective. As a result, attempts to create regulations 
that cover all conduct give rise to complexity and confusion with the result that the 
regulations themselves become less effective119 (Law and Ethics in Finance Project, 2015). 
 
A further limitation of regulation is that, if regulations are vague or imprecise, it allows 
bankers to deny that either a breach has occurred or that there is responsibility on their part 
for such a breach. (di Vincenzo, 2005). Another factor that suggests there are limitations to 
the effectiveness of regulation is the cost-benefit evaluation made by bankers on a course 
of unethical behaviour (that is, bankers come to a decision as to whether the risk of being 
found out is less than the opportunity to achieve a greater profit by following a particular 
course of behaviour). Enforcement of regulations is also made harder by the burden of 
proof required by the court,120 which leads to compliance in form, but avoidance in effect 
(di Vincenzo, 2005). 
 
                                              
118 A detailed account of the power of lobbyists in Washington during the period following the financial 
crisis 2007-2008 is contained in "The Payoff: Why Wall Street Always Wins"(Connaught, 2012). It illustrates 
reticence of the government to take active steps for reform, the reliance of the government on the Wall 
Street experts who had not prevented the crisis and the opposition who were benefiting from campaign 
donations from Wall Street financiers. 
119 For example, The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive [MiFID] was criticised for being complex, 
difficult to follow and to enforce with substantial costs falling on the investor rather than investment firms 
(Burke, 2009). 
120 The burden of proof required for a criminal prosecution is 'beyond reasonable doubt. It is very difficult 
to prove that a banker was acting fraudulently rather than recklessly in implementing a regulation. 
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Often overlooked in such discussions are the financial constraints on regulators compared 
to the industry they are trying to regulate, as well as the fact that the reward schemes 
offered to bankers are attractive to the poorly paid employees of regulators. Regulators are 
often well trained and therefore   good sources for recruitment by the banks. An employee 
of a regulator hoping to be employed by a bank would not wish to create a bad reputation 
with potential future employers by becoming too ‘difficult’ with them (Luyendijk, 2012). 
 
3.5 Changes in corporate culture as an alternative approach to the 
problems of banks 
Whilst the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 and the other banking scandals referred to in the 
introductory chapter have led to further consideration of regulation, there have been 
alternative views and increased calls for there to be a moral or ethical approach, within the 
whole of banking and finance sector rather than on an institution-by-institution basis (Hill, 
2012). The interest of academics in such an approach has been echoed in official reports. 
For example, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards considered culture in 
the UK banking sector and professional standards following the LIBOR rate-setting 
scandal with the intent of ascertaining the lessons that could be learned from the LIBOR 
scandal, and made recommendations in a report “Changing Banking for Good ( 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking, 2013)”. This was followed by the Fair and 
Effective Markets Review,121 published in July 2015. Whilst that Report had a “headline” 
of increasing sentences for those involved in market abuse, it spent much of the report 
considering raising professionalism and standards of the participants in the market. They 
included recommendations for ascertaining and developing methods for aspiration to the 
highest standards, a strong ethical culture within businesses and the development of strong 
code of personal ethics, with self-review (HM Treasury, Bank of England, FCA, 2015). In 
addition, the Prudential Regulation Authority considers that its objectives rely on banks 
having the highest regard for those objectives and that they should be reflected in the banks 
and their “standards of behaviour” (The Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014). 
 
The Financial Crisis 2007-2008 and the subsequent problems that have affected banks have 
attracted much academic attention. Not unnaturally, most academic writers approach the 
                                              
121 The Fair and Effective Markets Review (FEMR), (HM Treasury, Bank of England, FCA, 2015) was 
established by Treasury together with the Bank of England and The Financial Conduct Authority, to 
investigate the manner in which the wholesale financial markets operate, with the aim of restoring 




problems from their own particular academic disciplines or interests ranging from a 
philosophical or ethical view to a socio-political viewpoint. Banking is therefore viewed 
from anthropological, organisational or socio-psychological viewpoints as well as using 
concepts of Ethical Decision-Making, Psychology and Education theory. However, 
academic suggestions as to the cause of the problems are often limited to those particular 
academic fields, whether it be the law, philosophy, psychology or social sciences. 
Nevertheless, this chapter will suggest that whilst each of the approaches to the problems 
of banks from the different academic disciplines makes a contribution, no single discipline 
(or even a combination of disciplines) provides an exhaustive explanation of the problems 
or has the solutions. It will suggest that on their own the “soft skills” approach is likely to 
fail when faced with the pressures to maximise profits and RoE.  
3.6 Explanations for the Ethical/Moral Problems in Banking 
The examples of unethical behaviour given above,122 as well as the concerns expressed by 
central bankers in keynote speeches, 123 show that regulation has not been successful in 
dealing with the problems of banks and that there are ethical and moral shortcomings that 
are not dealt with by regulation. 
 
A number of explanations are given as to the reasons why there are ethical and moral 
problems in banking. Firstly, it is suggested that the compensation/payment system 
rewards short-term performance and gaming (either manipulating personal targets or 
gambling with other people's assets). Such pay schemes are linked to income generating 
targets. They therefore align the bankers’ interests to be financially rewarded with the 
shareholders’ interests to maximise profit. In addition, if a banker receives a large bonus, it 
is a mark of that banker’s success, both within the current organisation and, if he or she 
wishes to move to work for another bank, it sets a benchmark from which he or she will 
receive future remuneration in the new employment.  The criteria for performance are 
short-term and judged against financial, rather than wider performance targets, because 
financial targets governed by accounting rules are easier to measure than moral or ethical 
standards (Hill, 2012). 
 
Secondly, a problem is recognised in bankers trading on their own account. They have 
much to gain if they are successful and, ultimately, are protected personally by the limited 
                                              
122 See section 3.3 Unethical Behaviour, above. 
123 See section 3.3 above (Tarullo, 2014). 
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liability of banks if they fail. Often the banks are TBTF124 and bank traders know that, 
ultimately, the State will step in to save them (Hill and Painter, 2015). Thirdly, there is a 
problem in the explanation given to customers who may become embrangled by the 
instruments or the procedures the banks are recommending and accept the assurance by the 
bankers that "everybody's doing it" (Hill, 2012). Customers rely on the banks’ guidance 
and just because everybody is (or is said) to be “doing it” is not a justification for 
recommending an unethical course. This concept can be referred back to the work of 
Kohlberg and the concept he propounded of ‘levels of ethical decision-making’ (Kohlberg, 
1975) (cited by Fichter 2016).125 In this case, the customer, and, indeed, the banker, would 
be at the level of decision-making where the decision-maker justifies the decision by 
relying on what peers and contemporaries are said to be doing (“conventional level of 
morality”) rather than on the higher level, “post-conventional level of morality”, where the 
decision-maker relies on his/her own interpretation of what is morally correct. 
 
Fourthly, problems arise in that bankers are a sub-community, often working long hours 
together, becoming isolated and seeking to prove their individual worth by outdoing each 
other. The group begins to develop its own values and norms, which seek to exclude the 
values of others, including those of wider society. The ethical problems that arise from 
bankers becoming a sub-community or “silo” could be considered from the aspect of 
Organisational Theory (Fichter, 2016) or, possibly, from an anthropological viewpoint 
(Tett, 2015).126  
 
However, underlying each of the four explanations above is the desire to maximise RoE. 
Pay structures reward those who maximise profit on deals and transactions; much can be 
gained by taking risks and there is little to lose because of TBTF. Customers are enticed 
into transactions on the guidance of bankers, who have much to gain in fees and 
commissions from profitable transactions. Finally, in relation to the “Silo effect”, as 
Governor Mark Carney suggested, “When bankers become detached from end-users, their 
                                              
124  Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF): describes the idea a business has become so large that a government will always 
prevent its collapse, as failure could start a systemic bank run adversely affecting the entire the economy. A 
Government may decide that the cost of an intervention is less to the economy than the cost of the failure. 
125 "Levels of Ethical Decision-Making": stages one and two were the pre-conventional level where rules are 
obeyed because of penalties imposed for non-compliance; stages three and four are the conventional 
level where people follow rules because of the behaviour of their peers and contemporaries; finally stages 
five and six are the Post conventional level of morality this is where individuals rely upon their own 
interpretation of what is morally correct. Rest took these principles and turned them into a Defining Issues 





only reward becomes money” (Carney, 2014). 
 
Whilst the preceding examples may, at times, show illegal conduct, they also show conduct 
that is unethical, relating in particular, to greed and pride. In order to see how these ethical 
problems can be addressed, the next section will look at the concepts of ethics and morality 
in more detail. 
3.7 The Introduction of Ethics and Morality as a way of dealing with the 
Problems of Banks 
It is suggested by some academics that a culture of ethics can only be successfully 
implemented if the banks individually internalise ethical values through their formal 
organisational structures and informally through a culture of ethics (Hardowar, 2017). 
Others argue that this crisis is a crisis of leadership or governance in numerous institutions, 
which is, in effect, a reflection of the failure of an economic and social model grounded on 
certain anthropological and ethical assumptions, and it is these assumptions that have 
failed and led to the wrong managerial approaches127 (Argandoña, 2011). However, in a 
competitive environment, where the race is to achieve maximum RoE, there is inevitably a 
clash of interests between the structure of a joint-stock bank128 with shareholders seeking 
the best return, and a duty to the customer and wider society to place ethics ahead of 
profits.129 Most academics accept that ethics and morality do not stand on their own and 
that they have to be part of either culture, an organisation or “trickle down” through 
leadership (Law and Ethics in Finance Project, 2015). These concepts will be considered 
later in this chapter. 
 
Different social science disciplines have looked at the problem from their own 
perspectives. Not only does this reflect academic and public interest in the problems of 
banks and the Financial Crisis 2007-2008, but it brings different approaches to the subject. 
These disciplines include those based on social science, business studies, philosophy as 
well as lawyers looking at the issue from the perspective of the limitations of the law. The 
next section will consider the approaches of these different academic disciplines. 
 
                                              
127  In incentive, accounting, reporting and monitoring systems as well in the selection, training and 
remuneration of personnel and in business culture. 
128 A Joint-Stock Bank is a bank which is a public limited company and issues shares that are owned by 
investors rather than by an institution, government as a mutual. 
129 See section 4.3 Why not rely on shareholder control? below. 
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 3.7.1 Too-Big-to-Fail (“TBTF”) 
Some academic disciplines have analysed the problems of banks and bankers and others 
have proposed solutions. Anthropology, for example, has looked at the interaction between 
individuals working in banks. Sociology has considered banks within society, whereas 
psychology has looked at bankers as psychological types. Social psychologists in 
particular, have argued shareholders were unwilling to accept lower returns, even though 
the regulatory requirements of BASEL III 130 required banks to hold higher capital (see 
section 2.4). Continued shareholder demands for RoE led banks’ lobbyists to seek to 
minimise the effects of Basel III. Another example was contained in an Oliver Wyman131 
report, which suggested that a number of fundamental problems that existed prior to the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 had not been resolved (Wilkinson, 2011),  but that the 
pressure to maintain a RoE was leading banks into the less regulated shadow banking 
system or into the creation of asset bubbles (Keen, 2017);  (Williams and Conley, 2014, p. 
102); (Wilkinson, 2011). Overall, scholars within these disciplines suggest that a number 
of the banking problems concern, firstly, the TBTF 132 problem, secondly a culture of 
insecurity and, thirdly, remuneration structures that promote the taking of risk and self-
interest. 
 
TBTF financial institutions are recognised as having five problems. Firstly, such TBTF 
banks may feel they can take on excessive borrowing, because of an expectation of 
government support should they run into difficulties.133 Secondly, they receive higher 
credit rating agency134 scores, because such agencies believe that TBTF banks will not fail 
as, ultimately, they will be supported by government. Thirdly, as a result of their contacts 
with government, TBTF financial institutions hold excessive political influence. Fourthly, 
their lending may become reckless, because creditors expect banks to be safe when they 
                                              
130 Basel III followed from the earlier Basel I and Basel II Accords. It aims to improve the ability of banks to 
improve and strengthen risk management, make the dealings of banks more open and deal with financial 
stress. A particular aim of Basel III was to create greater resilience at the level of individual banks so as to 
reduce the risk of systemic shocks. 
131 A global management consulting firm : http://www.oliverwyman.com/who-we-are.html 
132 "Too big to fail" describes the idea a business has become so large that a government will always prevent 
its collapse, as failure could start a systemic bank run adversely affecting the entire the economy. A 
Government may decide that the cost of an intervention is less to the economy than the cost of the failure. 
133 There are of course numerous organisations upon which a society depends to run smoothly and could 
equally be described as too big to fail (for example, a railway network or a health service). It does, however, 
appear only to apply to banks with the temptation/pressure to lend in order to maximise profits. 
134  Credit rating agency: a credit rating is the calculation of the ability of a borrower to repay a loan or 
other financial obligation. The borrower could be a state, local authority, company or an individual. Such 
assessments are undertaken by companies known as credit rating agencies, the best known of which are 
Standard & Poors, Moodys or Fitch. A problem comes from the fact that the objects of the assessment are 
those that pay for the credit rating and therefore there is a conflict-of-interest. 
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are guaranteed by government. Finally, there is a social problem in that people see the 
system as “privatising gains and socialising losses” (Williams and Conley, 2014, p. 110). 
 
Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, recognised the problem: 
 
“Perhaps, the most severe blow to public trust was the revelation that there were 
scores of too-big-to-fail institutions operating at the heart of finance. Bankers made 
enormous sums in the run-up to the crisis and were often well compensated after it 
hit. In turn, taxpayers picked up the tab for their failures. That unjust sharing of risk 
and reward contributed directly to inequality but – more importantly – has had a 
corrosive effect on the broader social fabric of which finance is part and on which it 
relies” (Carney, 2014). 
 
In his speech to the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism, Carney suggested that the 
Financial Stability Board135- having identified the TBTF institutions- had subjected them 
to higher standards in ‘stress tests’.136 The Financial Stability Board was also developing 
methods to ensure that if they did fail, such a failure could be resolved without damage to 
the financial system as a whole and risk to the taxpayer (Carney, 2014). In the United 
Kingdom, the Prudential Regulation Authority is charged with promoting the “safety and 
soundness” of financial services companies, including banks it regulates (Prudential 
Regulation Authority, 2013). Whilst it seeks to ensure that major financial institutions 
including banks are sound the Prudential Regulation Authority states it does not support a 
TBTF regime suggesting that it would allow firms to fail, but in a manner that would not 
affect financial stability (Cunliffe, 2014).  However, the efficacy of such methods will not 
be known until they are tested in another financial crisis as ‘stress tests’ are regulatory 
creations. For example ‘Stress tests’ do not affect the banks’ influence on the Credit 
Ratings agencies, nor the political influence exercised by TBTF banks, as  stress tests look 
at the bank’s ability to deal with the crisis rather than its influence and lobbying powers. 
                                              
135 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an international body established in 2009 following the Financial 
Crisis 2007-2008 by the G 22 to promote global financial stability by coordinating the development of 
regulatory, supervisory policies. The areas dealt with are purely regulatory and do not involve improving the 
culture or ethics of banks. 
136 Stress Tests: bank stress tests are assessments of how a bank would cope in difficult economic 
circumstances. They are an analysis conducted under unfavourable economic scenarios. Risks assessed 
include credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk to ascertain whether a bank has sufficient capital to cope 
with the impact of adverse developments. Whilst the Bank of Englands 2017 Stress Tests include 
Misconduct Costs (that is, fines) as a Stress factor, the Bank of Englands Stress Tests involve accounting 
and are quantifiable rather than attempting to assess the business culture of a bank under stress test 
assessment (Bank of England, 2017).  
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Regulatory changes may seek to control banks, but until the bank is successfully allowed 
to fail and not result in a bank run, the culture of too big to fail will still be embedded 
amongst bankers (Williams and Conley, 2014). 
 
 3.7.2 A Culture of Insecurity 
 
In addition to the TBTF issue, social anthropologists have recognised a culture of 
insecurity as another cause of problems in banking. Employment is seen as volatile and 
insecure, particularly, at lower and middle levels. This is very different to the culture that 
Chavez (Chavez, 2002) identified in the London banking culture of Charles Green.137 In 
the days of Charles Green, banking was a career starting from when a banking entrant left 
school and continued until he ‘got his gold watch” upon retirement. However, Bankers find 
themselves in very different circumstances today. Karen Ho, a social anthropologist, 
worked at Bankers Trust and found herself part of a downsizing exercise. She quotes one 
of her co-workers: 
 
“I think that every single day you realize that your job could be gone the next 
day. You have a downturn in the market and they lay off hundreds of people or 
you have a downturn in just your desk['s] [particular product area] performance; 
all of sudden they need to lay off people. Your company decides they don't want 
 to be in that product anymore; they lay off an entire department. I just think that's 
 part of life here” (Ho, 2009). 
 
Not only was their work insecure, but the only thing the employees’ line managers were 
interested in was ‘how much money have you made for me today?’’ In a dog-eat-dog 
environment, staff that did not perform and achieve their financial targets would find that 
they were summarily dismissed (Ho, 2009). This business culture of short-termism results 
in any worker protecting their own interests by making as much money as they can before 
the job is no longer there. They have no concern for the company or its customers; this 
culture makes them put their own interests first. In such an environment, any 
considerations for ethics, ‘to treat customers fairly’, or a longer-term view of the 
consequences of any actions, will be laid aside by the insecure employee. A combination 
of the competitive and individualistic culture of the TBTF financial institutions thus creates 
an environment where the management of risk and compliance are seen as encumbrances, 
                                              
137
 See section 3.6 Explanations for the Ethical/Moral Problems in Banking, above 
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rather than precautions. 
 
3.7.3 Bankers’ Bonuses - the Remuneration Problem 
 
One of the major problems is identified as the remuneration (known as “compensation”  in 
the USA) system (Hill, 2012); (Hill and Painter, 2015); (Williams and Conley, 2014). 
Many have been attracted to banking over the years because of its high remuneration (Bok, 
1993). However, the remuneration system works to exacerbate the ethical problems of 
banks. Firstly, it is suggested that the system of, in effect, re-insuring the risk of banking 
transactions (for example, by packaging and then reselling them) leads to more 
transactions and therefore more payment to those involved. Secondly, the size of their 
payments allows bankers and their institutions to have a far bigger effect on influencing 
government and political campaigning. The mentality the remuneration system creates, 
particularly when combined with the level of insecurity, is one of “get it while the going is 
good”. The compensation and payment system rewards short-term performance and 
gaming, either by manipulating personal targets or gambling with other people's assets 
(Hill and Painter, 2015). This led to a ‘manic search’ for deals and transactions and, when 
combined with the competitive and individualistic culture of the TBTF financial 
institutions, creates an environment in which the management of risk and compliance are 
seen as encumbrances, rather than precautions (Williams and Conley, 2014, p. 112). The 
remuneration system of performance-related bonuses ties the banker into the return on 
equity culture and thereby bankers’ financial rewards are based on profit rather than ethics. 
 
Moreover, the criteria for performance are short-term and set against financial rather than 
true performance targets. Using performance-based targets that can be quantified in 
accounting terms is often easier, as performance can be judged against the value of deals or 
profits made and bonuses given accordingly. However, it does not take into account other 
contributions to the success of a business such turning down a ‘deal’, which although 
profitable, may not be in the best interests of a customer (Hill, 2012). 
 
There have been a number of proposals to bring bankers bonuses closer to the long-term 
prosperity and security of banks (for example, bonus clawback, holding of shares for a 
period before encashment). However, such schemes may not be sufficient to change the 
behaviour of bankers. If they already have substantial assets, such bankers may be happy to 
risk a part of those assets when there is the possibility of a very large bonus if the risk 
succeeds. This may even extend to the shares they hold in the bank as well as any bonuses, 
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provided that they could maintain their wealthy lifestyle. Other bankers may be willing to 
take such risks if their personal assets - other than their shares in the bank- were not at risk, 
even if there were risk to the bank itself (Hill and Painter, 2015, Introduction). 
  
Having looked at the problems from an anthropological and sociological point of view, 
motivations for such human behaviour are now looked at with consideration to 
Organisational and Social Psychology. These fall into three categories: firstly, 
“instrumental motives”, for example, self-interest and the need to control one’s 
environment and circumstances; secondly, relationship motivation, which is based on the 
desire to belong to groups (families, countries workplaces) and, finally, moral motivation, 
which arises from the need to have a meaningful existence (Williams and Conley, 2014, p. 
114). 
 
The criticism of the sociological/anthropological approaches is that whilst they analyse the 
problems and make broad suggestions, no framework is proposed as to how those 
ameliorations can be effected, particularly against the existing bankers’ status quo. For 
example, in a culture where jobs are insecure, how do you prevent line managers with 
departmental targets from threatening their subordinates? 
 
 
3.7.4 The Individual Psychology of a Banker 
Social psychology and anthropology look at banks, bankers and banking culture as a group 
or organisation. However, the problem of bankers can be considered on an individual basis, 
by considering the psychological make-up of the persons who are bankers. 
 
In particular, the psychological processes by which bankers approach questions of ethics 
and honesty can be considered. Money Intelligence Theory138 research suggested that a 
“high love-of-money individuals have higher Machiavellianism” 139 and therefore “are 
more likely to use manipulative strategies, take high risks, and engage in unethical 
behaviour” than those who do not share the same “high love-of-money” aspirations (Tang 
& Chen, 2008). It is suggested that, in general, bankers fall into the category of “high love-
                                              
138 Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical 
concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate 
happiness.  (Tang & Chen, 2008 in Hardowar, 2017). 
139 Definition of "Machiavellianism" in psychology refers to a characteristic of a person who is so focused on 




of-money” individuals, as not only does the work involve money, but the bonus system and 
performance pay offer high monetary rewards. In addition, as was commented upon above 
by Mark Carney, the FICC markets had relied on an informal set of understandings which 
had not kept pace with the changing times and had thereby allowed a new culture 
reflecting current practice to become embedded. This allowed dishonesty to develop in the 
LIBOR markets, not just as a criminal offence or regulatory breach “but also a culturally 
defined psychological construct” (Tang & Chen, 2008 in Hardowar, 2017). 
 
In addition, ethical breaches may arise because of error - “good people making mistakes” 
out of confusion or ignorance; weakness - “good people having weakness of will”, and 
vice- “bad people choosing to do evil”, (Hardowar, 2017).  Other research shows that 
people like to consider themselves to be honest, yet a dishonest course often provides 
handsome rewards. This research exhibited the fact that people behave sufficiently 
dishonestly to profit themselves, but honestly enough to create a self-belief of their own 
integrity (Mazar, et al., 2008).  This research shows that bankers can act unethically to 
maximise profits, while at the same time, believing themselves to be acting correctly. The 
belief that they are fulfilling their role to achieve the maximum return equity, albeit by 
acting unethically, is subsumed into the self-belief that they are acting correctly. 
 
Another way of considering the psychology of bankers was to suggest that leading bankers 
were corporate psychopaths140 and this was a significant factor in causing the Financial 
Crisis 2007-2008 in addition to other problems identified above (Boddy, 2011). It was 
suggested that changes in the nature of large corporate organisations in the last part of the 
20th century, moving from a slow changing environment to one with mergers, takeovers, 
rapid movements in personnel and lack of job security, led to the character of individuals 
being less understood (Boddy, 2011, p. 257). Boddy states that Professor Robert Hare, ‘the 
world's leading expert’ on psychopathy "has repeatedly drawn attention to the possible 
damage that Corporate Psychopaths could cause in major financial and other 
organizations” (Boddy, (2011).  
 
Psychologists and organisational behaviour consultants suggest that a culture of ethics may 
prevent “errors”, overcome “weakness” (submitters who felt compelled to follow the 
orders of superiors) and punish “wrongdoers” (Hardowar, 2017). However, the pressure on 
                                              
140 Psychopaths are "people who, perhaps due to physical factors to do with abnormal brain connectivity 
and chemistry, especially in the areas of the amygdala and orbital/ventrolateral frontal cortex" (Boddy, 
2011, p. 256). 
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those employed in banks to achieve a RoE (dividend to shareholders) continues, 
notwithstanding the attempts to change corporate culture in banks141 (Wilkinson, 2011). 
Combined with the insights provided by the Money Intelligence Theory35 this suggests that 
attempts to create such a ‘culture of ethics’, will always have intrinsic difficulties because 
whilst behaviour is motivated by many factors such as norms, cooperation, fairness, 
empathy and moral duty (Williams and Conley, 2014, p. 115),  it is suggested that 
alternative motives do exist to those of the pure acquisition of money by bankers and that 
that changes in organisational culture within banks could have an effect on their ethical 
behaviour. 
3.8 Cognitive Moral Development and Ethical Decision-Making (“EDM”) 
It has been seen that bankers seek to avoid regulation through the use of lawyers to find 
‘loopholes’, lobbyists to amend regulations that impede them maximising profits and 
sometimes simply by ignoring regulations altogether. In the previous section, problems 
connected to ‘TBTF’, workplace insecurity, remuneration packages that draw bankers into 
maximising RoE and individual psychological motivations were discussed. An alternative 
method to explore how bankers reach their decisions is by looking at theories of ethical 
decision-making.142 Kohlberg, in developing the Cognitive Moral Development Theory 
(Kohlberg, 1975), considered decision-making involving ethical problems.  
 
Kohlberg's Cognitive Moral Development Theory143 suggested that moral selves develop 
with time and experience. The theory explains that persons operate at three levels. Firstly a 
‘pre-conventional’ level where persons act in particular ways to avoid punishment; 
secondly at a ‘conventional level’ where there is conformity resulting from the need for 
approval and acceptance by others; and finally, at a ‘post-conventional’ level, which 
applies to persons who have developed their own moral values independent from others 
and irrespective of what the law may dictate (Kohlberg, 1975). The theory argues that most 
persons operate on the ‘conventional level’ with ethical decisions being made because of 
conformity and the desire to be socially accepted.  
                                              
141 The limitations of such attempts can be seen from way in which the Prudential Regulation Authority 
identifies failings and culture. It seeks to review valuation methods, assess the independence of risk 
management and "board effectiveness reviews", and consider remuneration policies. These are regulatory 
attempts to assess culture by using measures that are quantifiable. Banks will be able to prepare 
themselves to pass such quantifiable tests without changing underlying ethos-to maximise shareholder 
profit (Prudential Regulation Authority, 2014). 
142 Ethical Decision Making it is a process which assists individuals to make difficult choices where there is 
an ethical problem and where there is no obvious correct answer.  
143 A further useful consideration of Ethical Decision-Making and Cognitive Moral Development Theory can 




In the hierarchical world of banking, this shows itself in junior employees not expressing a 
differing opinion through fear that their superiors may exclude them from future projects 
or because it may impinge on their career prospects. More senior employees accept the 
prevailing ethos that profits must be maximised per trader or department. There are no 
encouragements to express moral values that are contrary to those of the prevailing ethos 
of maximising shareholder value. 
 
Working from Kohlberg’s theory, James Rest created an Ethical Decision-Making 
(EDM)144 model, the “Defining Issues Test” (Rest, 1975). However, experiments by 
researchers to ascertain whether gender, age or business ethics courses lead to the exercise 
of greater moral values in finance, failed to show that there was any statistical difference 
145
 or correlation between high levels of education and higher scores on ethical decision-
making (Chavez, 2002); (Rhodes, 2010). Whilst EDM explains why bankers behave in 
ways that do not assert ethical behaviour, the theory does not suggest how this can be 
overcome and although recommendations were made in the conclusions of the research 
projects, they assert that maximising RoE overrides EDM.142 
 
Furthermore, EDM theory is limited as a way of controlling overarching pressure to 
maximise shareholder value, because it assumes a rational decision-making process. In 
fact, emotion often plays a role in decision-making which interferes with rationality 
(Dirkx, 1997); (Yorks, 2002). Similarly, EDM focuses on rules rather than moral standards 
and assumes that an employee uses his/her own innate skills and moral support 
mechanisms, which will act as an effective guide to decision-making. It could be argued 
that, in complex and uncertain environments, such an assumption may not work. For 
example, an organisation's atmosphere can damage an employee’s own moral identity if 
the organisation is pursuing the goal of profit maximisation and acting less ethically in 
order to achieve shareholder return. In such circumstances a banker may decide to 
conform, following the "everyone is doing it" concept (Hill, 2012, p. 690) rather than 
                                              
144 Ethical Decision-Making (EDM) Theory seeks "to understand how employees make decisions about 
ethical issues, it is important to examine the Ethical Decision Making process" (Fichter, 2016, p. 3). 
145 The finding of one of the research projects was a correlation between high levels of education and 
higher scores on ethical decision-making. However, it was noted that employees with such a higher level of 
education commanded higher salaries and the pressure for profit maximisation required clerical staff that 
were less well educated and lower paid (Chavez, 2002, p. 71). The other experimental study concluded that 
taking ethics courses in business management schools did not increase their test scores over those who had 
not (Rhodes, 2010). It was suggested that this supported the finding that the approach of such business 
schools was financial, concentrating on the maximisation of shareholder value (Emiliani, 2004). 
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acting ethically (Fichter, 2017). Academics have suggested modifications to the core 
theory of EDM146. However, as will be seen, they do not overcome the underlying problem 
that the pressure to achieve RoE is a prevailing ethos. 
 
There have been various refinements to the theory of EDM to overcome the flaws 
mentioned. The underlying flaw in the argument that there is an expectation for ethics or 
morality to control the behaviour of bankers is found in EDM itself. Given that it has been 
suggested that most involved in banking work on Kohlberg's ‘conventional level’, that is, 
acting in conformity to obtain for approval and acceptance by others, they are more likely 
to be those who commit "crimes of obedience". Whatever the impression that banks may 
wish to give, the pressure on those operating at "conventional level" is not to put ethics and 
morality first, but to seek the maximum profits, RoE. 
 
3.9 The Importance of Leadership  
Those who believe that moral authority and ethical education can overcome the drive to 
maximise shareholder value and profit suggest that concepts of leadership and culture are 
linked. Whatever aspirations to having an ethical culture a bank may have, they will not 
become embedded unless they are adopted and promoted by the leadership of the bank. An 
example of this is the conduct of Richard S. Fuld, the CEO of Lehman Brothers. Until the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, Fuld was praised for the bank’s profitability and his 
authoritarian excesses were ignored  (Stevens & Buechler, 2013). It is argued that the 
quality of the leadership of a bank is an essential requirement for ensuring that the banking 
institution encompasses ethical behaviour and that its core values are embedded within the 
culture, not just platitudes. Leaders holding to the values of honesty, integrity and 
trustworthiness are seen to be needed to re-establish trust between the organisation and its 
employees and customers (Doering, 1998); (Minner, 2016). It showed leaders can have an 
impact by acting as role models, treating their employees and others with respect, standing 
by their word and not asking for more than they can give themselves (Zwygart, 2014). 
Leaders must also ensure that the culture they wish to imbue “trickles down” through the 
                                              
146 For example, it has been suggested that the concept of Moral Strength could be added with the aim of 
tackling the pressure to conform, rather than to make an ethical stand (Fichter, 2016, p. 6); (Trevino, 1986) 
This contrasts with those who are likely to follow unethical directives without question and commit "crimes 
of obedience". To complain about ethical issues, for example by, whistleblowing", requires moral strength.  
A whistle-blower has to be willing to bear the (often considerable) personal risk that whistleblowing may 
involve; not only will his/her current employment being at an end, but are unlikely to be hired by any other 
financial institution, who would feel that the person was a potential troublemaker (Fichter, 2016); (Sekerka, 
et al., 2009, p. 575).  
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organisation so that those at all levels will eventually implement the ethical lead (Law and 
Ethics in Finance Project, 2015). 147 Moreover, when employees are committed to an 
organisation, this has a significant impact on their adoption of those core values. Thus, this 
study supports the literature which suggests that leadership and commitment are 
prerequisites for the adoption of values (Wallace & de Chernatony, 2011, p. 397).  
 
However, the fundamental problem for realising the aspiration to embody ethics into the 
culture of banks to assist in overcoming the problems exemplified above148 is that chief 
executives of banks are not appointed for their ethical skills. They are appointed because 
they increase the profits of the bank and dividends to shareholders. In their time, Sir Fred 
Goodwin (RBS), Richard S. Fuld of Lehman Brothers and149 John Varley150 of Barclays 
Bank were the "darlings" of the industry, because of the profits they distributed to their 
shareholders. The shareholders paid little attention to the ethics of those leaders or 
disregarded them, because their focus was on the profits they made. Not surprisingly, great 
leaders in banks are generally considered by shareholders to be those who maximise 
shareholder value and RoE rather than those who may be too ‘pious’ and thus achieve a 
lower return on shareholder equity. 
 
3.10 The Role of Organisational Culture in Ethical Decision-Making 
 
For those who suggest that there is a moral or ethical alternative or an addition to 
regulation to prevent the dominance of the RoE concept, the avenue of change in 
Organisational Behaviour Theory lies, arguably, in the concept of "Ethical Business 
Culture".151 Official ethical goals are found, for example, in business documentation. 
                                              
147 The Law and Ethics in Finance Project started work in 2013 and consisted of a group with expertise in the 
law, finance and ethics.148 See the section 3.3 Unethical Behaviour above.  
148 See the section 3.3 Unethical Behaviour above.  
149 Richard S. Fuld produced profits every year for Lehman brothers until its bankruptcy in 2008 including 
one of $4.7 billion in 2007, the year of its demise. He was nicknamed the "gorilla" because of his 
competitiveness. Whilst the bank had a code of conduct it appears that it was not used as a strategic 
document (Stevens & Buechler, 2013). 
150 John Varley was the chief executive of Barclays bank until 2010 and who signed the Barclays code of 
conduct which included the statement We expect every Barclays employee, and others who work on our 
behalf, to conduct themselves according to consistently high professional and ethical standards. Mr Varley 
is currently being prosecuted for offences arising out of the Barclays and Qatar rescue during the financial 
crisis 2007-2008 (Auger, 2013). 
151 An "Ethical Business Culture" involves a bank keeping to its obligations and not deceiving or lying to 
others. It should also have a Code of Conduct describing how its employees will behave and the quality 
standards of its product or service. It will exhibit openness, as an ethical business has nothing to hide other 
than, perhaps, its competitive strategies. Finally, an ethical business is judged by its treatment of its staff 
and others and seeks to enhance its connection with them. 
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However, a bank’s operative goals (goals that banks use on a day-to-day basis) are the 
adaption of formal ethical standards into actual behaviours, but, as has been seen above, 
they are not always adhered to.152 Moreover, corporate culture can be a double-edged 
sword if the culture of a financial institution is a purely short-term business culture, that is, 
one seeking to maximise profit above all else. It is then this very culture that will lead to 
ethical problems (Hardowar, 2017). When the headline “bank returns to profit” or “bank 
achieves record profits” gains the readership of banks’ plaudits, unethical behaviour can 
remain hidden until a future date. 
 
Businesses are constantly adjusting to changes in their environment. This results in a 
tension between official goals ("espoused values"), which describe the business's mission, 
and the business’s operative goals. The competing tensions affect the way decisions are 
made and how the business’s competing goals are reconciled. Espoused values are found in 
an organisation’s mission statement and official reports (Fichter, 2016).  However, as can 
be seen from the expressed core values of the major banks listed at the commencement of 
this chapter, what an organisation says is not the same as what an organisation actually 
does (Schein, 2004). An expression of core values is mainly for public relations purposes. 
What is expected by shareholders and facilitated by bankers who are rewarded by their 
share profits made by the bank, is the maximum return on their shareholding, whilst at the 
same time seeking to minimise accusations that they are behaving unethically. 
  
A further complication for a bank may lie with its history as an organisation. This occurs 
when different sections of a company may have different subsidiaries each with their own 
ethical standards. The challenge for an organisation is to "close the gap" between its 
articulated standards and actual practice. The frequently changing operational goals, which 
are typical in the finance industry, may affect the quality of an individual's EDM (ethical 
decision-making), and the lack of certainty of operating goals makes it harder to identify 
problems within the bank. In addition, defensive routines come to the fore when employees 
are faced with challenging situations.  These may prevent constructive internal debate and 
often cause escalating errors (Fichter, 2016). With such conflicting ethical considerations, 
an easier path is to pursue the more obvious objective of maximising shareholder value. 
 
                                              
152 For example: Lehman Bros (Stevens & Buechler, 2013). 
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A further suggestion for cultural change in order to embed a change in ethical standards is 
the establishment of a banking profession or professions.153 The rationale for this is that 
professions observe ethics that go further than legal obligations as it is seen as a 
professional duty to serve the client. Professions such as the law, medicine or education 
exemplify not just a duty to the clients, patients or pupils but also have an understanding of 
the importance of a duty to the system as a whole, for example, the Hippocratic Oath, or 
the duty of a lawyer to the court (Law and Ethics in Finance Project, 2015). 
 
The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS), ( Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking, 2013) was set up to report on professional standards and culture 
in banks. Whilst it recognised the changes in the banking industry as a result of 
technology, globalisation and forms of remuneration as factors which restrained individual 
behaviour in banking culture, it failed to mention the former Institute of Bankers.  In fact, 
the Commission recommended a professional body for bankers, which it believed would 
be a significant factor in itself, and act as a tool for cultural change. Nevertheless, it 
recognised that such a professional body could be at least a generation away.  If banking 
were to be considered as a profession, the question arises of "who is the client?" In the case 
of the other professions mentioned, the overriding duty is to the patient, pupil or client 
(with companion duties to a professional body, education authority or the court). In the 
case of a bank, is the duty to the employer, the bank shareholder to maximise RoE or to the 
customer? This is particularly important where the financial services are proprietary154 and 
a banker is trading on behalf of the bank itself, rather than on behalf of a customer. Given 
the pressures to maximise profits, it is difficult to see how there would not be a conflict 
between professional duty and shareholder profit in a joint-stock bank.155  
 
The culture of organisations and, in particular of banks, often fails because it only looks at 
financial reward: 
                                              
153 In 1979 the President of the Chartered Institute of Bankers expressed the objective that the role of the 
Institute was to equip bankers to become better qualified and occupy more senior positions within their 
profession as quoted in a book for the Institute's 100th anniversary in which "profession featured in the 
book title (Green, 1979, p. 154). It will be noted that this speech was made prior to the "Big Bang" and 
before Charles Green was writing about the future of ethics in banking (Green, 1989). The idea that banking 
was a profession has declined since that time and the Chartered Institute of Bankers, having been the 
Institute of Financial Services, is now the London Institute for Banking and Finance. It is purely an 
organisation for giving tuition and does not speak of any professional duty. 
154 Proprietary trading  is when a trader trades in stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, their derivatives, 
or other financial instruments, with the banks  owning money rather than the a depositors' cash, so as to   
profit  itself. 
155 However, if there were an alternative banking structure as suggested in section 4.4.4 below, the same 




“Organisations often punish unethical behaviour but do not reward those who ‘‘do 
the right thing.’’ Indeed, ethical behaviour is assumed as part of the job. 
Organisations already understand the power of incentives to drive behaviour and 
should consider using tools such as compensation, promotion, and recognition to 
celebrate actions that support and strengthen an organization’s ethical standards” 
(Group of Thirty, 2015). 
 
An example of how good conduct is not rewarded can be seen in how bankers are 
rewarded for bringing in high-quality/low-risk new clients, but received no recognition if 
they decline lower-quality/high-risk clients (Hill, 2012). However, as the profit motive and 
the return for shareholders is the major concern of a joint-stock bank,156 it is difficult to 
envisage a situation where bank employees could be rewarded for not bringing in business 
when pressure is put on them to do so in order to receive their bonuses. Research makes 
clear that cultural processes have to be aligned with goals and formal mechanisms to 
emphasise required behaviour and gives the example of bankers’ incentive schemes 
(Fichter, 2016); (Hill 2012). This also relates back to the statement by Bank Governor 
Tarullo, referred to above,157 in which he asked whether bank employees understood their 
job was to maximise profits provided they remained lawful, or did they believe they were 
working within a broader set of principles (Tarullo, 2014). It appears that the answer to his 
rhetorical question is that EDM in its basic form is insufficient to improve bankers’ 
behaviour, which has led other writers to suggest improvements to the concept of EDM. 
 
However, as bank employees fall into Kohlberg's category of “conventional level-
conformity” and by working in a large hierarchical organisation, they would follow 
behaviour that is accepted by others, either superiors or long-time co-workers within the 
bank. Attempts to introduce Ethical Decision-Making or a changed culture will always 
confront the problem of RoE; a joint-stock bank’s legal objective is to return profit for 
shareholders. Whatever soothing ethical words a bank leadership may speak, as Karen Ho 
observed, bank employees are judged on the income generated for shareholders (Ho, 
2009); they will not be judged on their words but on the profits they make. Accordingly, 
attempts to embed an ethical culture provide moral strength or ethical learning will always 
                                              
156 A Joint-Stock Bank is a bank which is a public limited company and which issue shares that are owned by 
investors rather than by an institution or government as a mutual.  
 




be subject to the ultimate test of how much profit the bank has made. 
3.11 Conclusions: Returning to the Limits Regulation 
The second chapter considered whether regulation would be able to solve the problems of 
banks. It concluded that banks sought to avoid, manipulate or change regulation with the 
purpose of enabling the maximisation profits. This chapter has considered whether a 
change in culture could embed ethics and moral behaviour to ensure that banks not only 
followed the letter of regulation, but also the intent of that regulation for the protection and 
well-being of customers and society as a whole. 
 
This chapter has reviewed the limits of regulation: the failure to control bankers because of 
a failed ethos, skewed remuneration and bonus schemes, protection against financial risk 
by the limited liability of the companies for which they work and the TBTF position of 
many banks. An imbalance of resources between the wealthy banks and public sector 
funded regulators has added to the problems, as has the inability to regulate all banking 
behaviour and keep up with the financial structures created by bankers. In addition, banks 
have sought to ‘say the right thing’ in expressing core values and issuing codes of conduct, 
while continuing to put profit first in order to provide their shareholders with RoE. The 
continuing search for legal loopholes in regulations and the use of considerable resources 
to pay lobbyists to get the regulations changed shows that the commitment is to 
maximising profit, rather than ethical or moral concerns.  
 
Externalising risk and searching for loopholes in regulation had become an object of pride, 
with the justification that “everybody’s doing it" and by a sub-community where bankers 
work long hours together and are detached from the rest of society developing a "silo 
mentality" (Hill, 2012); (Tett, 2015). Regulation was also "significantly hindered" by the 
problem of the ethos of banking and the realisation that this was not just an issue confined 
to rogue bankers, but an industry-wide problem. According to this assessment it is not a 
question of a few “bad apples” but of the “apple barrel”, meaning that it is not just random 
employees who cause the problem, but it is the problem running through the whole 
organisation (Hill, 2012). 
 
This chapter then assessed ways that different disciplines had considered that failure of 
ethics and morality.  Ideas from anthropology, organisational and social psychology, 
including those of TBTF, short-termism and the culture of insecurity together with the 
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problem of excessive bonuses were examined. In addition, the psychology of bankers was 
considered. It argued that reliance on changes in culture fail to take into account the 
behaviour of individuals, their desire for financial reward and the high love-of-money. 
Next the relevance and impact of social science theories including Cognitive Moral 
Development and Ethical Decision-Making (“EDM”), as well as theories of Organisational 
Development and Adult Learning were considered, as were recommendations for changes 
that could improve ethics in banking. 
 
The argument made in this chapter is that whilst these theories explain different aspects of 
bankers’ behaviour, and while some of the suggestions and recommendations had 
considerable merit, it is unlikely that on their own or in combination, any of them will 
succeed. The drivers are fundamentally too great in the existing banking culture, in which 
all the major banks are joint-stock banks (as are almost all UK financial institutions). Other 
forms of corporate organisations (for example, public, cooperative or mutual) form such a 
small part of the market that their influence is insignificant. In the existing system the 
pressures from shareholders to maximise profit and to achieve the best RoE, are always 
stronger than good intentions to improve ethical leadership and moral business culture. In 
the end, bankers regard their duty to their shareholders and because of the remuneration 
system, which is linked to profits; they have a joint enterprise with the shareholders. As 
long as the goal is one of maximising return on shareholdings, ethical behaviour will 
always take second place. 
 
Combining the “soft” tools of ethics, leadership or culture to the inherent problems in 
banking identified by the different disciplines in order to effect changes in bankers’ 
behaviour is unlikely to succeed. What is required is a totally new approach. In the 
concluding chapter, opportunities for further research into the changes in the legal structure 
















4. Chapter 4: Conclusions and proposals for 
future Research 
Polonius: “Neither a borrower nor a lender be, for loan oft loses both itself, and 
friend and borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry (Shakespeare, 1599–1601). 
 
“Without reform of the financial system, another crisis is certain, and the failure 
... to   tackle the disequilibrium in the world economy makes it likely that it will 
come sooner rather than later” (King, 2010). 
 
4.1 Banking - the continuing problem 
Over 400 years separated the above quotations and yet they are linked. In the first, 
Polonius is warning his over-adventurous son, Laertes, who is about to leave for a young 
man’s education in Paris. No doubt, Polonius was concerned about the expense. However, 
the social context for this comment by Polonius in Shakespeare's Hamlet was the 
extravagance in the late Elizabethan court where the aristocracy were borrowing to spend 
and having to sell off their lands and manors to pay for their extravagance (Stone, 1952). 
 
Four hundred years later, the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 was also preceded by a boom in 
consumer spending and borrowing. The difference, however, was that the 16th century 
Elizabethan extravagance was confined to a small section of society, whereas in the period 
before 2007-2008, financialisation, as described above158 led to far higher levels of 
spending and borrowing by those living beyond their means. The effect of over borrowing 
by the public led to the Financial Crisis 2007-2008, yet the passage of time has brought a 
forgetfulness of such concerns. The temptations to consumers of cheap car credit and low-
rate mortgages have led personal borrowing to rise to record levels (Eliott, 2017). The 
former Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, writes that another financial crisis 
is certain to come in the not too distant future ( (King, 2016, p. 334 of 432).The credit 
boom cannot be controlled by raising interest rates, through fear that the recovery from the 
Financial Crisis 2007-2008 will not be sustained (King, 2016, p. 335 of 432), or through 
                                              
158 See section 1.3 Financialisation and Return on Equity (“RoE”)above. 
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large state subventions to support TBTF banks  as it only “perpetuates an underlying 
disequilibrium” (King, 2016, p. 367). King maintains: 
 
"Only a fundamental rethink of how we, as a society, organise our system of money 
and banking will prevent a repetition of the crisis that we experienced in 2008” 
(King, 2016, p. 287) . 
 
In Chapter 1, the importance of banks in facilitating a growing economy and the historic 
problem the banks have, in that they "borrow short and lend long", was examined. A new 
problem was identified, namely, the growth of financialisation and demands of 
shareholders for RoE. This exacerbated the historic problem, as the more the bank can lend 
the greater the RoE. Such lending is fuelled by a human instinct to overconsume.159 
However, the effects of financialisation, which led to a failure of wage growth, resulted in 
the average worker, disappointed at their stagnant living standards, using easy credit to 
purchase goods and services promoted to improve their lifestyles. In addition, such 
pressures to produce RoE for their shareholders, incentivised bankers, who, in turn, 
through their bonuses, shared in the profits that were made and encouraged them to act in 
ways that were illegal or unethical. 
 
This dissertation has proposed that the two suggestions for dealing with the problems 
caused by banks were further regulation and improvement in the ethics and culture of 
banks and bankers. This dissertation has further proposed that neither improvements in 
regulation nor ethics, singularly or together, would be successful because of the overriding 
pressure from shareholders to maximise profits and achieve the highest RoE. 
 
Chapter 2 considered regulation, with particular reference to capital adequacy. It was 
shown that by increasing the amount of share capital a bank had to hold to meet customers’ 
calls for return of their deposits, there was an adverse effect on the ability to produce 
higher returns on equity. It was further shown that banks, by way of lobbying, sought to 
reduce the amount that had to be held by virtue of the Basel accords (and in particular 
                                              
159It has been suggested that evolution has not developed humans as hunter gatherers, where there were 
shortages and what was found or hunted was consumed at once. Todays consumerist society -where credit 
can be obtained easily- allows for short-term consumption, where the brain cannot control the desire for 




Basel III). Further, it was demonstrated that the importance of RoE gave bankers the 
opportunity to ‘adjust’ risk weighted assets by giving them a lower risk rating than should 
otherwise be the case. Similarly, there was pressure not to write off bad loans, because it 
would affect capital adequacy. Finally, by using off balance sheet entities, bankers could 
reduce the loans on their books and, therefore, lend more with the same amount of capital. 
The question was posed whether reform of bankers’ conduct would overcome such 
problems 
 
In Chapter 3, the question was asked as to whether steps that have been taken to improve 
the conduct of bankers through embedding ethics, cultural change or better leadership 
would be successful. The concept of Ethical Decision Making as propounded by Kohlberg 
was considered, together with social science additions, such as Organisational Theory. The 
dissertation demonstrated that, notwithstanding the work undertaken to improve the culture 
within banking organisations, the fundamental purpose of such organisations remained. As 
joint-stock banks, their criteria for success are not how ethical their conduct is but how 
much they contribute to profits available to shareholders. It could not be demonstrated that 
changes in culture had overcome the need for RoE to take precedence. In fact, in relation to 
the question of leadership it was shown that the bankers who are most highly regarded are 
those producing the most profits.  
 
Accordingly, neither greater regulation nor enhanced ethics will be successful in 
controlling the excesses of banks because of the inherent pressure of RoE. Mervyn King is 
not the only voice suggesting that there will be another banking crisis. The Bank of 
England itself is saying, "History shows that there are two things we can be sure of when it 
comes to financial crises: there will be another one, and the next one won’t be the same as 
the last" (Bank of England Knowledge Bank , 2017). 
 
4.2 Suggestions for reform 
 
If, as suggested above, neither regulation nor embedding a culture of ethics will succeed in 
resolving the problems of banks and, if as the former Governor of the Bank of England, 
Mervyn King suggests, another crisis is inevitable, what is suggested to address the 
problem? Mervyn King suggested that central banks should become "Pawnbroker(s) for all 
Seasons" (King, 2010, p. 268). In effect, this is an extension of the call to end fractional 
88 
 
banking (narrow banking”) referred to above (section 2.5) 160. Banks, in effect, would have 
to pledge their assets in advance to the central bank and would then be able to lend only up 
to the value that the central bank placed on those assets. The Bank of England speaks of its 
own reforms. These are, firstly, stress tests161, secondly, a £85,000 Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme operated by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and which protects 
customers’ bank deposits, thirdly a form of ring fencing is being introduced.162  The Bank 
of England also now boasts that as there is a living will scheme for banks: "the general 
public will not pay the price when things go wrong. In the new set-up, there is no need for 
bailouts" (Bank of England Knowledge Bank , 2017). 
 
By the Bank of England's admission there will be further banking crises and the 
precautions that it is taking only deal with the symptoms (the excesses of banks) rather 
than the cause (the desire for maximum RoE). After all, for a century prior to Northern 
Rock there had not been a bank run. 
 
It is suggested that the limited liability of banks encourages risky behaviour by bankers and 
that it could be replaced by ‘covenant banking’ This involves senior bankers in a bank 
pledging to make a specific payment in the event of loss, or pledge assessable stock which 
would be forfeited in the event of a bank’s default (Hill and Painter, 2015, Kindle locations 
1838, 2374 & 2918) . Such proposals do not consider the possibility of indemnities from 
the bank or insurance schemes to protect their managers against any claims. Accordingly, 
any such proposals would need careful consideration and further research. 
 
This dissertation suggests that rather than expecting that regulation or ethics within the 
existing structure of a joint-stock bank will be successful in dealing with the problems of 
banks, alternative legal structures should be considered, as it is the pressure for RoE that 
continues to be a cause of problems of banks as well as problematic behaviour of bankers. 
                                              
160 See section 2.5 above.  
161 See footnote 136 above. 
162 Ring-fencing requires a bank to separate its investment and trading division from its retail banking, which 
was a central recommendation of the Vickers report (Independent Commission on Banking, 2011). Deposits 
from customers and small businesses would be within the ring fenced (retail) part of the bank and 
protected from the proprietary trading activities of the investment bank section. However, as indicated in 
section 2.4 above, the banks lobbied to minimise the effects of ring fencing. They were allowed to share 
profits, transact and cross-sell products between the ring- fenced and the non-ring-fenced sections and 
intragroup lending. The result was described "as lenient as the banks could reasonably have hoped" 
(Binham, 2015); (Smith, 2015). 
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It is accepted that the existing joint-stock Banks will not disappear, but that by the growth 
of a far larger not-for-profit sector within banking, that sector may be able to control the 
excesses of joint-stock banks that result from the pressure for RoE. Further research should 
investigate whether customers would be attracted to banks that conduct themselves 
ethically163 (Ernst & Young, 2010). Secondly, such research would consider whether - if 
the level of conduct improves in one part of the banking industry - it is likely to affect 
other participants and thirdly, whether as existing research shows, a less expensive not-for-
profit sector would attract the support of sufficient customers to make it able to compete 
with the existing, profit-driven banks (Casu, 2015). Finally, alternative legal structures for 
banks would be opposed by the lobbyists acting on behalf of joint-stock banks. They 
would, in principle, be subject to takeovers and the desire of those in the not-for-profit 
banking sector would look enviously at the remuneration of those in the joint-stock banks. 
Accordingly, research would have to be undertaken to consider ways of ensuring that such 
alternative legal structures did not themselves convert to becoming joint-stock banks or 
being taken over by them.  
4.3 Why not rely on shareholder control? 
In Chapter 2, it was shown that the use of regulation in controlling banks was undermined 
by the predominant effect of maximising RoE/shareholder value. In Chapter 3, it was 
shown that the use of ethics, leadership and organisational theory was also unsuccessful, 
because of the same pressure for RoE/shareholder value, which ultimately, always 
overrides moral criteria. If the pressure to maximise RoE /shareholder value is the major 
influence, it must be considered whether shareholders, who are the beneficiaries of RoE, 
are able to control bankers. If they are able to do so, then there would be no need to 
consider alternative structures in order to overcome the problems of banks and bankers. 
 
There is a view that if the shareholders are passive and that if they were to be less passive 
they would be able to exercise control over directors and prevent the problems that led to 
the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 (Dignam, 2013, p. 640); (Stout, 2007). 
 
However, this view of shareholder involvement is flawed for several reasons. Firstly, the 
legal nature of a "share" and therefore the rights of a "shareholder", are difficult to define. 
                                              
163 a report prepared by Ernst and Young found that as a result of the Financial Crisis 2007-2008,  45% of 
Europeans have lost trust in their bankers. This rose to 56% in the UK, while 60% of those in Germany said 
the financial crisis had made no difference in their opinion and trust of their banks. A number of 
respondents said that lack of trust and ethics were a consideration in any decision to change banks (Ernst & 
Young, 2010, p. 5 and 15). 
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If a company were to be wound up the shareholders would receive a payment, provided the 
bank was solvent. However, holding shares in a company does not give a right to corporate 
assets (Ireland, 1999). There is an ambiguity between the corporate shareholder having a 
status similar to that of the debenture holder or a "rentier" and the view that shareholders 
have "ownership". It is   also misleading to consider that the relationship between directors 
and shareholders is that of agent and principal (Ireland, 1999, p. 12).  Having let go of a 
company's assets, it is argued that shareholders have given up the right to have the 
company act in only the shareholders’ interests (Ireland, 1999, p. 25). Ireland argues that 
corporations should not be regarded as being capable of being owned by shareholders as 
they are in fact a network of personal and business relationships with a common social 
purpose. Accordingly, increased shareholder activity, would look to the selfish interests of 
maximising shareholder value rather than those of society. It must therefore be asked if 
increasing shareholder control would assist any more in controlling banks than the 
promotion of shareholder interests in maximising RoE (Ireland, 1999). 
 
Secondly, the view that there could be ‘shareholder stewardship’ is a misinterpretation, 
because it requires a perhaps out-dated view that shareholders consist of ‘ordinary’ people 
and institutional investors (insurance companies and pension funds) who take a long-term 
view of their involvement in providing stewardship of their companies (Ireland, 1999, p. 
19); (Dignam, 2013, p. 640). In fact, research has shown that from 2005 most of the 
shareholders were no longer the traditional institutional investors and private individuals, 
but were passive shareholders from overseas; secondly, they were often very short-term 
holders of shares comprising of activist hedge funds, or traders making profits on the 
volatility of shares and computers using algorithms to trade (Dignam, 2013). Indeed, the 
effect of promoting greater shareholder powers will be the exacerbation of pressures for 
short-term returns by taking greater risks (Admati, 2017, p. 138).  
 
Whilst prior to financialisation, directors would often consider that they ran companies not 
just for their shareholders but also for other stakeholders, such as employees and the wider 
community, this has been replaced by the view that company boards have a primary duty 
to current shareholders to the exclusion of other stakeholders, which when combined with 
incentivised remuneration packages makes it a more desirable option for directors 
(Dignam, 2013). The interests of directors, senior managers and traders then combine to 
achieve the maximisation of shareholder value/RoE, and thus the directors’ prime aim 




In this way, closer shareholder involvement increases the problems of banks by demanding 
a short-term maximisation of RoE, rather than seeking to control them through long-term 
shareholder stewardship.  
4.4 Could banks with alternative legal structures help? Opportunities for 
future research 
If neither regulation nor ethics and cultural change are successful in dealing with the 
problems of banks and the behaviour of bankers, because of the primary pressure of 
maximising shareholder value in a joint stock bank, is there the possibility of having other 
legal structures that are not subject to the pressures of maximising shareholder value? 
 
Using Mintzberg's theory of organisational configurations framework164 (Mintzberg, 
1992), banks can be seen as organisations which are "a divisionalised form."  They have 
set procedures, tight control systems and their key parts use standardised outputs as a 
prime method of coordination which in many ways, resemble a bureaucracy. This structure 
is likely to be the same whether a bank is joint-stock with shareholders or with another 
form of ownership. Further research could be directed at looking at such alternative 
structures to see whether they overcome the fundamental problem identified in this 
dissertation that the requirement to maximise shareholder value/RoE is the determinant 
force in a joint-stock bank. If such alternative banks could overcome the problem of 
maximising shareholder value, so that the behaviour of those banks is to act responsibly, 
ethically and to not just adhere to the letter but the spirit of regulations, then it is suggested 
that not only will customers be drawn to them, but if they constitute a large enough section 
of the banking market then their positive and ethical influence would affect other banks 
and bankers. 
 
Moreover, it is unlikely that there will be a nationalisation of existing banks, even if it were 
to be considered desirable. Indeed, when the UK government had the opportunity to 
nationalise banks during the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, it initially declined, ultimately 
only doing so at arm’s length through UK Financial Investments Limited. In any event, the 
process of financialisation has given banks lobbying power and importance within the 
                                              
164 In the Organizational Configurations Framework business management theorist Henry Mintzberg 
classified organisational structures into five types: The entrepreneurial organisation, the machine 
organisation (e.g. a bureaucracy), the professional organisation (e.g. a law firm), the divisional (diversified) 
organisation (a central autonomous HQ) and finally, the innovative organisation ("adhocracy" e.g. a 




financial structure to ensure that this would be too difficult politically.  In effect, the 
banking cartel that existed for most of the 20th century gave the state a hegemonic 
relationship with banks, so all that was required was the ‘raising an eyebrow by the 
Governor of the Bank of England’ (Binham, 2015) to gain compliance. However, Bank 
lending is about the assessment of the risk of lending. In the old banking cartel, bank 
managers were reluctant to take risks. In alternative legal structures, there would be no 
personal incentive for bankers to take risks, because their remuneration would be salaried 
rather than linked to the profits that come from taking risks. In addition, in an institution 
where caution was valued, they would be criticised for a bad lending decision. This would 
further deter risk taking to assist business ventures that might become successful, but 
would not have the opportunity without a lender taking a risk on their behalf. Accordingly, 
future research would have to consider a balance between risk taking, which may provide 
advantages in supporting lending ventures which may initially prove unattractive, and 
avoidance of the problems that banks have experienced. 
 
Whilst there were suggestions that there could be alternative ways of dealing with the 
return of shares held by UK Financial Investments Ltd other than by sale of shares (Hope, 
2011), the final shares in Lloyds Bank have been sold (Treanor, 2017) and the Royal Bank 
of Scotland shares are waiting to be sold at an appropriate time (N M Rothschild & Sons 
Limited, 2015). Given that the UK Government has tended to defer to the City and the 
pressure of those who believe in maximising RoE, it is, perhaps, not surprising that this 
was the outcome (Froud, 2010); (Froud, 2011); (Bryan & al, 2012). 
 
In order to overcome the problems that were found in the banking system, the UK 
Parliament (H of C Treasury Committee, 2011) recommended that there should be more 
competition. However, such competition was not suggested to be outside of the existing 
joint-stock bank model, which as, has been demonstrated above is not subject to the 
pressures to maximise RoE. Virgin Money has taken over the remnants Northern Rock 
(Virgin Money, 2012) (Fantato, 2017). Lloyds Bank has hived off a number of its former 
branches into a new TSB which it sold to Banc Sabadell (Banc Sabadell, 2015). A proposal 
by Royal Bank of Scotland to divest Williams & Glyn’s was abandoned following 
concerns about Brexit (BBC News, 2017).  The Green Investment Bank was established 
with government support in 2012 (DTI, 2012) with the intention of raising private sector 
money to fund environmentally friendly private sector projects. Eventually, it was sold to 
an Australian financial services conglomerate, Macquarie Group Limited. Each of these 
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banks has been taken over by existing joint-stock companies, so their joint-stock 
shareholder model is no different from existing banks. 
 
There has been some academic consideration of the possibility of alternative models to 
those of joint-stock banks.  CRESC165  have undertaken work considering the failure of 
existing joint-stock banks. Using “Critical Business Model Analysis”166 (Froud, et al., 
2016). The study considered the business models of banks as opposed to the markets in 
which they operated, which were considered to be uncompetitive. The analysis undertaken 
considered the conflicting interests between shareholders who required RoE, and effects on 
customers (for example, mis-selling of financial products, unclear charges and cross 
subsidies). The study recognised that maximising returns for shareholder value/RoE which 
focused on short-term indicative or on stock market pricing of shares, were “entrenched” 
and made a general suggestion that alternative models could be considered, but no specific 
recommendations were made as to what such alternative banking models might be. The 
study confined itself to making recommendations to change the manner in which such 
joint-stock banks should act. Accordingly, the work recognised the problem but did not 
consider the solution of alternative corporate banking structures. 
 
While such research could look at, as yet, unidentified models, many of the alternative 
models for banking structures have, as will be seen below, already exist. It should be 
considered whether such alternative models not only have a cooperative/neutral/non-profit-
making organisational basis, but how they can compete in a market where they are likely to 
start smaller when facing the “Big 4”167. Ultimately, because of the problems of “new 
entrants” having sufficient capital to run a business, without the considerations of capital 
required to meet regulatory purposes, the “Big 4” are likely to win and the smaller banks 
will either collapse or in turn, sell their shares to the hegemonic Big 4 banks. 
 
This dissertation suggests that there should be further research to consider whether banking 
structures with different ownership models to those of joint-stock banks could overcome 
the problem of the predominant pressure to maximise shareholder value. There are, 
however, limited opportunities to consider new structures that have been created since the 
Financial Crisis 2007-2008. There are a number of new “Challenger Banks" which have 
                                              
165 Centre for Research in Socio-Cultural Change, University of Manchester 
166 Critical Business Model analysis is a generally accepted a generally accepted way of analysing challenges 
choice and development of organisations (Baden-Fuller & Morgan, 2010). 
167 Lloyds, Barclays, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland. 
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been established since 2010. Currently, these include Atom Bank, Metro Bank, Monese, 
Monzo and Starling Bank. The best known, Metro Bank, seeks to distinguish itself by 
offering seven-day week branch banking. Some offer banking services that are limited to 
smartphone applications. If these banks were to grow as large as the "Big 4" then their 
model is identical to those of the existing banks and there is nothing to suggest that they 
would become anything different. It is hard to believe that the owners of such banks are 
not building them to the stage where they cannot be or bought out by a larger financial 
institution as the objective of the shareholders is to get the best return on their 
shareholdings. The history of new entrants into banking has been problematic, as the 
transformation of building societies to banks has shown. It was, after all, the attempt by the 
UK Government to create competition to the major UK banks following the Building 
Societies Act, 1986 that led to the demutualisation of Building Societies. However, this 
was unsuccessful, as they could not compete with the “Big 4”. Either those 1980s building 
societies became challenger banks and were taken over by competitors or failed in the 
Financial Crisis 2007-2008. (Froud, et al., 2016); (Klimecki & Willmott, 2009). 
 
As illustrated above, banks continue to seek maximisation of RoE, because that is the 
accepted purpose of such joint-stock banks and it binds the senior employees in profit-
making schemes with maximising shareholder value for mutual wealth creation., It is 
proposed that an area for further research should thus be alternative banking structures that 
are not dependent on the need to provide shareholders with maximum profits and RoE. 
 
However, before the rise of financialisation, alternative (not-for-profit) financial 
institutions were important parts of the banking system. Building Societies developed from 
the 18th century as a mutual movement.168 However from more than 2000 building 
societies at the start of the 20th century only 44 remain (Casu, 2015). Building societies 
were given increased powers through the 1980s, so that they could compete and offer 
similar services to banks (Marshall, 1997). They also were given the opportunity to 
demutualise and either issue shares themselves or merge with other institutions, which was 
a course many of them took (Tayler, 2003). Following the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 a 
survey showed that the remaining building societies were regarded more favourably by 
customers than banks and inspired more trust (Atkinson, 2011).  
 
                                              
168 For definition of mutual see footnote 111. 
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Nevertheless, during the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 a number of building societies 
encountered difficulties. N & P were involved in a mis-selling scandal. The Nationwide 
Building Society169 had to take on the three failing societies and others had to merge 
(Womack, 2010).The Britannia Building Society, which had a public sector link through 
NALGO170 was taken over by the Co-operative Bank and led to the Co-op Bank’s 
downfall (Kelly, 2014). It appears that their problems arose largely because they had left 
their traditional borrowing and lending patterns, which followed the deregulation permitted 
by the Building Societies Act 1986. Building Societies competed with banks and in the 
early 1990s prior to demutualisation, achieved RoE at least as great as those of the joint-
stock banks allowing them to build up reserves greater than would have been required for 
regulatory purposes or to assist with future growth (Tayler, 2003). It was suggested that 
this was a strategy to enhance the value in preparation for demutualisation. (Llewellyn & 
Holmes, 1991). The conduct of building society managers was also called into question as 
it was suggested that they looked favourably on demutualisation as they believed it would 
increase their remuneration and give them share options. Further research is required to 
consider whether such problems arose from the desire to see themselves as competitors to 
joint-stock banks or whether such conduct arose because the building society managers 
were looking to future RoE, even before demutualisation. It may be that the problem itself 
stems from the predominance of RoE; the course followed by these building societies and 
their senior managers may be a reflection of the predominant ethos of RoE, resulting from 
the dominance of the joint-stock banks and the rewards received by their managers in 
comparison with their building society counterparts together with the pressures towards 
Financialisation. Future research would have to consider how this dichotomy could be 
addressed. In addition, any further research would have to address the problem of who 
ensures that the any new mutual bank would not fall prey to “carpetbaggers”171.  
 
An alternative business structure to those of joint-stock banks (and of Building Societies) 
was the Trustee Savings Bank (the "TSB"). The TSB set up as many local banks from the 
                                              
169 The Nationwide Building Society was known as the Co-operative Permanent Building Society  until 1970 
when it changed its name. 
170 NALGO: National Association of Local Government Officers (a trade union) 
171 "Carpetbagger": a term originally from the post-Civil War period of the United States. Carpetbaggers 
were from the northern states and came south to take advantage of the defeated Confederacy. There were 
so named because they kept luggage made out of recycled carpet. In the period of demutualisation of 
building societies carpetbaggers became members of mutual building societies in order to vote to make 
them demutualise and gain windfall profits. The BBC detailed website article contains numerous interviews 
and information about how building societies attempted to counteract carpet bagging (BBC, 1999 ). 
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beginning of the 19th century with cooperative and philanthropic principles.172 Its 
customers were, generally, not wealthy, but were craftsmen and workers. The monies paid 
into the TSBs were deposited into government stock through the Bank of England and 
were safe for borrowers who had little financial experience. By the middle of the 20th 
century the combined Trustee Savings Bank movement was the size of one of the four 
clearing banks (Marshall, 1985). In Germany, however, the equivalent of the TSB, still 
continues as Sparkasse and Landesbanken in public ownership (Carnevali, 2005). It is also 
suggested by this dissertation that the German system of banking requires further 
comparative research 173 as it is estimated that some 82% of banking organisations with 
44% of banking assets are not required to maximise shareholder value (Hufner, 2010). 
Research would examine whether the predominance of such public banks in Germany 
influences the behaviour of joint-stock banks. It is clear from the German example that 
alternative banking structures can exist and form a sizeable part of a country's banking 
system (Hufner, 2010). Indeed, a comparison between banking in Germany and Britain and 
comparisons of the lending to business by banks in each country would be an area for 
further research as it is suggested that the German model has been of greater advantage to 
German business (Carnevali, 2005). 
 
The 1960s and 1970s saw a number of government initiatives in banking that were not 
owned by joint-stock shareholders, including the creation of National Girobank as part of 
the General Post Office in 1968, from the Post Office Savings Bank.174 Although public 
sector organisations do not have a good reputation for being innovative, National Girobank 
                                              
172 The TSB guaranteed depositors savings which could be fully withdrawn with interest. The funds held by 
the TSB were transferred to the Bank of England to service the National Debt, which allowed the guarantee 
to be given to depositors. The "Trustees" of the TSB were voluntary and received no financial benefit (Batiz-
Lazo & Maixe-Altes, 2006). 
173 Banks in Germany fall into three categories. Firstly, there are joint-stock banks such as Commerzbank or 
Deutsche Bank, which comprise about 33% of banking business volume and 1/10 of banking institutions in 
Germany. Secondly, there are cooperative banks, in which each member has one vote irrespective of the 
amount saved in the cooperative bank. Cooperative banks are the largest number of banking institutions 
and have about 10% volume of banking business in Germany. Finally, there are the publicly owned banks 
Sparkasse (savings banks) and Landesbanken (publicly owned regional wholesale banks), which comprise 
some 33% of banking volume in Germany. German joint-stock banks are not permitted to acquire public 
banks. (Hufner, 2010). Sparkasse play a particularly important role in the German economy in lending to 
small businesses (Carnevali, 2005, p. 146);  (Schulte, 2016).  
174 The first public sector bank to be established in over a century, it was the hope of the founders of the 
National Giro that it would enable many more people, especially those of restricted means to have banking 
facilities. (Davies G, 2002) (Kindle location 8081) In addition it was hoped that the Giro would become the 
country's main payment and clearing system. Initially loss-making, by the end of the 1970s, 25% of all cash 
deposits at banks were through the National Girobank and, by 1985 it had over two million customers. It 
was sold, as a UK government privatisation measure, to the Alliance & Leicester Building Society in 1990. 
Alliance & Leicester Building Society subsequently demutualised and following difficulties in the financial 
crisis 2007-2008 Alliance & Leicester was acquired by Banco Santander. 
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was the first bank to offer interest bearing current accounts, the first bank to offer a 
telephone banking service (before First Direct)  and was at the forefront of computerisation 
using Optical Character Reading. Not only was it a bank that had no associated scandal, 
but was also a forerunner in advancing technology and leading joint-stock banks in service 
to customers. 
 
Some banks established in the 1960s and 70s and are now almost forgotten. Finance for 
Industry Ltd was established by the UK government to provide medium-term finance to 
companies who had difficulty raising funds through the capital markets. A companion 
venture, Equity Capital for Industry Ltd, was set up in 1976 to be an 'equity bank' 
(Thomas, 2013). Neither of these public-sector ventures survived. Such organisations were 
not ones required to maximise shareholder value and could be examined to see whether 
their structures could be replicated and, if so, whether they would have a beneficial effect 
on improving banker behaviour. It is suggested that these historical examples, together 
with the transactions of the Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions 
(Wilson Committee, 1975) would be worthwhile areas of research as they would show 
thinking on banking reform prior to the onset of financialisation (Moore, 1981).   They 
would show that alternative models for banking other than the joint-stock bank have 
existed and have, in the case of the TSB and National Girobank, become of a sufficient 
size to compete with ‘Big 4’. Research will show why the pressures of financialisation and 
neo-Liberalism resulted in these non-profit maximising banks being 
privatised/demutualised and how their existence was in competition to the joint-stock 
banks and how they set a benchmark for the conduct of joint-stock banks. Further research 
will be necessary to consider how, if similar banks were to be established,175 they could 
avoid the pressures of financialisation to privatise/demutualise again. 
 
 
The joint-stock banks lobbied against the formation of National Girobank in the 1960s 
(Davies G, 2002). It is unlikely that such banks would be willing to support new entrants 
on either a public or mutual/cooperative basis. Any research would have to consider how 
any such new entrants could be protected from the power of the existing joint-stock banks. 
                                              
175 In addition, there are other forms of banking/savings institutions. For example, Credit unions are small 
mutual organisations that work as cooperatives. They assist members with financial matters particularly 
small-scale savings and borrowings. There are currently 424 listed credit unions. Credit unions are small but 






History provides models of alternative legal structures of banks, other than the joint-stock 
model, that had a sizeable market share. They may have been in the pre-financialisation, 
pre-Big Bang, era of Charles Green, where bankers considered their duty to be 
“stewardship on the basis of trust” and borrowing was difficult. However, as seen above, 
public banks continue to do well in other jurisdictions such as Germany.  There is an 
opportunity for further research to see whether such alternative banking structures could, if 
they managed to obtain sufficient market share, provide competition for customers and 
also assist in raising ethical standards of the banking industry which their joint-stock rivals 
would then be obliged to follow. 
 
 
Taming the Tiger? The truth is that tigers cannot be tamed. However, there are more 
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